



Daily Report

Supplement

China

Viewing China Through a Third Eye

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China SUPPLEMENT

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VIEWING CHINA THROUGH A THIRD EYE

FBIS Introduction

According to numerous reports in Hong Kong's China-watching press last year, the publication in early 1994 of *Viewing China Through a Third Eye*, Wang Shan's sweeping critique of the reform era under Deng Xiaoping, created a minor sensation among politically conscious, educated Chinese, and the book quickly attracted a wide readership among intellectuals and officials alike. A purported interview with Wang and his agent in the 7 January issue of the independent Hong Kong paper EASTERN EXPRESS (published in the FBIS DAILY REPORT on 9 January, pp. 18-20) claimed that the controversial work was initially praised by party General Secretary Jiang Zemin but within a short time was withdrawn from circulation by Beijing authorities. Although published under the name of a fictitious author, "Europe's most influential Sinologist" by the name of "Leninger," with Wang listed only as the translator, many reviewers, including those writing in PRC media, immediately questioned the book's authorship. Wang later acknowledged his authorship in an article published in the well-connected Hong Kong journal MING PAO YUEH KAN on 1 November 1994 (published in the FBIS DAILY REPORT on 2 November, pp. 23-26) and announced that he was writing a sequel to his book entitled *Viewing China Through a Fourth Eye*. The new book, he promised, would be a "discourse on politics." In a conversation with Wang published in Hong Kong's English-language SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST on 8 April (published in the FBIS DAILY REPORT on 10 April, pp. 29-30), Wang was quoted as saying that he had "received pressure from people high up in the central government" to not publish the sequel. He also said that the editor of the Shanxi People's Publishing House which published the first book had lost his job and that other publishers he had contacted have been warned not to handle the sequel. In addition, he complained that he had been unable to get a passport for a book promotion trip to Japan.

The *Third Eye* is a wide-ranging, if contradictory, polemic against the negative social, economic, and political consequences of Deng's reforms. Wang contends that reform is careening out of control, with the result that social dissolution and class conflict have emerged and are likely to culminate in a social explosion. He concludes that the era of reform has so eroded faith in Marxist-Leninist ideology and undermined the power and authority of the party-state that Beijing's leaders are no longer able to arrest these trends. Wang attacks efforts by foreign capitalist powers to undermine socialism from within and weaken China internationally, Deng's liberal policies toward peasants, the political ineffectiveness of intellectuals, and the corruption of cadres. Intellectuals, he says, are "incapable of independent thought," and

lack the maturity as well as "experience, ability, character, and prestige" to participate effectively in government. Cadres remain inept, corrupt, and imperious despite Mao's efforts to destroy the new bureaucratic ruling class in the Cultural Revolution. In perhaps the most provocative chapter in the book, Wang argues that the millions of peasants freed from the land by Deng's agricultural policies constitute a "great active volcano" which could "explode at any time" and which might even bring down the regime. Wang's prescription is to reconstitute ideological authority in the form of Mao Zedong Thought, reestablish a Mao-style leader, restore the authority of the central government, and reemphasize social equality.

Much of the controversy over Wang's book stems from his unabashedly conservative view of China's predicament and his unfavorable, if implicit, comparison of Deng's political acumen and leadership to that of Mao Zedong—especially Wang's sympathy with Mao's policy of using the coercive power of the state to keep peasants shackled to the land in order to pursue rapid industrialization. Wang also defends Mao's motives in launching the Cultural Revolution, praising Mao as a benevolent, idealistic leader who tried to overcome the gap between the common people and officials. Wang argues that the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution was that society did not have the necessary conditions to bring about Mao's vision of a nonbureaucratic, classless, democratic society.

In its direct praise for Jiang Zemin and Li Peng and subtle criticism of Deng and other top reformers, Wang's book appears to be a conscious effort to influence the current political debate in Beijing. In particular, his veiled but strong criticism of influential party elder Wan Li, a Deng ally, suggests that Wang may have had political protection from well-placed party conservatives. Without naming Wan, Wang criticizes a certain "provincial party secretary" for "not understanding China's peasants" and thus for promoting the "wrong" rural policies in the 1970's. Wan was the party secretary in Anhui province who pioneered the rural reforms later championed by Deng as the centerpiece of his early reform agenda.

Whatever Wang's political connections, his political leanings and analysis of contemporary trends reflect the growing fear and disillusionment of one segment of China's elite over the social consequences of reform. His views also tap into widespread public resentment of corruption and social inequality, concern over the "floating population" flooding China's cities, and general anxiety over the loss of ideological and moral direction. Although Wang's political views do not constitute a coherent body of ideas and do not fit neatly into any existing school of thought in China, they most closely resemble the ideas of the "neoauthoritarian" or "neocconservative" school that emerged in the late 1980's in response to Deng's reforms. The followers of this school, which includes ample representation from the children of high-ranking conservative cadres, are less concerned about purely ideological issues than their orthodox socialist predecessors. They advocate the recentralization of state economic and political power, limited market reforms, a nationalistic foreign policy, and the exercise of power by an authoritarian political elite.

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At least two reviews of *The Third Eye* were published in PRC media, a positive review in the popular Beijing weekly BEIJING QINGNIANBAO, published by the Beijing Municipal Party Committee's China Youth League branch, and a biting, critical review in the literary journal DU SHU by prominent reform writer and former culture minister Wang Meng. Like the book itself, the reviews appear to reflect the various political forces at play in the controversy surrounding it. The review in the 25 June 1994 issue of BEIJING QINGNIANBAO (published in the FBIS DAILY REPORT on 11 August 1994, pp. 20-21) praised the book for its "remarkable insights" and claimed that it had "struck home" among Chinese readers. In a brief summary of the author's views, the review stressed the commonalities between Mao and Deng, praised the book for criticizing theories that embrace "the market as all-powerful" and "democracy as utopia" and noted that because of the book, people can now "take a more cautious attitude" toward markets and democracy and support an approach more "in conformity with China's national conditions." The review heralded public discussion of the book as "extremely beneficial."

Wang Meng's sarcastic put-down of the book appeared in the September issue of DU SHU (published in the FBIS DAILY REPORT on 6 January, pp. 8-11). Although Wang allowed that he had "great admiration" for some of the author's views—such as his warning that expectations of "quick profits and immediate success" would threaten reform, and his criticism of foreign interference in China's affairs—Wang stated that "the more I read the more frightened I became, and at times I was gripped by absolute terror." It is "one thing to point out the risks of reform," he said, "but can there be stability without reform? Should we restore the Qing dynasty?" Criticizing in turn each of the major themes in the book, Wang reserved special contempt for the author's defense of Mao's exploitation of peasants. Accusing the author of approving continued starvation of peasants even today to boost industrialization, Wang asked rhetorically whether "a policy of starving people is more conducive to developing the productive forces than a policy of making them rich?" Such a stance, he said, "sends chills up one's spine" and "makes every commoner break out in a cold sweat." Wang concluded sarcastically, "I am not an economist and my ideas are too crude. I only hope that those experts who so admire this book can enlighten me on this issue." Wang also lampooned the author's clumsy attempt to disguise his identity by writing under a German pseudonym, lauding the book's translation as "truly amazing." "This German's language," he mocked, is "even more Chinese than many Chinese." Wang Shan "must be one of the greatest Chinese translators today."

Like the pro-conservative review in BEIJING QINGNIANBAO, Wang Meng's efforts in defense of reform appeared to have a broader agenda, aimed not only at debunking Wang Shan's ideas but at discrediting the political views of party conservatives more generally.

Noting that the "strange book" had "received critical acclaim from some journals" and was considered by some comrades as a "national treasure," Wang Meng speculated that "this 'German scholar' obviously has said what these comrades cannot say." Wang went on to attack the hypocrisy of readers who admire the book's criticism of Deng's reforms but who take advantage of the more open atmosphere spawned by those very reforms to engage in public discussion of controversial ideas. In an earlier era, Wang asserted, the *Third Eye* would have been denounced as "treason and heresy," and its author might have "killed himself." Biographical Note:

The 7 January EASTERN EXPRESS interview identified Wang as a 42-year-old mid-level party cadre "nominally attached to the Beijing Opera College," who, prior to writing the *Third Eye*, was a "best selling author of pulp fiction" crime novels. A short biographical appendix accompanying Wang's article in MING PAO YUEH KAN also claimed that he was the son of a retired PLA general.

VIEWING CHINA THROUGH A THIRD EYE

Publisher's Explanation (Wang Shan, October 1993)

Dr. Leninger (August 1953—) is currently Europe's most influential Sinologist. Since the beginning of the 1980s, Mr. Leninger has published a series of monographs studying China's national conditions and state political structure. His views and critiques of China's political issues have had a great impact on the China policies of all political forces in Western Europe, being considered one of the most important theoretical grounds for the EC's Asia policy.

Viewing China Through a Third Eye is the author's most important work of research on Chinese issues. The book proceeds from a study of the revolutionary history of the Chinese people and the natural development of Chinese society, trying to find the rational parts in China's current social life and political structure, as well as describing the concrete evolutionary form of the direction of China's future development contradictions and conflicts. The excessive praise for *Viewing China Through a Third Eye* means that the author was not only unwilling to simply restate the stand of the Chinese people, but also did his best to distinguish this view from the traditional hostile Western view of China, thus objectively presenting a law-like summary of current Chinese issues. While the book gives considerable space to exploring the crucial issues in China's revolutionary history, particularly reaching different conclusions from ours on China's later rightist movement, the Lushan Conference, and the anti-right-deviationist movement, as well as on the causes of the Great Cultural Revolution and the good motives of those who launched it, it still shows the author's attempt to take an impartial stand

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and his friendly feelings for the Chinese people. It also gives a unique view of the youthful unrest that is occurring again in Chinese society.

The book does contain certain views that we cannot agree with, such as on China's peasant problem and the current state of economic development, where the author's views have a clearly pessimistic tendency. But once Mr. Leninger's future works make certain corrections on these matters, we will continue to introduce them to our Chinese readers.

Summary of Contents

Chapter 1. Do Not Interfere in China

The international intervention principle: One absolutely must not establish one's homeland in the boundaries of out-of-control nuclear weapons stockpiles. Is China a country with unsound control mechanisms?

Since the end of the tragic Great Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping has tried to establish a democratic political system in China. Chinese citizens admonish Deng Xiaoping: Your intentions may be good, but you are too idealistic.

The mistake has been all-out reform.

Political reform and the dismissal of two general secretaries.

Can 1.2 billion Chinese split along political lines?

As Chinese political development is a natural historical process, any form of international interference would lead to an historic catastrophe.

Chapter 2. Eight Hundred Million Peasants—China's Active Volcano

All Chinese dynasties were destroyed by refugees. As the Communist Party of China [CPC] arose in poor rural areas, will it fail on the peasant problem?

Two plans for solving peasant problems: Shackling and emancipation.

Mao Zedong's grand brushstroke: Peasants were confined to the land for three decades. History will settle the issue between the peasants and Mao Zedong: Who actually abandoned whom?

In defense of Mao Zedong: There was no alternative to the Great Cultural Revolution.

Deng Xiaoping was forced into his reform program by hunger. Peasant forces are a double-edged sword, able to hit targets, as well as being self-destructive. Liberating the peasants was bound to bring a painful exchange. The domino effect.

The refugee and crime waves.

Out of greed or the lust for wealth, peasants will do anything, against which preparations are necessary.

Possible options for a modern Bao-Jia system.

Chapter 3. Young Chinese Intellectuals — Lonely Warriors for Democracy

The baseness, blindness, and immaturity of intellectuals. Who should be held more responsible for the 1957 incident?

Mao Zedong's disappointment and anger. The second vicious blow to Peng Dehuai's head.

The rebellious generation that grew up on wolf's milk. Only one minor figure understood Mao Zedong.

Reflections and secret worries about the settling of the Great Cultural Revolution accounts.

The Xidan Democracy Wall.

The end of the old democracy movement—the 1989 Beijing incident.

Chapter 4. China's Cadre Problem

China's strata divisions. Mao Zedong's political testament. Power alienation is unconditional. Placing hopes on democracy is like marrying one's daughter to a devil.

Can all members of society profit equally from the reform policy? Proof that Mao Zedong was betrayed: No one has done a comparative analysis of the class forces of reform.

Deng Xiaoping's tearful compromise was for political and social stability.

An interesting phenomenon in China is that every reform breakthrough grows directly out of moral degeneration.

An embarrassing verdict: Reform has resulted in ever growing social polarization.

The only choice is to firmly restrict power.

Chapter 5. Social Control Plans for China That Can Be Foreseen in the Next Few Years

Crucial features of improvement and rectification have been partially betrayed or restored. Will China's third generation leadership emerge from a "restoration" movement? How will Deng Xiaoping's legacy be carried on? When will we return to the days of Mao Zedong?

On not putting blind faith in the legal system.

Another mistake: That central, local government, and enterprise aims are the same. Who is the most ferocious enemy? Central government dictatorship. The magic that preserves order.

China is now in the first stage of class divisions. The social features and future of class divisions.

All Chinese are learning from the People's Liberation Army. Military expansion is to deal with the social struggle. Feasible options for local states of emergency and military control.

Will work teams again take over control of grass-roots political power?

Five pitfalls on the road ahead. Can the two magic weapons—the dictatorship of the party and letting a hundred schools of thought contend—coexist?

History's great love for the Chinese people, the complete Mao Zedong and the complete Deng Xiaoping.

Chapter 6. China and International Society

Where will the world's next danger originate? The specific terms for a country to pose a threat to the fate of humanity. Ways to judge a country's status quo and understand its trends.

A rational analysis of China's prospects.

When will a sharp clash break out between China and international society?

Chapter 1. Do Not Interfere in China

Summary: *The new character of world political struggle is intervention in internal affairs. Is China a nation lacking a well-developed control mechanism? Four principles of international intervention. Causes and effects of the failed intervention against China. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Is interruption of the economic development process the best venue for interfering in China. China's political reform is a natural maturation process.*

One harsh reality that dumbfounded and left the political leaders of all countries at a loss about what to do following destruction of the world Cold-War pattern was the attendant crumbling of a series of guiding principles that had been built up among nations during the Cold-War era. Just as when a husband and wife part, but the family has to be kept intact, the members of the family must set up rules of behavior to maintain an awkward balance. But when the husband and wife reconcile or when the family no longer exists because of the death of one or the other, these behavior rules also lose their reason for being. Nevertheless, for a fairly long time thereafter, members of both the father's family and the mother's family continue to use these rules as a weapon to protect themselves, and if these rules become family ethical standards through long use, then new family conflicts are contests and clashes between new and old ethical standards.

It is not difficult to understand that the world was in a state of balance when two military blocs having sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate mankind several times over were in sharp confrontation, and when all nations or regions of the world belonged to the sphere of influence of the two large military blocs or maintained neutrality toward this confrontation. At that time, maintenance of a balance was the most effective means of safeguarding the security of mankind. In order to maintain the balance and safeguard the security of mankind itself, a series of rules were drawn up to serve as behavior

standards. Standards for relations among nations were the most important of these behavior standards. Mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for adversaries' independence and territorial integrity became the main points of the standards for relations among nations.

Once the Cold War ended, the above principles immediately lost both their reason for being and their force. When the United States sent military forces to Grenada and Panama, we continued to hear international calls, albeit feebly but nevertheless very distinctly, for "not permitting interference in internal affairs." When the United States imposed an economic blockade on Libya, such calls became a half-hearted murmur. Finally, interference in Iraq's internal affairs following its defeat, halting civil war in Somalia, inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities, sending troops to Cambodia, and halting the civil war in Bosnia and Hercegovina became concerted actions taken by all the world's big powers and all international groups. Even though these actions were directed against the internal affairs of these countries, no nation opposed them on grounds of not permitting interference in internal affairs or not permitting infringements of sovereignty.

The old international order exists no longer, and the old standards for relations among nations are bound to give way to new ones.

Profound misunderstandings exist between China and Western nations. In addition to the complete mutual distrust stemming from the ideological confrontation between statesmen, in the eyes of the public at large, the political conduct and modes of thought of the other side are also clearly preposterous and not amenable to reason.

In the wake of the Beijing incident during the summer of 1989, a New York newspaper reprinted an article written by a Beijing middle school student. This 15-year-old youth expressed profound inability to understand and strong indignation about international sanctions. He said, "Only the Chinese can solve China's affairs. Why do you brazenly interfere?" The youth's article ended with a strong condemnation: "Our family is living peacefully. Why are the neighbors unwilling to live in peace with us but rather interfere with, sabotage, and stir up discord among our family members? Do we not have the right to live in our own way?"

This young man's views are innocent and straightforward. His words clearly have a more powerful impact than the solemn pronouncements of Chinese officialdom on the public mind in the West. The feelings of the public in the West are complex and leaden in the face of this child's appeal and censure. Nevertheless, this has not caused Western society and the public to reflect on their conduct. Instead, it has strengthened their determination to interfere in Chinese affairs and take action. They say that China's next generation must be rescued.

People living in different societies often make completely opposite judgments about ordinary moral issues,

not solely because of their cultural backgrounds, but more primarily because of their different perceptions of the nature of events. Whether interference in a neighbor's affairs is in keeping with ethical standards is the essence of this matter (i.e., sanctions against China).

The interference of Western nations in China's internal affairs is regarded by the general public in China and by China's political leaders as a manifestation of old fashioned, aggressive imperialist ambitions. It is political aggression in conjunction with economic aggression and cultural aggression. To a certain extent, this perception reflects some historical realities. This is because in the more than a century since 1840, western colonialist have wantonly looted China's wealth and territory in the several wars they started against China. Moreover, during the three years of civil war just prior to founding of the Chinese Communist regime, when it acted as a mediator between the Kuomintang and the CPC, the actions of the United States were not fair and just but openly favored one side. Furthermore, because the favored party was completely defeated in the war, this favoritism seriously hurt America's image. Subsequently, this perception of "imperialism" was verified and further strengthened on a series of issues including the war on the Korean peninsula, the Indochina war, and the Taiwan Straits crisis. Thus, it has become the traditional political mentality of the Chinese public and China's political leaders. When they look at international society's policies toward China through this hostile or masochistic mentality, since the conclusions may frequently deviate from the initial intent and goals of these policies, because of the painful historical imprint the policies bear, the result is a pattern of long mutual lack of understanding between China and international society.

Because a struggle between communist expansion and opposition to this expansion, and between containment and opposition to containment of communist-ruled nations has dominated global political action since the end of World War II, we are hard put to find a perfect example to show the good intent of the policies of international society (mostly Western society headed by the United States) toward China, as well as the malicious distortions of this good intent. Every event contains traces of the Cold War, subversion, and exploitation. However, in 1971, during the presidency of Richard Nixon, the United States took the initiative to break the deadlock, establishing formal diplomatic relations with China. Subsequently, it accorded China most-favored-nation trade status. During the critical period of all-out confrontation between China and the USSR, in particular, the United States helped and protected China from a large scale Soviet military attack. Although this event smacks of strategic exploitation, nevertheless, its benefit to China is evident. Action that benefits a neighbor and helps its development should be fairly evaluated as a well-intentioned action.

Is interference in China a well-intentioned action? Following the Beijing incident of 1989, international society

imposed joint sanctions against China, openly interfered in China's internal affairs, and even extremely ingloriously supported discredited youths and rebels inside the country. Why?

1. The Principles of International Interference and Their Point of Departure

Modern Western security concepts derive almost entirely from two sources: One is the summary understanding gained from the painful experiences of World War II. The second is the dread of a world war, given the destructive nature of the nuclear age, and the search for ways to prevent it.

Reflections on World War II are painful. The appearance of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party henchmen was ultimately able to drag the entire world easily into a bloody and fiery war. Mankind paid a price in 300 million lives for its own mistake. The only cause for rejoicing is that the Hitlerian age was still what might be termed a relative cold weapons era. The weapons it used to slaughter mankind were limited to tanks, guns, and propeller driven aircraft. Should a similar mistake occur today, it would result in the complete annihilation of mankind itself.

Thus, it is only natural that people raise many questions about the causes that may set off this world catastrophe.

First, was Hitler's rise to power where he could control the German war machine an accident? Can such an accident occur again?

Historians have cited countless facts to show that it was specific historical and current coincidences and mistakes, as well as the fortuitous sequence of these coincidences and mistakes, that brought Hitler to the political stage. How, but for countless accidents and historical mistakes, could a discharged, wounded corporal of lowly lineage and uncertain nationality, who fervently preached socialism, become Germany's commander-in-chief, head of state, and spiritual leader? In other words, the probability of such an occurrence was one in several tens of million, or virtually zero.

The problem is that virtually zero is not zero. The safety of mankind requires absolute certainty of zero probability. In fact, this accident did end in bloody warfare and slaughter. When the next accident occurs, will mankind be able to survive? It has taken several billion years for single cell organisms to evolve into present day man, and for present day man finally to break free from the earth to go out into the vast universe. If another accident occurs in consequence of this extremely small probability, this advance can only end prematurely in mid-course. Mankind cannot gamble his destiny on the gaming table of luck and chance.

Second, what is the mechanism for eradicating this kind of accident?

The fact is that the national institutions in Germany at that time could not prevent Hitler, who psychologists today diagnose as paranoid and masochistic, from seizing political power. They were unable to prevent him from controlling the trigger on the war machine. On the contrary, the rapacious desires of the Junker landlords, the aggressive ambitions of the military-industrial complex, the complex psychology of the German race, and the narrowly focused anger of the worker masses combined to contaminate and transform the national control system in Germany at that time. Thus, the control system became a screening mechanism that sifted Hitler and his henchmen from among several million possibilities. Thanks to the workings of the national system, chance became inevitability, and went on to become reality.

The whole problem lies in national control institutions. The world family is made of numerous independent nations in each of which live countless mentally dysfunctional people, racial bigots, religious fanatics, and the politically frustrated. Unless each nation's control mechanism can prevent the aspirations and ambitions of these people from being realized through the state machinery, our world will never know peace. Putting aside for the moment the countries that are members of the nuclear club, if the state mechanism of just a small country of only several million does not prevent, but rather ensures sanctuary for dictators who preach international terrorism, religious fanaticism, and drug dealing, this world will be unsafe.

But what of the large nuclear powers? We have found that global security and the fate of mankind hinge on the safe operation and healthiness of a nation's control mechanism.

The conclusion is that with regard to national control mechanisms, where there are no national boundaries, there are also no concepts of pure internal administration.

Third is international society's right and responsibility to interfere under the above conditions.

This issue is an extremely serious one. International interference, particularly active interference or hegemonistic interference carried out through interference in a nation's control system and control process, clashes sharply with and runs counter to traditional standards for relations among nations and ethical principles. Such clashes and contradictions are reflected in more than just the confrontation of collective security with national dignity and national self-determination. A greater difficulty is that the status, process, and sequence of a people's natural development may run counter to what international society requires. Giving in on this natural development is tantamount to abandonment of the principle of international intervention, while persisting in intervention is bound to result in real confrontation and warfare. The lessons of the Vietnam War are sufficient reminder for a thousand years.

This is yet another example of mankind's being confronted with two difficult choices. The only way to solve this difficulty is to adhere to the premise of international intervention while strictly limiting it, i.e., limiting its scope and also limiting the methods used to carry it out.

At the present time, the following principles are applied to international intervention:

A. Intervention may be carried out only when the international policies that a nation pursues endanger the security of international society.

B. The object of intervention is limited to a nation's decision making practices and patterns.

C. Use of economic restraints or assistance to guide the evolution and make more rational the country's decision-making styles and models.

D. No use of military force to intervene other than at times of imminent danger. The outcome of military intervention must not be to force any given policy mode on a nation, but to guide the natural generation and development of this kind of rational pattern.

2. The Failed Intervention Against China

In 1989, international society instituted economic sanctions against China because of the Tiananmen incident in Beijing. This was not only a failed international intervention, but it also became a laughing stock that completely exposed American-led international society's naivete, blindness, and failure to estimate its own strength. This action failed because it fundamentally violated international intervention principles.

During this incident the Beijing government went to great lengths to show maturity and restraint. Even so, both the factual data that Beijing officialdom disclosed and results of an American public opinion survey showed that Beijing students took to the streets in an antigovernment demonstration largely because of the encouragement, support, and even planning provided by Western political, business, and ideological circles, the goal being to spur Chinese political reform. Thus, this may be viewed as the beginning of international intervention. If we regard this intervention as well-intentioned intervention and assistance to China's modernization process, then the following outcomes were completely at variance with the original intentions of the instigators.

A. Progress in political system reform, which had already begun in China, was interrupted by the Beijing incident, and it could not resume for many years to come, or it certainly could not reach the advanced degree it had attained in 1989.

B. The leaders who preached and practiced political system reform were found to have made "errors" and were relieved of their authority. With the advent of a

new leadership team, the political reform faction, as a natural political force having some power at that time, disappeared.

C. The subversive tactics and the interventionist mentality that international intervention revealed greatly damaged the national self-respect of the Chinese public, and it also greatly stimulated vigilance on the part of the power-holding CPC. The social tumult caused by the provocation to riot also provided a negative phenomenon against which to measure the tightening of ideological control and control of civil rights. Centralization of state power and a single-party dictatorship have become a workable national policy generally accepted by all.

D. Judging from their actions during the Beijing incident and after being forced into exile, Chinese intellectuals of the young democratic faction that the Western nations supported with all their might were certainly not representative of progressive Chinese political forces. The democratic awareness of these people was extremely weak and their traitorous and anti-nationalist sentiments were strong. Had the Beijing incident evolved into a successful coup d'etat, with state power in China falling into the hands of these youths, not only would this have been a disaster for China but also a source of catastrophe for the world as well.

E. Following the failure of international interference in China, not only did China effectively surmount the difficulties that economic sanctions created, but also became the wonder of the world in the speed of its economic development. This made China the most hopeful place in the world to invest, and a major force in spurring the world's economic recovery.

We may draw the following conclusions from the above facts:

A. Progress in political reform in China is a natural process whose occurrence, development, and sequence have a natural basis. Artificial interference from the outside, curtailing this process, or changing it positively, cannot make it develop more rapidly or more healthily.

B. The main reasons for the failure of international society's interference in China in 1989 were lack of respect for Chinese realities and violation of the correct principles for international intervention.

C. For some time to come, international society will pay a price for this rash, unjust, and failed intervention. This means not only a halt to China's political reform process and constant creation of world alarms, but also the political changes that are extremely likely to occur once China's economic development sustains major setbacks. No one should forget that China is a member of the world nuclear club.

D. Two choices remain for international society on the China issue. The first is full support for China's economic development. When economic development ultimately makes the Chinese public and government realize

that backward institutions have become the main impediment to economic development, particularly when economic development ultimately produces conditions necessary for political reform, political reform will begin naturally (some limited social unrest possibly occurring).

These choices are also by no means satisfactory to all concerned inasmuch as full support to China's development can go no farther than providing general propaganda support. In orienting toward the world, China's economy will more than ever encounter boycotts, oppression, and cutthroat competition. Selfishness in economic interaction and interference in political interaction exist together in the world order. Therefore, it is hoped that simultaneous with China's smooth political reform, all the Western countries will take concerted action to provide real assistance, protection, concessions, and other needed support to China in economic relations and trade.

The second choice is to continue to interfere in China in various ways.

China is a large country whose unbalanced political and economic development means, first, that any government policy will always be inappropriate somewhere, and, second, that there are real splits and separatist tendencies in the country. Not only do these provide all sorts of opportunities for international society to interfere in China, but they also provide the possibility of success for such interference. Opportunity and success are the lures that make interference and counterinterference a constant theme in contacts between China and international society.

The reality very likely is that international society will apply these two choices in combination, revising the emphasis in light of the development of China's economy and changes in the internal political situation.

3. The Beginning of Chinese Political System Reform

For international interference to be termed well-intentioned, its substantive significance must be effective international assistance. The object of the interference must be limited to a country's political decision-making methods and procedures, i.e., use of international assistance to begin to build a complete democratic political operating system that has a feedback mechanism. In the view of Western society, such assistance is of crucial importance, because such a system will not only constrain the country to carry out peaceful and conciliatory international policies, but it is also the only effective system for guaranteeing healthy economic development.

This popular Western point of view not only contains a marked ideological bias but its logic also mixes cause and effect in economic and political development.

After China ended the tragic Great Cultural Revolution, a brief period of self-examination to learn from painful experience ensued. During this period, the political

reform faction headed by Deng Xiaoping envisioned the building of its own more rational democratic political institutions. Several months before and after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng's remarks on both public and private occasions had just one theme: How to build a democratic supervision and feedback mechanism within the CPC to prevent recurrence of the tragedy of dragging the entire party into disaster through the personal dictatorship of a leader.

Deng's wish was certainly sincere inasmuch as he personally had repeatedly been the victim of the ridiculous leader-dictatorship system.

Deng had long been a loyal follower of the deified leader of the CPC, Mao Zedong. This history can be traced back to the difficult period when the CPC was king of the hills in the barren mountain region of Jiangxi Province. Because of his excessively close relationship with Mao Zedong, Deng suffered rectification at the hands of the orthodox Stalinists who returned from Moscow. Subsequently, Deng was always put in the Mao Zedong faction and, owing to his outstanding talents as well as the confidence of Mao Zedong, he rose rapidly all the way to the position of party general secretary. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Great Cultural Revolution that Mao initiated, which had as its goal purification of the internal organization and the elimination of opposition factions, Deng was declared the number two enemy of the party and mercilessly driven from the political stage.

The reasons for Deng's downfall were many. Not only had he adopted an uncooperative attitude toward the Cultural Revolution that Mao Zedong launched, but a more important factor was his strong personality. He was unable to submit and show obedience to another person in authority, Marshal Lin Biao, and to Mao Zedong's wife, Jiang Qing. He was unwilling to submit easily to this removal, however, his truly profound understanding and candid acknowledgement of the shortcomings of the party and government political system stemmed largely from his subsequent experience.

Following Marshal Lin Biao's defection and fall from grace, Deng Xiaoping staged a comeback with support from another leader who held great power, Premier Zhou Enlai. Naturally during this process, Deng personally had to show contrition to Mao Zedong in order to win forgiveness. Like a forgiving elder, Mao very rapidly forgot the unpleasantness that had occurred between them and entrusted Deng with important tasks. Nevertheless, four years later, Mao Zedong personally toppled Deng Xiaoping once again. In fact, he had not forgotten the past. He termed Deng "incorrigible."

A series of events that occurred before the second toppling provide the most food for thought.

Mao Zedong was already in his twilight years at this time. Wracked with illness, his thinking, speech, and actions were seriously impaired. Even so, this sickly old man remained the helmsman of the great ship that was

China. Not only did he decide the heading of this ship, but his likes and dislikes and his moods decided the rise and fall and the fate of every political body. Thus, one faction represented by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and another faction represented by Jiang Qing had to vie with each other in expressions of loyalty at Mao's sickbed to win his support and understanding.

This was a difficult, damaging, undignified, and awkward situation. But Mao Zedong deftly applied his political skills, adroitly maintaining a balance between the two factional forces, and he made the Deng Xiaoping faction, which he disfavored, superficially appear to have the upper hand. This friction was extraordinarily painful. Individual political ambitions and the future fate of the nation depended entirely on the individual inclinations and viewpoint of this supreme personage. As a serious statesman, all that Deng Xiaoping could do at that time was sigh in vain.

Mao Zedong's confidence in Deng Xiaoping did not last for very long, and the change also occurred extremely suddenly. Analysis of data that has now been disclosed shows that in addition to Jiang Qing's repeated vilification of Deng to Mao Zedong, three more important reasons caused Mao to turn against Deng. These three reasons also show the total ridiculousness of the CPC's leadership system.

A. After the death of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong's condition worsened. Thus, not only did Deng Xiaoping have no protector but his channel of contact with Mao Zedong was cut off as well. This was extremely dangerous. If you were able always to sway before the eyes of that old man and able to rattle on endlessly with high-sounding words beside his ear, even though you might be wrong, you could gain an extremely great degree of indulgence. However, if several months went by without your appearing before his eyes, the old man's suspicions and credulity would place you in an extremely vulnerable and dangerous position.

B. Even more deadly was the appearance of three young people, two of whom were Mao Zedong's relatives. Because of their slight experience, these three did not belong to a political faction or enjoy Mao's confidence at this time, but they had become the most effective channel for Mao's contact with the outside world and for transmission of his instructions. Since Deng Xiaoping was of serious demeanor and avoided frivolous speech and laughter, he very likely did not particularly gain the good will of these three young people. There is also evidence that one of them had been suborned by Jiang Qing. This young person was not only Mao Zedong's nephew, but he was also the only formal "liaison person" between The CPC Politburo and Chairman Mao Zedong. Information from Jiang Qing could flow endlessly through this channel to Mao Zedong; however, information from Mr. Deng was interdicted. Thus, Deng Xiaoping's predicament was even more lamentable. His destiny and endeavors were at the mercy of a young man.

C. But it was Mao himself who played the ultimate role. The greatest difference, or primary bone of contention, between Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong was how to evaluate the Great Cultural Revolution. Deng loathed this campaign and completely repudiated it. In 1950, Mao Zedong had introduced Deng Xiaoping to Marshal Stalin as a rare talent who "is both principled and flexible." On the handling of the Great Cultural Revolution, Deng's principles and flexibility were expressed to the full. On the one hand, using rectification as the pretext, he exposed the negative effects of the Great Cultural Revolution and eliminated them from the work for which he was personally responsible. On the other hand, he also never openly expressed his disdain and discontent with this campaign. However, this was by no means sufficient to protect himself, because the person he was dealing with was a very sick old man, and this old man still held absolute power and authority in ruling the nation.

The final aspiration of the aged Mao Zedong was preservation of the achievements of the Great Cultural Revolution. In looking back over his life, he felt that his most glorious achievements in revolutionary struggle had been only two. One was driving Mr. Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan island, and the other was starting the Great Cultural Revolution, and that the most dependable way to protect this legacy was to turn it over to a person who treasured it more. Given his shrewdness, Mao Zedong could not help but see, or could not basically forget, Deng Xiaoping's loathing of the Great Cultural Revolution.

Thus it was that this critically ill old man once again brought down Deng Xiaoping with a slight gesture of his hand. That the old man had such enormous power demonstrated the decadence and woes of the party system.

A statesman extremely loyal to his own race, after rising for the third time, Deng Xiaoping must have learned the following lesson from this painful experiences: A democratic, collective decision-making system had to be built within the government and the CPC to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of an individual leader and to prevent the nation and the people from being engulfed in disaster as a result of the mistakes of a single leader.

In August 1980, the enlarged meeting of the CPC Politburo decided that party chairman Hua Guofeng could no longer serve concurrently as premier of the State Council, and that Zhao Ziyang should succeed him in that position. During a speech to this meeting, Deng Xiaoping strongly attacked the old system in which power was overly centralized. He said:

Certainly various mistakes that occurred in the past were related to the thinking and work style of certain leaders, but problems in the organizational system and the work system were more important. When these systems are in good order, malefactors cannot wantonly run amuck;

when these systems are bad, good people have no way to perform good deeds to the full, or they may turn in the opposite direction. Even a personage as great as Comrade Mao Zedong was also seriously affected by some bad systems, which created very great misfortune for the party, for the country, and for himself.

It is even more noteworthy that Deng Xiaoping also quoted Mao Zedong in open affirmation, to a certain extent, of the democratic political system of Western countries. He said:

Stalin did serious damage to the socialist rule of law, and Comrade Mao Zedong said that such a thing could not have happened in Western countries like the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

Deng complained about Mao Zedong saying: "Although he knew this, his failure to resolve real problems in the leadership system, and other reasons, led to the 10 years of calamity of the Great Cultural Revolution."

For the following more than a decade, Deng Xiaoping was the de facto supreme leader of CPC and the Chinese government. When he was openly hailed as "the chief architect of reform," he gained, in fact, a position of authority equaling that of Mao Zedong in those years. Chinese political system reform had the most favorable conditions for success with him to promote it, but the outcome was far from successful. Deng's conception for political system reform had the following main features:

A. The "leadership system" of the CPC is seriously flawed. It must be reformed.

B. The focus of reform is the decentralization of power, democratization, and institutionalization. (Deng set a personal example, resigning one after another from the various positions he held concurrently with his position on the CPC Central Military Commission, and steadfastly retreating behind the scenes. He did not want to become another Mao Zedong-style old man).

C. The object of reform was the "system" and *only* the "system." (In this connection, he drew up "four basic principles," namely adherence to Marxism and Maoism, adherence to the leadership of the CPC, adherence to the socialist road, and adherence to the people's democratic dictatorship).

China proposed the idea of political reform long before Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union, and began political reform before economic system reform. However, China did not take nearly the large strides in this regard as did the USSR, and the results achieved also did not attract as much attention as the results of economic reform.

By comparison with the present chaos and turmoil in the former USSR, the economic situation and social stability in China today are much better. For this reason, the Chinese boast that they made the right choice in the sequencing of economic reform and political reform.

Deng is an enthusiast and past master at the games of weiqi and bridge. In both these games, the correct "order" is the key to success or failure. In the game of moving ahead with the development of China's society, he first expanded gradually and in an orderly way the degree of liberalization of economic activity. Later he proceeded step by step and without much fanfare to liberalize party control of art and literature, publishing, theory, and speech, thereby enabling China to show both progress and order. This was actually what happened. The living environment of the public, in general, and of the intellectuals, in particular, have improved markedly during the past 10 or 20 years, becoming fairly relaxed and free. The most striking evidence of this is that punishment for ideology or speech in China today is, if it has not been completely abolished, extremely rare.

However, the following several problems relating to political institution or system reform are still a matter of extreme concern:

A. According to Deng Xiaoping's original intentions, or at least his views during the 1978-1980 period, China should establish a democratic restraint, supervision, and feedback mechanism within the CPC, and it was for the goals and achievements of political reform that this mechanism was to be established and operate. However, the CPC did not make marked efforts in this regard, or else its efforts did not produce marked results. The "Various Regulations on Political Life in the party" that the party congress drew up have faded from memory, and the supreme decision-making levels still practice a leadership system in which collective meetings are supplementary.

Deng Xiaoping's determination and devotion to principles enjoy popular credence. Changes in his original intentions or the interruption of progress resulted not from wavering determination but from hard to overcome difficulties and obstacles in practice. Just what were these difficulties and obstacles?

B. Deng selected two fairly young political leaders as party general secretary. Both were enthusiastic advocates of political system reform, and both were dismissed subsequently because they went too far, too fast in this regard. Apart from their different individual work styles, most of the reforms that these two leaders advocated must have been taken from Mr. Deng's master blueprint. Since they were both reversed one after another, does this mean a readjustment of the course of political reform, or was the reversal purely attributable to their personal mistakes?

C. China's political reform remains to this day a palace style or statesman's reform conducted from the top down. Consequently, the results of reform may be telescoped and controlled, the degree of expansion or contraction depending entirely on how well the society and the economy are operating. In this regard, political reform has become, as luck would have it, a result of social progress. This is logical. However, it also has an

obvious impermanence or quality of having been bestowed. An endless stream of good people of outstanding ability have come to the fore to man the front line of economic reform, but only an extremely small number of middle and low level officials or intellectuals and theoreticians have come forward to carry out political reform boldly.

D. Therefore, this constitutes a latent danger for intense turmoil in Chinese society. When obstacles to operation of the economy appear or the situation is bad, political or ideological control becomes correspondingly strong. Thus, the general public experiences both economic pressure and political restraint at the same time. Channels through which they can vent their feelings are either not open or largely blocked. When these feelings build up too much, social tumult occurs in which goals are disorganized and feelings intense.

4. China's Political Crisis and the Point of International Interference

When studying the pattern of operation of Chinese society and its correlation to international interference, statesmen or scholars in various countries see very clearly the following distinct, logical train of thought.

A. The traditional, rather outmoded, decision-making system and methods frequently, or inevitably, lead to mistakes in making economic decisions. During the 15 years since 1977, the development of China's economy has been in an irregular curve having intense ups and downs. The shortness of the distance between peaks and valleys, and the precipices between rises and falls, are extreme and make one fearful and apprehensive. Moreover, the three economic take-offs (which the Chinese are accustomed to calling "leaps forward" or "aiming high and going all out") have all been caused by the enthusiastic calls or active participation of political leaders. Three CPC secretaries (Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang) were each responsible for one "leap forward." However, each economic take-off very quickly exhibits the lack of development and the unsoundness of the foundation through overheating. The inflation, price rises, decline in product quality, and rise in crime on the most recent occasion were all guests who showed up at the banquet on time, all of them uninvited.

Each period of economic overheating is rapidly followed by a freeze or readjustment period during which residents' savings deposits increase, commodities do not sell well, the development of production slows, and both the number of money-losing state-owned enterprises and the amount of their losses increase. The 1989-1991 readjustment, when the central government instituted the "double-tight policy," "fiscal and credit," was the most resolute, most intense classic case.

No matter whether the economy is in a hot or a cold stage, it is the central government that causes it and that is the initiator or perpetrator. This makes the problem of rationalizing decision-making procedures and methods loom more serious.

China is currently at the acme of its fourth peak economic development period when the economy is growing extremely rapidly. This "leap forward" was set off by Mr. Deng Xiaoping himself. In early 1992, during a survey of several cities in south China during which he was accompanied by his family, he encouraged enterprises to "be a little bolder, and move a little faster." After Deng's remarks were printed in the newspapers, they set off an upsurge of investment throughout the whole country. At this time, Deng was already well along in years, and he held no position in either the party or the government.

China presently has a series of political regulation and control systems, but they do not play an effective role in curbing government economic policy decisions. At the 1993 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference [CPPCC] meeting, in reply to a question from a foreign correspondent about whether China's economy is overheated, a Democratic Party (the only independent party organization in mainland China, the principle on which it is founded being to swear it will not act as an opposition party) leader confused the term "overheated" with the term "enthusiasm," which are somewhat similar in Chinese. Anxious to defend the government's economic policy, he boldly asked in reply: How can there not be enthusiasm for building the economy? I feel not enough heat has been generated!

This leader's statement has become a joke. Not only does it reflect the not very high caliber of this representative of the democratic personages, but it also indirectly reveals the ineffectiveness and immaturity of China's political supervision system.

B. The rhythm with which the economy rises and falls directs the pace of political reform. During periods of freeze or readjustment of economic development, in particular, political retrenchment and thought control seem especially severe. During the early, mid-, and late 1980s, the slogans "bourgeois liberalization," "eliminate spiritual pollution," and "guard against peaceful evolution," which the CPC put forward, gave rise to campaigns of varying lengths throughout the country. The peaceful evolution issue was raised back in the 1960s during the Sino-Soviet polemic, and the Great Cultural Revolution was actually one effort to solve this problem. The fright and apprehension caused by the reappearance of this slogan after 1990 can be imagined.

C. The rhythm of rise and fall in the economy and the advance and retreat in the political pace cause flood and ebb tides in antigovernment activities of young students. (This issue will be discussed in a separate chapter).

D. Too frequent economic and political ups and downs, the intrusion of commodity concepts, and the gradual disintegration of social morality have made inroads into prevailing customs and the loyalty of officials. Signs of malignancy have appeared. Because of their discontent with social mores and the living environment, public lack of confidence, particularly in middle and lower level

officials, has intensified, and has begun to shake confidence in and support for the CPC. Some Western experts believe that the CPC grass-roots organization survives in name only in townships and villages, or that it no longer plays a role. The situation probably has not become this bad, but weakening of the role and influence of the CPC in grass-roots economic organizations has become a fact. (Please note that this is both dangerous and extremely unfortunate. The vacuum created by withdrawal of the old control forces before the new control system can fully and effectively exercise control is a recipe for social disaster).

E. During this process, international interference using human rights as a pretext and a breakthrough point has never restrained its own enthusiasm and drive. Sometimes, it has even been overbearing, impatient, and frequently anxious to capitalize on others' adversity.

F. Because of the occurrence at the same time of the various above dangers and circumstances, not only is reform of China's political system unable to get off the ground, but a further trend toward retrenchment and holding fast is possible. If a further major economic setback (which the experts estimate will occur during 1994-95) occurs, China may enter a brief "freeze period" politically. Right now, frustrated CPC grass-roots cadres and members in all age groups who are not accustomed to the realities are calling on party leaders to take action.

G. Although pounded by the consumer market, the international market, and financial regulation and control policies, and repeatedly sliding from crests to troughs, China's economic development is the fastest in the world. Although China's economy is critically flawed, it also has extremely valuable healthy elements which we will discuss separately in a later chapter. Here we will say only that China has all the conditions for economic development. Once it can get smoothly through the difficulties of the transformation of state-owned enterprise equity and operating rights, it will show unparalleled vitality.

In the course of free and autonomous economic development, a corps of entrepreneurs and a middle class will gradually emerge to form a powerful independent political force.

H. Paradoxical political and economic development occurred in a situation of mutual support and cooperation between firm political control and maximum economic freedom. For some time to come, this strange combination will become the basic pattern of Chinese society, and will prove to be an effective organization and control method in China's modernization process.

The problem is that later on, clashes between political and economic development will be inevitable. When the free economy no longer needs protection, and such protection becomes an intolerable burden, clashes will begin. The quicker the economic development, the shorter this process will be.

I. China's distinctive circumstances include a vast land area and a large population, but extremely unbalanced economic development. Differences between the north and the south and the east and the west are not just quantitative. Differences in several qualitative levels also exist. If we cause a change, a sudden change, an interruption, or a retrogression in the logical change process outlined above, or in any element of it, if China's political leaders make mistakes on major guiding policies, and if catastrophes such as great social turmoil, loss of political control, or splintering of the country ensue, the reason will lie in the fundamental inability of the unified central guiding policy to respond to the social development situation in areas having such great disparities. Economic policy is not the issue here, because a freer economy and the delegation of authority can solve this problem. Mostly political and ideological policy is meant here. While some areas must uphold socialist social policies in order to maintain stability and subsistence, in some other areas traces of socialism will have been reformed to the point where they can scarcely be found anywhere.

A political split up of 1.2 billion people is not just extremely dangerous, but also has an extremely high probability rate.

This danger is expressed largely in the opportunity, the necessity, and the possibility that a political split up provides for intervention by international society. Once such a situation occurs, international intervention will become unavoidable, and intense confrontation between China and international society will also become unavoidable.

5. Any Form of International Intervention Is A Crime Against China

International intervention has become an important form of international political intercourse because the goal of intervention is security and development. This goal or benefit enables the intervening countries to free themselves completely of all moral remorse.

If a nuclear power plant cannot effectively prevent a demented person from entering its main gate, and if this madman freely plays with the glittering buttons, and the nuclear equipment has no automatic safety interlocking system for effective response, then this nuclear power station is no different than an armed nuclear bomb waiting to go off. No one would want to build his home near it.

Two control and feedback mechanisms for preventing the madman from entering and not causing trouble once he is inside constitute a basic security support system. A nuclear power station lacking a security support system exists illegally. What if a nation lacks such a security support system? And what if this nation has powerful military forces such as Germany had during the 1930s? And what if this nation has nuclear weapons?

A force over which control has been lost poses a real threat against which all ways and means of intervention must be used. The ways and means used in this event are generally recognized to be in keeping with generally accepted principles because an even greater goal lies behind them, namely the collective safety of all mankind.

Every people, no matter of what cultural background, historical traditions, or political bent, can accept the above reasoning and conclusions without difficulty. They worry not only about themselves but have to worry about their neighbors too, and they interfere against their neighbors when they have sufficient strength or when they have no strength.

The whole issue lies in, and only in, the following: Who has the right to arbitrate? Who will judge whether this or that state machine has or does not have a security support system? Who? The big powerful countries? The collective majority? Or the United Nations in which what one or two big nations say goes.

Every country makes an independent decision based on its own interests, political experience, ethical standards, and value orientation. Consequently, differences among independent judgments are readily apparent. All the world's disputes and troubles are typified in this way. It is also as a result of this problem that, because of their unfeasibility or their coerciveness, all rational decisions about international intervention are completely overturned.

Therefore, the people of all countries can only be allowed to take their own course. What exists in reality has to be recognized as rational. It is an historical summation and it is relatively rational.

Nevertheless, mankind is by no means completely without recourse. Natural means for active interference still exist. These natural means are economic.

In order to gain maximum profit, capital in its most natural form circulates among different countries, territories, and industrial sectors. The factors that attract capital are two: maximum gain and minimum risk. The basic guideline for determining whether a country is fit for investment and for judging whether a region can be normally developed is whether it has a scientifically rational political control and support system. The existence of these systems will keep the investment climate stable and prevent its sudden deterioration. Before the outbreak of the Gulf War, after many years of talks, a German-Belgian-Austrian consortium signed an agreement to invest a huge amount of capital in Iraq for the development of petroleum and mineral resources. This investment was doomed to failure. United Nations economic sanctions swamped it. The reason for the failure was, that beguiled by high profits, the political safety coefficient was not fully estimated. Because of the personal dictatorship and the lack of safety interlocking in Iraq, the recovery of and profits from huge investment

depended on the wisdom of the leader's judgment. The failure resulted from the consortium's having forgotten the principle that you positively may not build houses beside a smoking bomb.

The modernization of developing nations requires mutually beneficial assistance in the form of international capital and technology. Therefore, political reform and the founding of scientific decision-making and feedback mechanisms become important prerequisites for attracting this assistance and for smooth development of the home country economy. In his writings, Marx repeatedly stressed the relationship between the economic and the political, and events have proven this to be a truly profound insight. Political international intervention is being quietly but firmly carried out in capital economic and technical economic forms.

During the early 1980s, the Taiwan government began secretly to build a heavy water equipment laboratory. The goal was possession of its own independent nuclear strike force, which it could use to threaten the mainland communist regime, thereby ensuring the security of Taiwan island. This was a justifiable reason inasmuch as the mainland and Taiwan had long been hostile, and the mainland had made no guarantee not to use armed force to achieve unification.

The Americans most firmly attacked Taiwan's efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons. First they used every means, including espionage, to surveil this laboratory, and after obtaining reliable intelligence, they completely and peremptorily demolished it, and rolled up and took away all technical data they could gather.

The American actions greatly damaged the self respect of the Taiwanese, and both the government and the people angrily denounced the Americans: Just what right do you have? But the Americans response was also very curt: The security of the Taiwan Straits, Asia, and the world.

World public opinion's evaluation of this American action was: Very responsible and constructive.

Actually, the Americans are now deemed to have done a boundlessly beneficial deed. They eliminated this hidden danger that threatened the security of the entire region, thereby creating conditions for both sides of the Taiwan Straits and all of East Asia and Southeast Asia to become the finest investment area.

However, inasmuch as a military alliance exists between the United States and Taiwan, this international interference action does not hold typical significance. The Americans motivation may be fully explained in other terms. However, the Americans interference against the China mainland communist regime is extremely typical.

In the mid 1960s, China obtained its own atomic and hydrogen bombs. Although its nuclear arsenal is not large, the nuclear warheads it has readied over a period of nearly 30 years, and the associated carrier vehicles that it has steadily improved, constitute a strike force

that cannot be ignored. In addition, the conventional weapons system that China has fashioned is also quite large and capable.

The United States and Western countries are worried and frightened by these Chinese forces, but they are positively unable to remove this source of dread by using the means they employed in Taiwan or Iraq. Consequently they pressure China to improve its human rights record; they pressure China to institute political reforms; and they even resort to mercenary methods to get young rebels to conduct campus and street demonstrations, etc. We will make no evaluation of these activities for the time being, but their goal is obvious: to bring down the power-holding CPC regime and bring about peaceful evolution.

The understanding of and actions of Western society against China have become extremely biased. In subsequent chapters on actual events in China, we will reach the following conclusions: 1) The CPC is an indispensable political force for China's social stability and economic development at the present stage; 2) the CPC leadership system is changing according to Mr. Deng Xiaoping's plan; 3) China positively cannot permit the occurrence of a power vacuum at the present stage; and 4) outside force will reverse the situation.

Seriously speaking, no matter the motivation for intervention, any form of intervention in the China mainland at the present stage will be a foolishly criminal act.

In the course of its development to the present day, numerous problems have occurred in the internal organism of Western society itself. In the case of the United States, drugs, AIDS, race riots, and political scandal have become, along with international terrorism, incurable diseases that threaten national survival. The country's democratic political system and quite mature legal system seems at a loss, pale, and feeble in the face of these events. Unchecked liberal economic operating methods are gradually exhibiting pathological symptoms. Decline has become the dominant theme. Many insightful people have correctly noted that the prescription to cure America's illnesses can be found in the East. Yes, after we make a further analysis of Chinese society, we will find numerous beneficial insights.

The sophistication of institutions, or the scientific qualities or rationality of operating mechanisms in society used to be relative. For 20 centuries, China was the most powerful nation on this planet. During the most recent 200 years, however, this nation has been corrupt and degenerate. Thus, it lags greatly behind the world. One simple reason is that geographic and conscious isolation cut off channels for the influx of information. China's relative rationality became ridiculous with the passage of time.

The more scientifically rational the social control mechanism, the more unyielding it is. Maybe this is another game that God plays to provide equal opportunity and to

restrain the strong and help the weak. Remember, God does not always favor the United States. He does not have to apply for an American "green card."

Chapter 2. Eight Hundred Million Peasants—China's Active Volcano

Summary: All Chinese dynasties were destroyed by refugees. Will the CPC, which began in impoverished rural villages, founder on the peasant problem? The dazhai road, an oriental garden of eden that Mao Zedong designed. The destruction of ideals and the hardships and dangers of deliverance. The most important issue is educating the peasants. The contemporary significance of the Baojia system. Are democracy and freedom poison wines that will kill social stability?

An editorial writer for the American WASHINGTON MAGAZINE wrote the following during the 1930s: No matter whether you are a congressman, a financier, or a general, or even the president of the United States, once you take a trip to a rural village in northwest China and get to know the peasants there, you will immediately become a supporter and a disciple of the CPC.

This editorial writer was not trying to be sensational. During the late 1930s, a number of young western European and American intellectuals went to northwest China to help China in the war of resistance to Japan. Virtually all of them subsequently became converts to the religion that Marx had founded, and some of them even became members of the CPC.

After gaining political control of the whole country, the CPC made a series of serious mistakes, but its gravest mistake of all was hiding the impoverished villages and ragged peasants, not allowing the outside world to see the whole truth. Possibly this stemmed from the Chinese people's traditional hypocrisy about not washing dirty laundry in public, or possibly it stemmed from the CPC's exaggerated self-respect in reporting only good news but not bad. Nevertheless, the result was that the CPC lost an opportunity for international sympathy, understanding, and assistance. Without an understanding of China's peasants, it is impossible to understand the policies and the difficulties of the CPC.

1. Peasants Have Determined the Success or Failure of China's Modern Political Parties

Right up to the present day, western experts on Chinese history are still puzzled about the following: How was Mao Zedong able to lead a small, isolated, and helpless CPC band in defeating an adversary much stronger than he, the power-holding Kuomintang [KMT] led by Chiang Kai-shek?

No matter how one analyzes it, Chiang and the KMT were much stronger; there was just no reason for their inevitable defeat. First of all, Chiang was the legitimate head of state. In China, with its strong patriarchal consciousness, he had also gained the general respect and

recognition of the citizens, while the CPC was virtually synonymous with "bandits" for a fairly long time. Second, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the KMT, made the strongly capitalist-tinged "Three Principles of the People" the KMT's aim. In terms of appropriateness at that stage of social development, the Three Principles of the People were far more realistic than the vague and general communist ideology. Furthermore, Chiang and the KMT had obtained the support and assistance of international society, particularly the United States, while the CPC was completely isolated and without help. Finally, the great disparity between the material combat strength of the two parties made a marvelous outcome to a decisive struggle virtually impossible for the communists. The regular national army commanded by Chiang numbered 8 million, making it the world's largest national defense force. Its CPC adversary had a much smaller force, and its equipment was extremely poor. It was virtually unarmed.

In the autumn of 1945, following the defeat of Japanese aggression by the KMT and the CPC under leadership of Chiang, the two parties and their two military forces pulled apart to engage in a fierce battle for political control of the whole country on this vast mainland of East Asia. The outcome is well-known to all. Within just three years, Chiang was thoroughly defeated. Later on, leading his remnant forces, he fled to Taiwan.

This outcome left the political leaders of the whole world, including even Marshal Stalin, dumbfounded. However, anyone familiar with Chinese history would not have been astounded at it, because in Chinese history, similar miracles or myths have been performed many times. Comparatively speaking, the success of General Li Zicheng 350 years ago appeared more brilliant than the victory of the CPC. This general, who led a roving bandit cavalry force in northwest China, overthrew within several months the Ming dynasty, which had ruled China for 250 years.

We find a remarkable fact in paging through the history of China, namely that without exception, all the dynasties were destroyed at the hands of roving bands. Here roving bands mean peasants who have lost their land or who are not settled on the land. Once these ignorant, blind, extremely destructive peasant armies are organized to resist a regime, that regime's days are numbered. There is no way it can save itself. Yet, the task of organizing these displaced persons is so simple and effective. A rumor can make them believe something beyond a shadow of a doubt. All one has to do is raise the standard of revolt, and a large force is attracted to it.

So, is modern political power or the fate of political parties still decided by the peasants?

Miracles can often reveal secrets in a striking way. The victory of the CPC in the civil war was attributable largely to the support and participation of the peasants.

CPC theoreticians frequently conceal this fact. They attribute victory to the invincibility of communism. They maintain that once communism was introduced into China from the USSR, the winning of political power throughout the country was a very natural result. A folk song that is popular throughout the country goes: Without the CPC, there would be no new China.

However, CPC leader Mao Zedong himself derided this superficial view. He often used the clearly derogatory term "dogmatism," as a substitute for Marxist or Leninist theory, and he delivered the most excoriating attack on such dogmatism. He even said that dogmatism was more useless than dog shit. "Dog shit can be used as fertilizer, and human excrement can be used to feed dogs, but dogmatism? It cannot be used for fertilizer or to feed dogs. What use does it have?"

The victory of the CPC has always been regarded as the victory of Marxism in China. This conclusion seems very questionable. During his sickness-racked final years, Mao Zedong disclosed the real secret to victory. He said: The line determined everything.

Here it is necessary to refer to two founders of the CPC inasmuch it was these two professors who introduced Mao Zedong to communism and influenced him first. They were Professor Chen Duxiu and Professor Li Dazhao.

Chen Duxiu believed sincerely the Marxist-Leninist theory of the law of historical development, namely that socialist revolution was inevitable because of the inherent contradictions in capitalism and the sharpening and insurmountability of these contradictions, and that mankind would inevitably take the path of socialism and communism. Therefore, cities were the centers of conflict, and the working class was the main force.

Professor Li Dazhao was far from all that devout about Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He believed that Marxism was a merger of ethics and impulse, that in China it was the Chinese who would build socialism, and most of the Chinese population was peasant. Therefore, only through the transformation of rural villages could a new China arrive.

The different points of view of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao formed the fountainhead of two different lines and two ideological understandings within the CPC later on. Relatively, the influence of Professor Li Dazhao was much less. Virtually all of the leading cadres during the CPC's early years were followers of Chen Duxiu's ideology. Thus, Zhou Enlai devoted himself throughout to organizing armed insurrection in cities.

As a communist, throughout his entire life Mao Zedong never gave up the ideal of realizing communism. However, it was only after he was driven by Chiang's army into the life of an exile in the mountains that he began to realize the real meaning of Li Dazhao's ideas. The

correctness of this change was gradually accepted ideologically by the entire CPC only after numerous internal struggles, particularly after both the CPC and the army were put to a life and death test, with Mao becoming the leader of the CPC as a consequence. Subsequently, Mao's line was repeatedly proven by events. This line also carried the CPC out of the mountain ravines into the cities and to winning political power over the whole country. It was with pleasure that Mao instructed his colleagues as follows: "Policies and strategy shape the CPC's destiny." "When the line is right, men become available where there were no men before, and arms become available where there were no arms before."

Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized a correct line in a maximum effort to arouse peasant support for the CPC in the struggle to seize political power. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the KMT and the CPC forged a united front to withstand the Japanese army. During this time, the interests of the Chinese race were supreme. Nevertheless, Mao Zedong still dared to risk collapse of the united front by initiating a battle between the peasants and the landlords. In CPC-controlled areas, "rent reduction and interest reduction" campaigns were conducted. Had Mao not done this, the peasants would have had no way of differentiating the CPC from the KMT, or telling which was good and which was bad.

In the autumn of 1947, during the critical period of decisive engagements between the KMT and the CPC, Mao Zedong made a brilliant move in the task of winning over the peasants. He called upon the peasants to seize land from the landlords, and he termed this seized land the "fruits of victory." Now, when the KMT wants to take back the fruits of victory from your hands, what will you do, he asked the peasants.

The peasants response was: take up a rifle and join the CPC on the battlefield.

Let us re-examine somewhat the former power-holding party that the CPC defeated—the Chinese KMT. In fairness, although KMT members and their leaders were by no means honest, upright, clean, and beyond reproach, neither were they the political hirelings, the military incompetents, and the grafters bent on selling official posts and titles that the CPC made them out to be. Back then, virtually all of China's most outstanding youths were enlisted by the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, a situation for which Mao Zedong expressed profuse admiration.

In fact, after Chiang was defeated by the CPC and fled to Taiwan, his achievements and those of his KMT colleagues in the building of political power and developing the economy there were in no way inferior to those of the CPC. His achievements in economic growth enabled the island to break free from its undevelopment to become a newly industrializing society. Today, this island's international trade volume is virtually on a par with the whole mainland, and it has ranked first and second in the world for the past decade in foreign exchange and gold

reserves. Ironically, the economic revolution that the CPC has carried out on the mainland has used almost entirely the Taiwan development model as a blueprint. Moreover, Taiwan capital and management skills have also begun to flow back to the mainland.

Nevertheless, Taiwan's construction achievements had a precondition, namely that when Chiang and his sons fled to the island, they tossed to the CPC, which had just seized power, the huge burden of several hundred million impoverished peasants. Without the removal of this burden, Chiang's economic achievements would have been absolutely impossible. Actually, the KMT brought several hundred thousand peasants to Taiwan in the form of lower ranking officers and men in its armed forces, but once again the KMT showed its inability to deal with peasants. Following their retirement, these several hundred thousand officers and men once again created numerous troubles for the authorities, and they remain no small burden on Taiwan society to this day.

In the end, defeat became a fateful turning point. At this point, the party began an extremely rigorous trek, and it made repeated mistakes, but the KMT's rapid slide toward oblivion halted miraculously.

The existence of this enormous group of several hundred million peasants had put the KMT in a passive and vulnerable position from the very beginning in its battle with the CPC.

The intense battle between the KMT and the CPC took place during the 22 years between 1927 and 1949. Since industrial production was still in a primitive and ignorant state at that time, China was still a classic feudal agricultural society in which two large classes—the peasants and local landlords—were sharply antagonistic politically because of mutual clashes of interests. Bureaucrats, plant managers, and intellectual groups controlled the nation's economic lifelines and the bastions of ideology and culture. Moreover, virtually all of the hard core strength and key members of political parties, government, and the armed forces were members of the local landlord class. (This was also true of the CPC during its early period). The KMT was relatively free in its battle with the old warlords. It could both support the peasants' battle against landlords, and support the urban social upper crust made up of landlords, plant managers, and intellectuals in maintaining order. However, once, it seized political control of the whole country (i.e., succeeded in putting down the warlords) and became the power-holding party, it immediately faced the seemingly impossible choice on which it absolutely could not maintain an ambiguous neutrality, namely whether to support the peasants against the landlords, or to support the landlords in suppressing the peasants.

This meant that the KMT had to choose an enemy for itself. The problem lay in which to choose?

This choice was both grim and extremely daunting. Soothing the peasants to win their support was bound to

require forcing the landlords and urban interest groups to make concessions to the peasants, thereby creating rebellion by forces at the top throughout society. Support for the landlord class and for urban interest groups would entail suppressing the peasants. (The Chinese language has an idiom, "driven to join the Liang Mountain rebels," which means forcing the peasants to banditry against society. Subsequently, while at his provisional capital city at Yanan, Mao Zedong very much appreciated a Chinese opera titled "Driven Up Liang Mountain." Jiang Qing, who he later married, played the leading female role in this opera).

When he became military commander-in-chief of the Northern Expedition to suppress the northern warlords and unite the country, Chiang not only won the wholehearted support of the peasants, but also saw with his own eyes the enormity and difficulty of the problem of controlling peasant strength. When under pressure from social forces at the top level in the cities and foreign capital interest groups, he ultimately chose to turn the barrel of the gun on the peasants, not only did he have to go through a test of courage, but he was also certainly morally tormented.

Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT could not take a middle-of-the road position that harmonized contradictions, the way feudal dynasties in China had done historically when they were first established, in order to mollify the struggle between classes in order to gain social stability. A large body of evidence suggests that Chiang tried to do this, but China during the 1930s was unable to replay history. Modern industry had begun to appear, foreign capital had flowed into the country, a democratic class was taking shape, and, more importantly, a Communist Party existed openly.

In 1927, Chiang tried to wipe out the CPC by using surprise attack tactics in order to set the stage for his own easy control (or mollification) of this fragmented society. The results suggest, however, that Chiang's choice of this method was a fatal mistake. Not only did it drive the CPC into the arms of the peasants, giving the CPC a solid base in society, but it also provided the several hundred million peasants with a fairly mature organizer. The CPC, which had nowhere else to turn, and the Chinese peasants, who likewise had no means of deliverance and were anxious to free themselves, were a nice fit for each other that rapidly joined to become a social force capable of overturning the old social order.

The CPC at that time might have been more accurately termed the peasant party. The confrontation between the CPC and the KMT, and the decisive battles on a super large scale of two huge military blocs were, in effect, an all-out war between the peasants and the landlord class and urban upper level interest groups. However, neither the peasants nor the landlords were the victors on the battlefield. This was because, judging from the outcome, the peasants gained no advantage other than obtaining land, and the land apportioned to them was taken back

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very quickly by a new landlord—the state—in the name of “taking the socialist cooperativization road.” The only victor was the CPC, and it was China’s industrialization that really benefitted from the war. This outcome symbolized the modern (the capitalist?) character of the traditional warfare between peasants and landlords owing to the participation of the CPC.

Although the CPC’s choice of the peasants was forced, once established, this marriage generated another great shake-up right up until the ultimate fruits of victory were obtained. Members of other classes, notably the large number of the young intellectuals who came from landlord families, were recruited into the CPC ranks where they became a mainstay force. However, this did not affect the CPC’s peasant standpoint and line. This was because these joiners had to accept indoctrination and brainwashing to change their standpoint. To use the words of Mao Zedong, they had to “sit their asses down on the side of the peasants” before they could be trusted.

The choice of the peasants for support, and standing with the peasants, was the correct line of which Mao spoke, and the education of the peasants and curtailment of their blindness in action, as well as the use of disguised means to undermine the landlords’ resistance were what might be termed “policies and strategies.” Mao’s line and policies also met with stiff challenges from his colleagues. In the history of the CPC, these challenges are termed “leftist” and “rightist” erroneous lines. For Mao Zedong, a rightist line of appeasing the landlords was truly intolerable, but a leftist trend divorced from the peasants and that abandoned the peasants was even more detestable, because to do this “would forfeit the revolution.” Mao Zedong’s subsequent antipathy toward Liu Shaoqi and his wariness of Zhou Enlai may have been related to the experiences and proclivities of these CPC leaders to work mostly on urban worker activities. Before Mao passed away, the Chinese were more inclined to believe that Mao’s mistakes were leftist. They believed him to be the instigator of ultra-leftism. This is very difficult for western students of Chinese affairs to understand. Because Mao Zedong never heeded directives of the Communist International nor acted in a dogmatic Marxist-Leninist way, nor ever became divorced from the peasants to become involved in urban proletarian demonstrations and rebellion, he was able to rescue the CPC and lead it to success.

Chinese history has repeatedly attested that the peasants decide everything. So, now that the CPC has established a new political authority, do the peasants still decide everything? Now that Deng Xiaoping has promoted a new national policy of reform and opening to the outside world, will the peasants be able to decide the success or failure of reform?

2. A Choice the CPC Faces: Whether To Abandon the Peasants

After the CPC took political control of the entire country, not only did it also find itself in a volcanic

crater of clashes between the interests of the peasants and other groups, but it also realized very clearly from its own successful experiences the strength and frightfulness of peasant power. Even more seriously, when the CPC began socialist industrialization and transformation, a new set of very real contradictions appeared in society, namely clashes between the interests of urban workers (including the intellectuals and the CPC, government, and military cadres), and the peasants.

As for the old contradictions, during the first year after taking power, the CPC solved them by dividing up the land of the landlords and rich peasants among the peasants. However, there was no simple method for solving the new contradiction between the workers and the peasants. Since a huge difference exists in labor efficiency between modern industrial production and agricultural production dominated by hand tools and animal power, real inequalities are bound to exist between worker and peasant brothers in the worker-and-peasant families that are the new China. What is more, when two brothers share a piece of cake, every additional mouthful one gets deprives the other of the same amount.

As the head of the household, the CPC is now facing two extraordinarily thorny choices. To mollify the peasants will mean slowing or even abandoning industrialization, but without industrialization, China will have no progress. To accelerate industrialization means depriving the peasants. Is the CPC willing to make the peasants its own antithesis?

Commendably, there was virtually unanimous agreement among high-level CPC cadres about abandoning the peasants temporarily to develop industrial production throughout the country. (There were also exceptions, such as the celebrated Marshal Peng Dehuai, who was known for stubbornness and who got into a confrontation with Mao Zedong for “pleading” on the peasants behalf and was removed from office. It is extremely curious that in reassessing the rights and wrongs and the ins and out of this quarrel today, virtually all CPC theoreticians rebuke and blame Mao Zedong with one voice and complain of injustice to Marshal Peng Dehuai. This is unjust. As the son of a peasant, why wouldn’t Mao Zedong have been willing to strive harder for spoils for the peasants? If blame should be placed for the mistake of depriving the peasants too much, then one should clarify whether the essential “line” is correct). This choice was both painful and fraught with danger for the CPC, but it was also extraordinarily prudent. For more than 20 years thereafter, the CPC used its political power to tighten the belts of the peasants in order to build its own relatively complete industrial system under straitened circumstances behind a tightly closed national door and to become one of the members of the world nuclear club.

Now that the matter is finished, we can make the following assumption: Had the CPC made an opposite

choice at that time, its industrialization road would have been a protracted one in which wealthy peasants accumulated capital which they used to run hand processing workshops and then went on to run industrial plants. Would China's peasants begin to operate several industrial plants after more than 2,000 years of accumulating? Would a China without industry be able to survive intact among covetous surrounding countries?

In theoretical terms, the CPC's shift from a peasant standpoint to an industry standpoint meant abandonment of agricultural socialism for national capitalism. Although, it was necessary to use rigid Marxist dogmatism somewhat embarrassedly to correct itself out of the need to pay attention to the peasant's interests from time to time, this was not classic state capitalism. However, the means used to expropriate the nation's capital were both classic and clever. With eagerness and zest, small fry plant managers were picked clean.

Centralized state capitalism was the starting point for China's modernization, but unavoidably it inflicted great pain, and left scars from various totalitarian abuses on the national organism. It also greatly damaged the national image. This pauper had not yet learned to use a knife and fork, so when very hungry, his table manners were not very refined.

Nevertheless, history will record the following facts: Under the leadership of unrefined or rather boorish leaders, China began its first steps toward modernization.

Now the only problem remaining is: How to cope with the peasants?

3. Two Plans For Solving the Peasant Problem: Shackling and Emancipation

Every nation in the world takes one of the following two actions to deal with or control multitudes of people who can damage, assault, or threaten overall social order: Either they proscribe their movement, or completely eradicate their distinctiveness so that they can no longer pose a threat. The second of these two courses is the better of the two, but assimilation of China's peasants is simply impossible because of the limitations that circumstances impose; thus, all that is left as an option is the shackling method. Clearly there is nothing in these plans per se that recommends one over the other. America's European emigrants shackled their black slaves for more than 100 years, and they have assimilated them for more than 100 years since the "Emancipation Proclamation," but race riots still occur frequently today.

The social impact of China's peasants on China's cities is evident. Purely on the basis of the huge difference in culture and awareness resulting from differences in education, these two groups of Chinese may be divided into two different races. Interracial discrimination exists to a marked degree. Arrogance and servility, compassion and

envy, separation and intrusion become universal states of mind in dealings between cities and the countryside.

The opportunity for assimilation will not exist for a fairly long time, because the level of development of industrial production simply cannot provide enough jobs for the peasants to move to the cities to live. During this period, any effort at assimilation will be at the cost of a regression of society overall. The assignment up to the mountains and down to the countryside of tens of millions of students between the end of the 1960s and the end of the 1970s was a classic work of Mao Zedong's romanticism. The result was interruption of the education of an entire generation. The social morality and order problems occasioned by the tide of peasants entering the cities during the 1980s is also extremely serious and has already created numerous real problems and dangers for society.

Mao Zedong's Plan: Shackle the Peasants Firmly to the Land

Mao Zedong's plan for managing the peasants was a fairly complex dialectical system made up of many different ideas mixed together. It contained both idyllic illusions and communist daydreams; it was replete with both gentle education and guidance and harsh controls and compulsory measures; it relied on both harsh Marxist principles and a large body of experience in governing inherited from history. That such a wealth of ingredients was wrapped up in a single system not only amply attested to Mao Zedong's genius and creativity, but also proved to be extremely effective. (When discussing Chinese matters, my students were often astounded by Mao's genius. Half of them are willing to accept that Mao was a god or no ordinary mortal). Six hundred million (later becoming 800 million) impoverished Chinese peasants who lacked an education, but who had a rich tradition of rebellion, were docilely shackled to the land for 30 years to give China enough time for industrialization.

A. The Cooperativization Movement

The CPC began to experiment with cooperative production in the countryside immediately after founding the people's republic. Subsequently, it promoted cooperativization in rural areas through the use of administrative authority (virtually the use of force) to bring about a transformation. This effort did not end until 1958 following establishment of the people's communes when all privately owned peasant land was taken over and centralized. However, thereafter, the cooperativization of agricultural production, otherwise known as the people's communes, was written into the constitution to become an iron principle of socialism that no one dared disturb.

Cooperativization, as originally envisioned, must have been well-intentioned. After dividing the means of production, including land, among the peasants a polarization might still occur owing to disparities in production conditions. The CPC absolutely did not want to create a

new landlord class with its own hands. Furthermore, cooperativization offered advantages for the promotion of superior varieties of crops and breeds of cattle, and the use of new techniques. It also benefitted farmland capital construction. Therefore, one might say that this scheme had the subjective well-intentioned motivation of raising the level of agricultural production.

However, two later events that occurred, one after another, caused unexpected deviations from the original plans for cooperativization and the people's communes, which turned them into a ready-made model that could be used to control the peasants.

The first event was the great mass fervor of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Apparently deluded by the fervor of his enthusiastic subordinates, Mao Zedong quickly lapsed into a kind of wonderment that generated a miraculous premonition. He likened China to an atom bomb. "Once this atom bomb explodes, society will liberate enormous energy. We will be able to do things that were never possible before."

The people's communes were just the right organizational form for an atom bomb explosion. Furthermore, they offered a once-in-a-thousand-year opportunity to solve the disparities between industry and agriculture in one step, thereby completely eradicating old-style agriculture. Thereupon, the people's communes immediately began to set up military camps (one might say concentration camps) specializing in various kinds of production. Everything having to do with small-scale agriculture was discarded overnight. Even peasant family kitchens were supplanted by large communist mess halls. Commune members were set to do all kinds of production in industry, agriculture, and mining. Virtually every commune had its own steel mill, and scientific research organizations were set up too.

This even revealed Mao's true design of using the elevation of the peasants to eliminate the peasants, and the people's communes happened to provide the organizational means for realization of this idea. Mao himself did not put much faith in the various statistics by which local officials at all levels reportedly showed the brilliant accomplishments of the Great Leap Forward, nor was he much interested. He paid more attention to the process for the attainment of utopian illusions than to ultimate goals. This was because the human spirit would become beautiful and the soul purified through the process of struggle. This method for making a rapid transition from the old morality to communist morality was very likely a shortcut to the complete transformation of the peasants. Later on, Mao Zedong—this son of a peasant—never forgot as long as he lived this goal of educating and transforming the peasants.

The second event was the rapid rise of "tendencies toward capitalism" among the peasants following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward. The peasants resorted to theft, vagrancy, and country-fair blackmarking to challenge the CPC regime which were a kind of

punishment for visionary communism. In particular, the selling of grain and vegetables at high prices on the black market directly threatened the stability of urban workers. These realities were not only a harsh blow to Mao's enthusiastic plans for transforming the peasantry, but they confirmed the frightful preconception in Mao's brain that this huge horde of peasants was a hot bed for the constant breeding of germs. It was "generating capitalism every minute of the day." It was at this time that Mao Zedong's view of China's peasants underwent a major change. No longer did he harbor illusions about them; instead, he began to form a latent fear of them.

History will clarify the following puzzle: Did Mao Zedong forsake the peasants or did the peasants forsake Mao Zedong?

During the mid- and late-1960s, Mao Zedong launched two large-scale mopping up campaigns against "spontaneous tendencies toward capitalism" in rural villages throughout the land. The "socialist education campaign" launched in 1964 brought under suspicion virtually every grass-roots level cadre below the commune level. Work teams made up of urban workers and staff went down to townships and villages to energize idlers and the impoverished in peasant households and to conduct investigation and purges of cadres. Mao Zedong said that what we are countering is the KMT.

The goal of the second campaign launched in 1969 continued to be a crackdown on "renascent capitalism" in rural villages. The targets of this campaign were even expanded to include fairly well-off peasant households and craftsmen. Simply because they had a greater opportunity to earn money than the peasants in general and were slightly better off, these people were classified as "newborn bourgeoisie." When the campaign was concluded, the means by which these peasants could leave the land to make a living were seriously curtailed.

Not only did these two campaigns nail the peasants firmly to the land, but they firmly shackled peasant thinking as well. The peasants, who lived in dread of the power of the regime, remained silent out of fear. Resigned to poverty, they dared not complain.

In feudal times, China practiced the Baojia neighborhood administrative system to muzzle the people's mouths and restrict their behavior. The peasants won victory over the landlords by following the CPC, but they had not completely liberated themselves. The control that the tri-level rural network, consisting of production teams, production brigades, and people's communes, exercised was similar to, or greater than, that of the old Baojia system. This was because it not only limited peasant speech and actions, but basically extinguished their hopes of becoming wealthy or achieving upward social mobility through struggle.

The fact is that despite a marked increase in gross output of grain and gross agricultural income between 1949 and 1977, because of the increase in rural population and a

dramatic rise in urban grain consumption, the peasant per capita annual grain ration did not increase. The government's low grain price policy gave the peasants extremely little surplus money to expand reproduction. Agriculture continued to hover miserably at the original level.

Even so, we still cannot lump together, or regard equally, the CPC regime and all former governments including the KMT one. Though they were all tyrannies for the peasants, their goals and motivations differed enormously. Mao Zedong had unspeakable difficulties. He had to conduct the daunting task of industrialization while surrounded and threatened by enemies. (During this period, on at least three occasions the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons to attack China, and the USSR was prepared to do so once). Had the peasants used spontaneous capitalist methods to undo construction plans and the regime from within, would he have stood quietly by with folded arms? Furthermore, as Mao himself said, major principles take precedence over minor principles. For the sake of a major principle (increasing the country's industrial power), he would have had no alternative but to play rough with his own peasant brethren.

Mao Zedong's methods were certainly wrong, but there was nothing very wrong with his motives. The question is how to evaluate the results of the strict control of the peasants by the people's communes. Had a policy of complete liberation of the peasants been initiated in 1949 that allowed them to develop freely, China would certainly have a different look today. Possibly it might have long since become another India.

B. The campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture

Mao Zedong's feelings toward the peasants did not change because of the peasant's expression of tendencies toward capitalism and their bourgeois greed. He remained a son of the peasantry throughout. During the great famine of 1960, when numerous peasants starved to death, he was so upset he could not sleep at night. On several occasions, he wept bitterly, and he ate no meat for several years thereafter. He also hoped that the peasants would continue to rid themselves of starvation and poverty, but this campaign to become wealthy had to meet three conditions: 1) Not permitting peasants to leave the land to avoid a threat to urban industrialization; 2) equal, common prosperity, not leaving out any "class brethren," nor permitting a gap between the poor and the rich; and 3. the basic means of becoming wealthy was to mobilize the power of the peasants to the maximum extent possible. Mao Zedong said: The power of man is boundless. Man is master of his fate. The more numerous the people, the easier it is to get things done. This philosopher still had not given up the idea of uplifting, transforming, and eliminating the peasantry through labor (meaning particularly Leninist style compulsory labor for which no compensation is paid).

This was virtually an insoluble problem, but Zhou Enlai, who regarded Mao Zedong's intentions favorably, and

who was extremely wise, found the key to unlock it. He told Mao about the Dazhai Brigade located in a barren mountain region of Shanxi Province. He said that during a year of great natural catastrophe, this brigade's output did not decrease; the peasants were filled with enthusiasm, and they were well clothed and well fed.

Zhou Enlai did not lie. The villagers of Dazhai, which is located in an arid mountain region where nature is at its worst, shouldered large rocks to build a series of solid stone dams, which they filled with soil to form a "small plateau" having a spongy surface layer of soil. This man-made project was able to withstand ordinary natural disasters in this barren mountain region. In a longer-term and wider sense, were all the arid regions of north and central China to build similar man-made projects, the erosion problems that have troubled China for several thousand years could be basically solved, and even the waters of the Huang He would be clear enough to see to the bottom. A popular ballad says: When the ancient sages were born, the Huang He was clear. When China gave birth to Mao Zedong, the old tableau took on a new color.

Mao Zedong was extremely excited about the Dazhai production role model.

In a certain sense, the peasants in Dazhai Village rescued Mao Zedong. What was only a rural role model for production experience and farming techniques to begin with, not only enabled the dejected Mao to find a "basic way out" for China's peasants, but it also provided a correct interpretation for his romantic ideals and heroic will. He said, "nothing is impossible under the sun so long as one is willing to scale the heights." Belief in the heroic will can solve all problems. If the country's several hundred million peasants and more than 10 million production teams were to do as Dazhai did, could not China build a communist paradise from the flat ground? Yes, it could. Several years earlier, Mao Zedong had angrily asked his CPC colleagues: Who says that something cannot be done that has never been done before?

Thus, Mao Zedong solemnly issued an order to the whole CPC and all the peasants: In agriculture, learn from Dazhai.

Mao Zedong's fondness for Dazhai was evident. If we analyze the reasons for this feeling in terms of more substantive psychological factors, we very easily find a deep-rooted attachment between him and Dazhai. This attachment was the most splendid dream that a Chinese peasant can have: A comfortably well off peasant family life that is idyllically beautiful, detached from the cares of the world and consequently tranquil, and self-sufficient and carefree. Mao Zedong expressed this dream in a poem: A land in which flowers are in full bloom everywhere in a place suffused with sunlight.

As an active practitioner of Marxism and socialist theory, Mao Zedong enlarged the meaning of a comfortably well-off peasant household to a production team.

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This enlargement had the effect of turning decay into a miracle. Not only did it place a socialist halo around vulgar and narrow peasant ideals, but this "great family" idea could be used for other purposes such as purifying the soul, uplifting the peasants, and changing poverty to prosperity. More important, one might say that the greatest objective result from the movement to learn from Dazhai in agriculture was that it bestowed ideals and hope on the peasants, permitting them to be shackled willingly to the land.

China's feudal society lasted for several thousand years during which successive dynastic rulers devised heaven knows how many schemes for keeping the peasants within bounds. (China's earliest known written law in the seventh century B.C. provided for the beheading of wandering peasants). However, no plan ever was more perfect and effective than the Dazhai plan that Mao Zedong devised. This plan tempers severity with mercy, combined seduction with force, and mixed ideals with reality. Even today, after Deng Xiaoping disbanded production teams nationwide with an administrative order, Mao Zedong's Dazhai plan retains its relatively sacred position (only in theory, not in practice any longer). In any case, the basic conditions for building homesteads and improving agricultural production should be decent. The problem is that when a new generation of leaders finds out that it must restrict the peasants (and later on, we will address the numerous problems that the emancipation of the peasants have occasioned for these leaders) and develop agricultural production, it will no longer have the magic weapon of the Dazhai plan. It will only be able to use payment of remuneration to buy the labor of the peasants.

That many people in China still cherish Mao Zedong today is an undeniable fact.

Since Mao Zedong had god-like authority in China, the campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture encountered virtually no opposition from his colleagues. Even though Mr. Zhou Enlai, the leader of the conservative faction, silently kept his own views on numerous issues, on this issue, history retains a record only of his heartfelt admiration and unstinting advocacy of the Dazhai experience. Following his rehabilitation during the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping also did not express dissatisfaction with, opposition to, or amended views about the campaign to learn from Dazhai.

The only dissent came from the intellectuals and a small number of mid- and low-level government officials. Although weak, the maliciousness of their methods had a fairly widespread effect. These opponents disseminated and spread an unverified rumor: Dazhai's achievements stemmed largely from reliance on large amounts of money and material assistance from the government. Another rumor said that two anti-aircraft artillery regiments had been stationed for a long time in the Dazhai mountains, and had used artillery shells to disperse any black clouds that might carry hailstones.

They asked sarcastically whether Mao Zedong could send so many anti-aircraft artillery divisions to the large number of production teams in the whole country.

The anti-aircraft division story is unbelievable, because it goes too far. Although anyone could see through this rumor very easily, it spread like wildfire among intellectuals and lower ranking cadres, showing that these people did not care about its truthfulness so long as they could vent their dissatisfaction toward Mao in a sarcastic and oblique attack. Under the circumstances at that time, such Chinese-style humor, or rumors, were the only way they had to express their dejected feelings.

The material support part of the story was very likely true. It was only on the amount of support, whether money was paid for the support, and whether it was provided at parity prices that the reports of the Dazhai villagers and the outside world differed. At that time, materials were extremely scarce in China. Agricultural fertilizer and oil could not be bought at any price, but it was probably a fact that local officials had taken the initiative to supply Dazhai with these materials.

This was a wonderful fact. It demonstrated vividly how CPC cadres could raise the red flag in order to strike down the red flag, how they could use a pitiful amount of farm materials to steal the chastity of the darling at Mao Zedong's knee. If Dazhai accepted a ton of chemical fertilizer outside quota, no matter whether it was paid for at the market price, that amounted to the sale of its virtue, and it lost its purity as a model for agriculture. It is extremely unlikely that the people of Dazhai refused these blandishments.

All this proceeded from the well-intentioned motivation of "cherish and protect" the "red flag" that Mao personally inculcated. Both formerly and nowadays, many Chinese heroes, models, and even exemplary collectives were destroyed in this way. This often puts people in the mind of an innocent and simple young maiden who was extremely unable to fend off the seduction and sweet talk of a group of despicable men who frequently exaggerated her achievements to the point of absurdity, thereby making her look foolish, or flattered her and made her into an omnipotent goddess, putting her on a pedestal for people to see as though she were a carnival monkey. Many western statesmen had great respect for the late Premier Zhou Enlai. However, when he convened the fourth National People's Congress, Zhou elevated a semi-literate peasant from Dazhai to the position of deputy premier of the State Council, possibly to cater to Mao. Why did Zhou do this? Given his astuteness, it was something he should not have done that harmed both Mao Zedong and the peasant and simultaneously sullied himself.

In studying Chinese matters, we frequently find that the Chinese really do not fully appreciate or cherish their leader, Mao Zedong. When provincial governments and county magistrates responsible for important tasks went in droves on pilgrimage to Dazhai and took along their

wives and children or their female secretaries to see the sights and enjoy themselves, Dazhai village—this agricultural production unit that had achieved fame by practicing Mao Zedong's ideology of self-reliance—was already discredited in the minds of the people throughout the land and had virtually become a freak.

The ones who really opposed the campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture and the one's who effectively wrecked this campaign were the peasants throughout the country.

Sole reliance on spiritual stimulation (including praise and criticism and harsh measures such as being labelled counterrevolutionary) to mobilize hundreds of millions of peasants to carry out farmland capital construction, and sustaining this enthusiasm for a decade on short rations and without payment of compensation, is something that no country can do, yet the CPC did it, even though the reliability of reported returns from the farmland is very suspect.

The opposition of the peasants did not take the form of passive work slowdowns but active work slowdowns, and going to extremes in carrying out orders. When carrying out a directive on deep plowing (which was also for the purpose of having a spongy soil surface), the peasants in northern Shanxi Province plowed 1 meter deep. As a result the immature soil layer rose up over the mellow soil layer, so there was virtually no harvest the following year. In Inner Mongolia the fertile grasslands were devastated during the campaign to learn from Dazhai, and more than 10 years later, many meadows had regressed to become deserts. In south China, a major effort was made to fill in lakes to make farmland; consequently, famous lakes there virtually disappeared from the map. The results of these efforts were tragic, because once these natural water conservancy projects that regulated water volume no longer functioned, the middle and lower reaches of the Chang Jiang were subject to extreme risk of flooding.

The mocking summarization of a decade of farmland water conservancy capital construction occurred in 1975 when major floods hit Henan and Anhui provinces. In a single night, more than 300 people met violent deaths. Rainfall that year was not extremely abnormal, and even an inundation should not have caused so tremendous a loss of life. The problem stemmed from construction in the hills of more than 10 small reservoirs of dubious quality. This string of reservoirs fell like a row of dominoes, breaching the dam of one reservoir causing the continuous collapse of the others. The more water impounded the greater the inundation, causing greater and greater damage. Caught unprepared, a torrent of water descended from the more than 10 reservoirs killing many people in their sleep.

It should be noted that responsibility for these mistakes cannot be blamed on the lack of knowledge and inability of local leaders. Many things were done knowingly and willingly, as well as extremely enthusiastically by the

peasant. One example was digging up meadows to grow farm crops. Another was filling in lakes, which caused the disappearance of virtually half the area of the famed 800-li Dianchi Lake in Yunnan Province. Peasants often completed these destructive actions, which defied common sense, secretly under cover of darkness. Naturally, in many cases peasant actions were done with the approval of the cadres. Moreover, the central government and local governments did not order a halt to these actions, which may be termed crimes, at that time! No one had the courage to halt them, because they were all carried out under the banner of learn from Dazhai in agriculture. Who dared oppose Mao Zedong?

Once again, Mao Zedong was sold out by his peasant brethren. The selfishness, narrowness, and shortsightedness of the peasants turned into a disaster during execution of the wonderful blueprint that he had drawn for them. But more fairly, when you set out to shackle to the impoverished soil several hundred million peasants who are not docile and have a rich tradition of resistance and sabotage, won't they play pranks that upset you? When peasants in Ningxia's Moslem community asked permission to raise pigs and collect manure, Mao Zedong completely lost face in the entire third world.

After studying various statistics published by the Chinese government, Harvard University Professor Dwight H. Perkins reached the following conclusion: "If the 20-year (1957-1977) mobilization of manpower (meaning the manpower for farmland water conservancy capital construction) is looked at as a whole, factors such as the increase in chemical fertilizer, insecticides, and improved varieties and breeds account for about two-thirds of the total increase in food output. Increase in the work force resulting from the addition of manpower to till the fields directly and from the use of machinery, plus the expansion of the irrigated area account for the increase in the remaining output portion."

All of the data that Professor Perkins used comes from the *Chinese Statistical Yearbook*, and the *Chinese Agricultural Yearbook*, both of which are published by the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. Professor Perkins' results are less than 20 percent the contribution of manpower that the campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture claimed for the increase in grain output. If some people feel these results are dismaying and difficult to accept emotionally, they should realize that the painstaking care and sweat of several hundred million peasants working 15 to 20 years during winter in freezing temperatures on frozen ground should be worth more. Another way of calculating this is to suppose a substantial portion of the chemical fertilizer and agricultural pesticides were thrown into the ocean by the conservative peasants and played no role at all. The benefit from farmland capital construction would thus increase in direct proportion to the amount of chemical fertilizer thrown into the sea. But is not such a calculation an even greater insult to China's peasants?

In all fairness, we have not had the heart to factor in another fact here, and that is that more than a decade of work that brings no return, and more than a decade of working might and main in an idealistic spirit with no compensation at all under guidance of the red flag ultimately produces a rebellious attitude. It engenders an inclination to give up detestable work on the land. In view of the many events now taking place, this inclination seems to be taking revenge on society. Not only has it caused the scrapping and destruction of some farmland facilities that are all that remains of the great accomplishments of the campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture, but it has also destroyed the fine tradition of hard work, pragmatism, diligence, and thrift that the Chinese peasants have maintained for several thousand years. In many places, large Chinese farmland facilities have been turned over to the local government, becoming their financial burden. Meanwhile, the beneficiaries—the peasants who contract farming of the land—are content to stand idly by watching government officials wrestle with the dilemma. So you want to collect money from the peasants to maintain or expand these facilities? If you do, the peasants will level accusations against the grass-roots government officials to the central government, and the central government can only support the peasants under these circumstances. The central government does not want to cause all the peasants to flee the land ultimately because of the "increase in peasant burdens."

In China, where the amount of cultivated land is less than 0.1 hectares per capita, a large area lies fallow because no one wants to work it. Is this a punishment for Mao Zedong's having launched the campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture? Are his profound feelings for the Chinese peasants and the sacrifices he made so that flowers would bloom everywhere and sunlight would suffuse China's rural villages not to be recompensed?

Once again, this demonstrates God's unfairness.

C. The Great Cultural Revolution

The launching by Mao in his twilight years of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," is a mistake which is difficult to understand, and the mobilization of several hundred million peasants to take part in this anarchical madness was an unpardonable sin that Mao Zedong committed. It is unpardonable because he knew very well the narrowness and the semiliteracy of the peasants, and he knew very well what would result from large groups of people like this creating rebellion on an ultra-large scale. But he refused Liu Shaoqi's and Deng Xiaoping's advice. (These two and Peng Zhen tried to concoct a document limiting the Cultural Revolution to the ideological and academic fields, but this was deemed a plot). He was hell bent on rallying the peasants to rebel against government officials at all levels. Thus, for two years, from 1967 to the end of 1968, China's rural villages became a virtual slaughter house.

The full CPC Central Committee should take responsibility for Mao Zedong's errors, inasmuch as Mao had

committed similar errors more than once, and the CPC Central Committee had not only not rendered a correct settlement verdict, but had praised them as Mao's contributions. This was not a matter of not speaking out of respect, but affirmation of the leader's achievements developing into mythology and becoming a new dogmatism. Wrong things became correct dogma that was diligently enforced. This shows that although the CPC had led a great revolution and won victory, it was still not mature. (The authority and role of the CPC Central Committee has long been like that of a parliament in a Western country, but the way "parliamentarians" are selected is completely in military or family style. They are designated by the senior officer or head of household. Consequently, committee members who toe the line are not very likely to express their views in a truly democratic way, and these "parliamentarians" cannot play a role in supervising and limiting the government and leaders).

In 1926, when the KMT-CPC coalition waged war against the warlords, Hunan peasants (please note, they were Hunan peasants) set up numerous committees with encouragement from the CPC to carry out struggle against the village gentry and landlords. This struggle went too far. It killed people, set fires, and humiliated people. Mao Zedong wrote an article about this in which he jubilantly exclaimed: the hooligan and lazy lout campaign is very good!

Of course, the necessity for the peasants to rebel against the landlords and for the CPC to rely on the peasants for support cannot be criticized, but hell-raising by drifters and louts (actually, truly simple farming peasants did not take part in the hell raising) as a tactic for struggle was bound to infuriate and frighten Chiang Kai-shek's KMT. Thus, when Communists burned and caused disturbances everywhere without taking necessary precautions, Chiang, with the support of infuriated landlords and military personnel, launched an attack against the CPC to round up all of them in one fell swoop. In this attack, CPC grass-roots organizations were practically wiped out and 90 percent of the more than 60,000 CPC members were slaughtered.

This piece of history has never been conscientiously discussed and summarized to this day, because no one dares express a dissenting view. Had Liu Shaoqi not perished tragically during the Cultural Revolution, he might have been able to state some more clearheaded opinions inasmuch as he maintained a reserved attitude toward Mao's peasant campaigns at that time and subsequently.

We continue to say that Mao Zedong's mobilization of the peasants to take part in the Cultural Revolution had a well-intentioned motivation and ample justification.

First of all, the behavior of government officials at all levels in deceiving those above and bullying those below caused the peasants plenty of suffering and even caused starvation on a large scale during the early 1960s. Mao

Zedong had already borne the unbearable from these officials, so he was anxious to incite the peasants to settle accounts with them.

Second, the peasants' "spontaneous tendencies toward capitalism" repeatedly attacked Mao's line and actually threatened it. Mao was no longer willing to tolerate this. He was anxious to wage a once-and-for-all campaign to eradicate this threat completely.

Third, he still wanted to educate and transform the peasants. The stated goal of the Cultural Revolution was to do away with old culture, old morality, old ideology, and old habits and customs. Mao had still not abandoned his plan for the rapid entry of peasants into communism in a moral consciousness sense.

Fourth, Mao was nervous about and lacked confidence in inevitable victory in his decisive battle with President Liu Shaoqi and CPC Secretary General Deng Xiaoping, but he firmly believed that the peasants would stand with him, thus, he mobilized the peasants.

Finally, instigation of the peasants to take part in the Cultural Revolution, and the plan for shackling the peasants to the land were by no means contradictory, because Mao believed that spiritual gains would be translated into material gains. Both the slogans and the actual methods of seizing revolution to promote production and promoting intense development of the campaign to learn from Dazhai in agriculture attested to this point.

There was only one point that Mao did not take into account, and that was what weapons the several hundred million semiliterate peasants would use to eliminate the old morality, ideology, and culture. And on what basis would they differentiate good cadres from bad cadres?

Obviously China's peasants were likewise impoverished on this score. They had virtually nothing to offer. This was because traditional peasant ideology was itself being criticized and purified, and when they memorized the Little Red Book of Mao Thought, aside from rote memorization of some passages, they usually applied their own ways of thinking and moral concepts, thereby completely changing the basic content. Things that should have been eliminated were garbed in Mao Thought, thereby gaining credence everywhere. This was probably one fruit of the Cultural Revolution in the countryside. Armed with this kind of ideology, the peasants went into combat on Mao's front.

Thus, they were more a hindrance than a help. (Since the time that Mao had decided to shackle the peasants to the land following establishment of the people's republic, and ultimately abandoned the peasants in the choice between industrialization and the peasantry, the peasants seemingly had not really helped Mao Zedong in a single instance).

Newspapers in Western countries published a lot about the ridiculous, shameful, stupid, evil, and destructive

actions of the peasants during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, China maintained secrecy about these matters even after Deng Xiaoping had thoroughly repudiated the Cultural Revolution. The only rational explanation for so doing is that this behavior was truly too sordid and repulsive, and that once it became known, the image of the CPC and government would be greatly damaged even though responsibility for it should be borne by the late Mao Zedong.

Because it is impossible to obtain accurate official Chinese data, we cannot know accurately how many of the "five categories" of people (landlords, rich peasants, and any others to whom any status was arbitrarily attached) were slaughtered in the counties of Hunan Province during the first several months of the Cultural Revolution. Since the CPC had assigned a class status to each family during land reform in order clearly to distinguish class alignment, the targets for slaughter were all family members, women and children not excepted. The slaughter of entire families also stemmed from the traditional peasant desire to "eliminate the source of trouble," and the role of Mao Zedong Thought in "preventing class enemies from staging a comeback." (This was an example of how the peasants changed Mao Thought). This slaughter spread like wild fire to townships, villages, and market towns in several counties. At least 100 families and several thousand people were murdered by shooting, burial alive, or collective immolation. After a large number of troops were dispatched to halt the slaughter, a lower-ranking PLA officer said: The tragic scene made one feel as though the end of the world had come."

A little later, a similar slaughter occurred on the grasslands of Inner Mongolia and even in suburban Beijing. Unlike the situation in Hunan, virtually all the targets of the Mongolian slaughter were nomad CPC cadres and CPC members, and the goal of the slaughter was protection of the CPC! The cause was a rumor. Someone fabricated a rumor out of whole cloth that a secret CPC existed in Inner Mongolia whose purpose was the independence of Inner Mongolia. Thus, an investigation began in which those investigated were lynched. Many people confessed under torture. Thus, a whole string of "bad people" were ferreted out. All these "bad people" were cruelly tortured, and some of them died while being tortured during interrogation.

To be fair and just, a basic motivation for Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution was his desire to set up a democratic political mechanism in which the masses participated. Unless one understands this motivation, one cannot explain how Mao permitted and encouraged anarchic behavior by workers and peasants, and why he dismissed from office all officials at every level in the country during a single night. In fact, after the founding of the people's republic, and particularly after the large-scale man-made famine disaster of the early 1960s occurred, Mao felt a general lack of confidence, and even a feeling of hostility toward mid- and

lower-level CPC officials. In addition, since he was surrounded by these people and unable to contact people at the grass roots, he felt isolated and he wondered whether and suspected that they might be hatching plots. Data show that Mao Zedong secretly sent some of his bodyguards to rural villages in some provinces "to hear the problems of the poor." However, no sooner were they out the door than lower-level officials bought them over. The more paid them, the more they took. Not only did Mao not get the factual data for which he longed, but he found that the situation was more serious and frightful than he had realized. (Mao reimbursed the government out of his own pocket for this expense).

China's decision-making machinery must be democratized, Mao Zedong always said, and this was also his ideal. However, he himself was part of an extremely patriarchal bureaucratic system and had become its supreme patriarch. Thus he had no way to promote his idea from top to bottom. All he could do was instigate the masses to revolt and bring down officials at all levels. He hoped that this process might naturally produce a democratic power structure and a democratic work-style like that of the Paris Commune. However, the chaos and destruction of the early Cultural Revolution period doomed this hope. Nevertheless, he did not abandon his efforts. Thus, when the Cultural Revolution formed a new power structure, "revolutionary committees," Mao Zedong persisted in instituting a "three-in-one combination" to enable large numbers of workers and peasants to enter the seats of power. He himself also brought a young worker from Shanghai to his side, and he personally encouraged the Central Committee to elect this worker deputy chairman of the CPC in order to groom him as his successors. (Most foreign leaders who met with Mao Zedong during this period saw this good looking and spirited conventional young man at Mao's side). However, Mao's fine intentions were once again thwarted by the workers and peasants. These people, either because they were ruffians and rascals of dishonorable character to begin with, who climbed to high positions because they were glib and skillful in argument (the young man who became deputy chairman was of this ilk), or because they were very quickly corrupted by power, became despots who used their authority for private gain. The few truly honest ordinary citizens, even if they became officials, could not play a role very easily, both because they lacked education and also the political background for and experience in official in-fighting. The Dazhai peasant who became deputy premier said virtually nothing at State Council meetings. For him, each day was like a year.

On his last birthday (26 December 1975) before his death, Mao met with an old peasant woman he knew at his home in Zhongnanhai. The peasant woman complained tearfully to him that she still did not have enough to eat. This was exactly the same thing he had heard in 1960. After more than a decade of relentless effort, and after a cultural revolution that turned heaven and earth upside down and astounded the world, the peasants'

circumstances were the same, officials still bullied those below and fawned on those above, and reported only good news but never bad. A healthy democratic leadership system has not yet been established, and Mao Zedong suddenly passed away in this depressed and unfortunate frame of mind. He was unable to die in peace.

The Western public and statesmen regard Mao Zedong as an extremely autocratic, crazed CPC emperor. This is a very great mistake. Actually, he, like most Chinese and Westerners, wanted a rational and fair political system, and pinned his hopes on the establishment of a political system that made democratic decisions and restrained the public. However, Mao Zedong was completely unable to do this in China.

In view of his prestige, authority, and political experience, Mao's inability to achieve this probably means that the natural conditions to establish such a political system do not yet exist in China. When one forges ahead when conditions do not exist, fine ideals collide with harsh realities. This was the tragedy in Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution, and it was also his personal misfortune.

Can American interference accomplish what Mao Zedong was unable to do? (Translator's note: This refers to establishment of a scientific, rational decision-making process.)

Mao Zedong used tyrannical methods to stabilize the peasants for 30 years. Despite a great famine that starved many, and despite a cultural revolution that killed many, the Chinese peasants remained shackled to the yellow soil of China. They did not have a destructive impact on China's hard-won industrial society. Was this an accomplishment of Mao or a difficult-to-excuse mistake?

Below we turn to Deng Xiaoping. How will he deal with China's peasants?

Deng Xiaoping's Plan: Liberate the Peasants' Power

Former CPC General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was forced to resign because of his words and deeds during the Beijing incident in 1989, but the title "chief architect of China's reform" that he conferred on Deng Xiaoping, the real supreme leader of the CPC Central Committee, has continue to be used. The Western public does not altogether approve this accolade because it, like the tribute "helmsman" that is applied to Mao Zedong, smacks of obsequiousness. Moreover, from the angle of political decisionmaking, to apply to a person something that has the character of absolute authority is neither scientific nor wise. Deng is a brilliant political leader, but he is also a more than 80-year-old man.

Actually, Deng Xiaoping decided to institute his first reform measures in 1979. At the time rural villages put into effect the output-related household contract system, his reform ideas were extraordinarily down to earth and responsible. His ideas were as follows:

A. To defend Mao Zedong's legacy, provide a greater understanding of and reform only those things requiring change; in other words, "no rejection of everything Mao Zedong did."

B. China's reforms are not bestowed by statesmen, nor do they come from the wisdom and knowledge of intellectuals. They are compelled by starvation. (Mao Zedong thought that when one is poor, one thinks of change.)

C. Translate political issues into economic issues for solution, not being fettered or encumbered by Marx, Lenin, or principles or dogmas that Mao prescribed.

Deng's several "declarations" on reform might well serve as a classic statement for all reformers, in addition to which they are also a most sagacious, and consequently most crafty and tough, statement of political tactics that statesmen might borrow.

Deng positively did not compromise. He stated frankly that some of Mao Zedong's things had to be changed, but he absolutely did not hurt the feelings of numerous faithful CPC members (the sentiments that two whole generations of Chinese had for Mao). He did not want reform to fail under attack from the majority of people, and the point of departure or breakthrough point for reform that he selected was the "starvation" issue, which no one could shun. This may have been a pretext, but with this as a pretext, reform could begin with the support of the people and the silence of opponents.

For statesmen in Western countries, the most important information that Deng conveyed was the truly materialist strategy of "translating political issues into economic issues for solution," shunning "isms" and "class" controversies, allowing facts to make the ultimate decision about the "ism" that society should have and selecting the true master.

This was the only course that China could take at the time, and it was also the one that the West hoped for day and night. It was a way station or step toward China's building of a scientifically rational decision-making system.

Peasant power was certainly a two-edged sword that could be used either for attacks on targets or to wound oneself. Deng Xiaoping's "starvation-forced" reform policy clearly did not take this into full account. Although the envisioned policy of maintaining most of Mao's policies was very wise, it was not realistic. Mao's Chinese rural policy was entirely a closely knit whole. Vibration of a single reinforcing bar might loosen the entire structure. The plan to use some of Mao's policies to maintain rural stability while reforming other policies to solve peasant subsistence and development problems was adolescent wishful thinking that oversimplified the problem. Mao had left behind an intact multistory building not a jerry-built hut. Now that China's history had developed this far, Deng faced a grim and painful

choice: Whether to carry on across the board, or complete repudiation. Seemingly there was no room for choosing a little something from both dishes.

Deng was extraordinarily aware of the seriousness of the problem. He said: "I am of the same generation as Mao Zedong." People of the same generation are together on basics. The issue of toppling Mao Zedong can only be left to later generations. However, he also could not simply do nothing. He had to "cross the river by groping for rocks," trying to find a third way.

Deng's two mostly highly regarded subordinates, Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li, had led the way in Sichuan Province in western China and in Anhui Province in eastern China in carrying out an antistarvation experiment that the Central Committee had not discussed or approved. Although unapproved, use of the "output-related household responsibility system" method for experiments conducted in two provinces separated by a couple of thousand km suggested that they had a common backer or behind-the-scenes planner. This person was later shown to be the "architect" Deng Xiaoping.

Deng was a formidable statesman, both persuasive and tough. You could neither cajole nor coerce him. Within the CPC, maintaining silence, acting first and reporting later, not engaging too much in theoretical controversies and arguments about rights or wrongs, and not acting recklessly had been Deng's style all along. When choosing a pet cat, he never paid attention to the color of its fur and its blood line; all he cared about was its sense of smell and whether its teeth were sharp. Before Deng's pragmatic, utilitarian, and imperious demeanor, Mao Zedong frequently felt helpless. All he could do is sigh in a knowing way and say: "He is always this way. It's always the same old thing."

The experiments in Sichuan and Anhui produced the anticipated success, but they also set off conceptual antagonisms between the peasants and cities.

The reaction of China's peasants was quick, strong, and had pronounced political overtones. The peasants immediately took Deng Xiaoping as their own political leader and gave him the nickname Blue Sky Deng. The political significance of this nickname could not be clearer: Only when Deng held authority over the country could the sky over the country be filled with sunshine. (The significance of this nickname in Chinese is entirely the same as the appellation "red sun" given to Mao Zedong. However, the nickname "red sun" was in praise of Mao during the early days of the people's republic. Later on the peasants did not truly regard Mao Zedong this way.)

At this same time, another folk rhyme having profound political significance spread throughout the country's rural villages. It went: "If you want to eat grain, see Ziyang; if you want to eat rice, see Wan Li." If translated into an American-style election campaign slogan, this folk rhyme might read: Want to fill your belly? Vote for Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li!

According to China's dynastic histories, folk rhymes foretold the collapse of every dynasty. Folk rhymes spread with the speed and over the distance of Gallup poll results. The peasants fervently wanted Deng, Zhao Ziyang, and Wan Li, whose experiments had shaken the old system, to take control of authority to pave the way for peasant emancipation. Mao Zedong used to say: The greater the oppression, the stronger the resistance. Of all the strata in Chinese society, the peasants are the most backward one. The 30-year long starvation policy alone made the peasants become the earliest supporters and promoters of Chinese political reform and economic system reform. The peasants' appeal was an incipient bud of modern democratic political operation.

Urban cadres and workers regarded this with trepidation. They acknowledged that the new rural system really did increase the amount of grain, but they also realized keenly the destructiveness of such experiments on the established order. One old retired general said tearfully: "I have fought wars all my life and I have had many close shaves for socialism. I know that only two large phrases are written on the socialist banner and they are public ownership and common prosperity!" Many others accused Deng of "not wanting socialism," and they attacked Zhao Ziyang for "destroying the Great Wall."

Deng launched a counterattack at once. He said that some people should be permitted to become rich first. He also explained that this was really a step toward common prosperity; it could spur the prosperity of all.

Deng could not imagine at this time that a policy and theory that permitted some people to become rich first was precisely the beginning of the collapse of the entire Great Wall. Whether Deng said that CPC members should take the lead in becoming rich, we have no way of verifying. However, as an old CPC member, he could not be too suspicious about the honesty of the CPC ranks, but it is certain that he was not fully prepared mentally for the possible negative role of rural grass-roots CPC members in the reform process.

Following full implementation of the contract system in rural villages, the power of the emancipated peasants began to diverge. An attack on the "Great Wall" began in two ways.

Destruction of Productivity

At the outset of reform, the peasants expressed tremendous enthusiasm. They were as jubilant as they had been at the time of land reform. At the same time, however, they harbored some deep-seated worries. Would this CPC policy last very long? In order to achieve a fait accompli and also to get real benefits at once, night after night peasants in many places began a destructive dividing up of publicly owned property. Worst of all was the felling of mountain forests. The peasants cut and sold the forests that were nominally apportioned to them. Only after tucking the money into their own pockets did they stop worrying.

Primitive egalitarian notions and shortsightedness were visible everywhere. A correspondent from an official news agency described a scene he had personally witnessed: A production team had too few plow oxen to distribute equally. This set off a quarrel. The production team leader accepted the suggestions of the villagers to kill the plow oxen, cook the meat, and apportion it among all the villagers. The hides and internal organs could also be traded for liquor. That same night, the entire production team celebrated the end of the old era with a feast.

Another incident was more heroic and more absurd. In order to prevent rural cadres from obtaining contract rights to the mechanized mill from which a profit could be made, several young peasants dynamited the mill and its equipment to smithereens under cover of darkness. They became righteous heroes among the villagers.

In the process of forging ahead with the new policy, large agricultural mechanized equipment and water conservancy facilities suffered most. Since the land had been cut up into countless small pieces having defined boundaries, cultivating and harvesting machinery completely lost its usefulness. The several thousand machine plowing stations that had been built throughout the country for more than 20 years became completely paralyzed within one or two years. This included the state-owned large horsepower caterpillar tractors and combines, virtually all of which rusted and corroded to become scrap iron. The loss of irrigation and drainage facilities for want of necessary labor input was also serious. To a very large extent, the flood disasters in the east China region during 1990 were attributable to human damage to the drainage system, which increased losses from the disasters.

It is generally believed that the revolution undertaken to fill stomachs that began in China's rural villages in 1978 set back by about 10 years the level of technology in Chinese agriculture. For the Chinese peasants, this regression was not of crucial concern, because in a land having a large population and relatively scant land, technical equipment in agriculture is a luxury. In fact, following reform, grain output increased, and peasant grain consumption increased markedly. More importantly, dismantling of the production teams gave the peasants freedom of labor and personal freedom.

For the Chinese government, and for the Chinese government's effective control of the peasants, this regression was truly mortal!

During the mid-1980s, when the Chinese government began to build the second trunk line on a railroad running from north to south, the total amount budgeted was nearly three times what it had been in the early 1980s. By the time construction on this railroad began in the early 1990s, the total budgeted amount rose another more than two times, and three years down the road when the railroad opens to traffic, the actual total amount invested will certainly have increased even

more. The rapid increase in construction costs have two causes. One is the rise in prices of raw and processed materials caused by inflation; the other is the peasant's unbridled increase in land prices, which have become like a bottomless pit. Every government construction plan from which all the people can benefit will seem fraught with countless difficulties and difficult to move ahead with because of obstacles that the peasants raise that are hard to deal with. Calculations show that had work begun on this railroad 10 years earlier, the saving in costs from this factor alone would have been 25 percent what it is today. This amount of money could have built four railroads of the same kind!

Another example is even more interesting. The first rural village to become rich appeared near Shenzhen. After they sold the land, the peasants in this village invested the money obtained in extremely high profit financial speculation. Today the amount of money per capita makes these villagers richer than French peasants.

Contracting of the land resulted in the government's rapid loss of conditions for low cost capital investment. Today the peasants set at the negotiating table, their hands extended toward you for astronomical sums of money for their land. They poke some dried twigs into the barren land and ask you to pay compensation for "loss of forest cover."

Consequently, there is another line of thinking: What would happen if the peasants had been allowed to starve several years longer?

Domino Effect

A provincial CPC secretary imbued with the spirit of reform said in a newspaper article that China's peasants are simple and responsible. Their own demand is a full stomach and to farm as they like.

He is wrong because he does not understand the peasants. Although China's peasants are simple and docile (that they were shackled to the land for 30 years by Mao Zedong without any major hooliganism or rebellions taking place attests to this point), however, once their stomachs are full, they will certainly be likely to make an incessant demand, and this demand will no longer be a demand for low-level survival but the desire to develop. The desire to develop is unstoppable. (Economists call it the ability to create wealth, and socialists term it realization of human perfection and value. The psychological explanation is greed). Those who yield to it survive; those who oppose it perish.

A university professor in Beijing said that survival problems serve as a bottleneck. During the struggle for survival, the genie is kept in the bottle. Now the bottleneck has been broken and the genie is out. Can you get it back in?

To whom does the genie refer? Is it the peasants or peasant greed and the desire to create wealth?

Another cadre's warning was more specific. He said that with the institution of the contract system in rural villages, the first domino has already fallen.

Their fears and warnings are certainly not superfluous. The large number of people on relatively scarce land in China's rural villages, and the low grain price policy that the government pursues out of necessity impel the peasants to rush immediately toward a new goal once their simple subsistence needs are met. No longer does the next goal lie in the fields; it exists more broadly in every corner of Chinese society, and it is money and opportunity. But it is not just surplus agricultural manpower that is leaving the fields. This is an overall trend for all members of rural villages. Every resource that can be used is used to extract wealth from society. These resources include farmland, manpower, recklessness, a population bred of ignorance and lack of understanding of the law, and women's bodies.

Possibilities for getting rich are widespread. Every odious profession offers possibilities for getting rich quick. More than \$500 may be made from kidnapping a young woman in Sichuan and selling her in Henan, Hebei, and Shandong. A young boy sells for as much as \$600 or more. The money that an unmarried woman makes by selling sex in Guangdong in a single day is as much as a woman of the same age in her home village can make by working for a whole year.

A strange and incomprehensible phenomenon occurred in a large Chinese city during the mid-1980s, when medium and small concerns in the city invited peasants into the city on contract. Did the concerns do this because peasant business acumen is greater than that of city folks? No, but because the peasants have more courage and are more stupid. Only they dared offer bribes, smuggle, defraud, and embezzle, thereby "invigorating" the concerns. For a time, Chinese newspapers discussed this matter with feigned ignorance. They asked: Why is the success rate so high for concerns making contracts with peasants? What is the reason?

One problem is solved only to have another problem appear. The ideology that Mao Zedong Thought nurtured and shaped has begun to be destroyed. The defense line that the government holds has also retreated further. Local governments constantly extend their hands to the central government for new "policies," and the central government can only make concessions to solve the new problems that arise. Reform of China's economic system is done this way. Let us take a backward look to see just what and how much remains of Mao Zedong's legacy. Deng Xiaoping has constantly emphasized the need to hold fast in four regards. Just how much holding fast has been done?

Possibly this is Deng's use of the solution to economic problems to spur solution to political problems?

Dismaying Politics

The success of economic reforms has brought in its wake numerous political tribulations. A greater feeling of crisis

and explosiveness about political and social stability exists in China today than during the Mao Zedong era.

A. Tide of drifters

More than 100 million peasants have surged out of the fields, but only an extremely small number of fortunate ones have planted their feet firmly in urban society and become rich. An overwhelming majority of peasants are still on the move constantly looking for opportunity.

During the Lunar New Year of 1990, RENMIN RIBAO reported that several hundred thousand peasants were camped out in railroad stations in Guangzhou and Shanghai because they had left villages to find opportunities to earn money. The newspaper carried a photograph showing a young peasant, his wife, his old mother, and a young child who slept out in the open in an open air square at the Shanghai railroad station. When it rained, the whole family sheltered under a single umbrella. Their plight was enough to make one sob.

This CPC Central Committee organ asked the peasants not to leave their villages mindlessly to find work.

Such a call is clearly feeble and pointless. Unless they go elsewhere to work, how are they going to earn money?

The tide of drifters is a virtual powder keg in society. In psychological terms, whenever several million people are moving about blindly, because of the resonance of their interacting emotions, every element can generate an intense masochistic psychology and desire for revenge for no reason at all, and this feeling in every element can produce a powerful destructive force in turn that can explode at any time as a deadly movement that has no leader and no purpose. At this time, any low-level rumor can turn this enormous, mindless force toward an innocent target. Therefore, any radical, religious, anti-authority ideology and belief can take root extremely easily in the depths of people's consciousness. Frequently, only at such a time can an extremely antisocial party gain basic adherents, and thereafter the antisocial psychology will long influence every person previously in the tide of drifters.

For a time, to get rich is glorious was a slogan of local CPC branches. Appealed to and controlled by this ideology, and spurred and stimulated by other economic factors, the tide of drifters will continue for a fairly long time in China. In fact, the movement of peasants in every large and medium-sized city will remain at around several hundred thousand in most years. Once they lose their temporary jobs in cities because of ups and downs in the economic cycle, hundreds of thousands of unemployed people and a steady influx of successors will become an unbearable burden for the cities.

During the economic take-off period, all developing countries have a problem with the large-scale influx of peasants into cities, and many troubles and disturbances result from this problem that leave in their wake painful lessons and complications that cannot be healed. China's

drifter problem has become especially dangerous for the three reasons given below, or one might say with certainty that should another large disturbance occur in Chinese society, the peasants will definitely be active participants and the main destructive force in it.

The three reasons are: The huge numbers of peasants are disproportionate to the speed of development of economic construction. Except in individual cities, it is not the urban economy that needs to attract peasant manpower, but peasant manpower that wants to squeeze into cities. The overall caliber of the peasants is far from meeting the requirements that urban economic life requires. Moreover, the order of urban economic life is its own incarnation of the law; consequently, the clash between the peasants and the law will be extremely intense and frequent. The speed with which the standard of living of urban residents in China rises is about even with the speed of economic growth, but the contrast with the peasant's income level is enormous. Therefore, peasants entering the city will feel envious, inferior, oppressed, and resentful. Such a mentality not only prevents them from gradually becoming urbanites, but may be expressed in crime.

The Chinese government has yet to adopt effective policies for solving the drifter problem. It cannot shut it off nor is there any place to channel it. Moreover, nothing is done to maintain control over and indoctrinate peasants leaving villages to work elsewhere. The only measure remaining is to use the Army and the police to suppress them once they make trouble (meaning the outbreak of social disturbances). However, at the appointed time, these troublemakers will certainly use some purely political or economic slogans to serve as rallying points for political goals (inasmuch as China also has several million young intellectuals). Will the government not fear that suppressing them will arouse the interference and opposition of international society?

B. The crime wave

The whole world is in a period of rising crime. Since crime is a social problem, its different forms reflect the state of operation of different societies. Some crimes are unavoidable outgrowths of the period of rapid socio-economic development; some crimes are marks of a change in socio-economic stages; and some kinds of crime clearly show sharp and unresolved contradictions within a society.

Because Chinese officialdom has not made available pertinent statistics, it is presently very difficult to determine accurately what percentage of all criminal cases are committed by peasants. However, statistics on all cases published during a month by 10 different legal publications sold openly on the streets of Beijing, show that more than 70 percent of professional criminals were peasants. This suggests that peasant crime has become a serious social problem in China.

In no country of the world has large-scale peasant introduction of criminal mentality and behavior into

cities been found during the initial or middle period of a peasant craze for entering cities. Usually the peasants are the targets or victims of criminal activities. Use of crime as a means and a goal of activity in entering cities is a distinctive phenomenon in the peasant craze to enter cities in China, and it is also a fact that has attracted extraordinary attention.

In classifying crimes by type, in general, they may be divided into two types. All crimes, the incidence of which may be lowered by increasing the police force and public order measures and that do not enjoy support from public opinion, may be termed ordinary crimes. This type of crime, no matter the degree of misery or danger it causes, may be regarded as an unavoidable accompaniment to social life. It does not adversely affect a society's normal life and development. An example is the appearance in Hunan Province of professional killers who may be hired to murder people. Although this situation makes people fearful and apprehensive, it may be regarded as a normal social phenomenon. Naturally if the number of persons engaged in this vocation increases to the point where it becomes a trade in which information flows readily and business is brisk, it will greatly terrorize society; however, this will only show that the police are not doing their job well and nothing else.

Among the crimes that Chinese peasants commit, holding hostages for ransom ranks fairly high. Frequently no base figures for this type crime exist and experience with it is lacking. Whether or not the victim's family reports the crime, the criminals usually kill the hostage or blithely extort money after they have killed him or her. Such unprofessional criminal methods show that such crimes are currently only at an incipient stage in China. Chinese care very much for family members. With the appearance of a relatively wealthy entrepreneur class, the number of cases of kidnapping for extortion will gradually increase. However, such crimes may also be regarded as a normal social problem.

The kidnapping and selling of people, particularly the selling of women, shows signs of running rampant in rural areas of China, and even some women students in urban universities have been sold in remote rural villages where they have been forced to marry, being released only after becoming pregnant or bearing a child. Although this type crime is appalling and rampant, it occurs largely because of an inadequate police force and an overextended social order network. Township and village cadres in some rural areas help guard kidnapped women and use armed force to prevent the police from rescuing them. This may also be regarded as a reflection of social mores and backward morality. Its threat to social culture, though great, has no pertinence to political disturbances in society.

It is the second type of crime that bears watching, namely crime committed by mature professional criminals who have a group base and substantial moral and public opinion support. Western social scientists term

this type crime cardiac social crime. No matter if only one instance occurs, it still reflects a social heart murmur that cannot be eliminated without a revamping of social policy. When this type of criminal activity can be discussed freely and without qualms by a group of people of a certain natural make-up, the social problems it reflects may be deemed to have reached the crisis point.

Along the railroad lines in various provinces of southwest China, groups of peasants who make a living by stealing railroad freight have appeared. When certain villages were searched, virtually every family was found to be hiding stolen goods. Had charges according to Chinese law been brought against the mature males in the peasant families where evidence of theft was found, the villages would have become "widow villages."

The railroad robbers called themselves "guerrillas," and they also adopt guerrilla tactics in opposing the law. When the Army and police intensify control, the frequency of their activities declines and railroad transportation becomes relatively safe. But once the publicity dies down, robberies mount. For some freight, the loss rate is as much as 50 percent per 1,000 kilometers traveled.

For some other crimes, the law is seemingly basically helpless. In peasant enterprise family groups, serious criminal acts including bribery, tax evasion, graft, smuggling, and making and selling fake goods is not only extremely common but morally accepted and supported. They even openly talk about their criminal behavior and show no concern about being charged or reported to the authorities. In fact, the law is rarely able to punish these people. Very curiously, CPC newspapers in some provinces openly discuss the issue of whether they "can exempt offending peasant enterprise families from suits to enable them to redeem themselves through good work." This was understandable when the CPC was just getting started on the economy and tended to be anxious to see results. However, that CPC cadres are not taking bribes but can tolerate the existence and the open activity of these enemies of society is extremely incomprehensible. Possibly this stems from their shortsightedness, or possibly they suppose these criminals are necessary for economic development. When a power-holding party regards social criminals as a part of and tool for development of the economy, this party is committing a crime against its own society and people. In Chinese society, this kind of criminal activity tends to be spreading.

The journal CHINA TOURISM NEWS carried a report about Wenzhou village in the capital city. The report said that peasants from Wenzhou in the south who went to Beijing to do business congregated at several residential sites in the city's southern suburbs. Since most of these people were peasants, the older residents of the capital city called this community "Wenzhou village." The report went on to say that robberies against rich merchants occurred at a rate of two every three days. The

robbers also were peasants from Wenzhou who had formed gangs and drawn up a specific "production plan," namely, no returning home to Wenzhou before stealing 1 million yuan. Some rich merchants either hired bodyguards to protect themselves or formed gangs for self-protection. Everybody was armed with clubs and iron implements. Such hot-tempered displays of "class warfare" in this place where the peasants congregate have become part of the capital city landscape.

At the outset of reform, Deng Xiaoping said nonchalantly: The doors and windows have been opened to let in some fresh air. If one or two flies get in, why make a fuss? China's crime wave is not caused by flies coming in from outside nor is it a small disturbance in an otherwise peaceful and prosperous world. When local bandits openly pilfer from train passenger cars, when armed peasants pick passengers clean on long-distance trains, and when communications cables and civilian transformers are openly stolen, signs of a social crisis have begun to appear in this country.

C. Trend toward collapse of grass-roots level authority

China's rural grass-roots government is underpinned by CPC grass-roots branches and peasant-elected village committees (or village heads). Since peasant ideological indoctrination is no longer given, and since extra-legal trials no longer make convictions for speech and ideology in rural villages, the authority of the CPC grass-roots branches has been greatly weakened. In many places, these branches exist in name only. No longer can they control the peasants.

Since village committees (or village heads) are responsible for the collection of grain and various other taxes and also for handing out materials used in agriculture that are in short supply, these are considered positions in which a profit can be made. Since various forces vie for them, often people take turns or sincere and virtuous people are elected. With decontrol of prices and commercialization of materials used in farming, peasant dependence on government is declining. The position and the authority of village heads has become unimportant. Peasants in villages have excessive freedom in production. The only device on which village heads can rely to coerce peasant compliance is support from the township government and public security judicial units in punishing peasants with fines. In rural villages, incidents of villager collective armed resistance to punishment imposed by the authorities are frequent. In Tianjin, after wealthy and well-known peasants at Daqiu Zhuang set up a private torture chamber that killed people, the Tianjin municipal government had to use troops and police to surround the village to seize the murderers, and the peasants confronted the soldiers and police.

The most dangerous situation occurs when the peasants first leave the land to enter the cities, leaving the place of their household registration. At that time, all their movements are uncontrolled. Their contact with society is

completely in flux. China has never had a social welfare security system (for peasants), so peasants who leave the place of their household registration no longer have any contact with government and institutions of government authority unless they are seized for a crime. This is one reason peasants or peasant entrepreneurs readily commit crimes in defiance of the law, and it is also a potential reason why peasants become involved in large-scale disorders during times of social disturbances. To have no ties and no restraints is to be without fear.

The people's commune-style *baojia* system had many shortcomings, and it has been intensely criticized by all democratic countries, but this system did exercise effective control over nearly 800 million Chinese peasants. With the spread of production responsibility systems, this system has been gradually weakened, and after it gradually lost its control function, no other relatively humane and democratic system capable of exercising effective control took its place at once. Once effective control is lost over such a group of people—a tremendous large and scattered Chinese peasant group living in poverty, having grievances and a desire to become rich, and insufficiently educated—it becomes an enormous hidden danger to society.

In no society do all forces coalesce and cooperate naturally. The various criticisms that Western nations level against China's political control system frequently have an air of utopian idealism. To impose on China a system that no one has yet truly applied effectively when China itself is carrying such a heavy burden of backward people is tantamount to conducting a dreamy social experiment for which no one is responsible. When we speak of the Chinese peasants being an active volcano, we mean the mindless, agitated state of this group when it goes out of control.

The character and coherence of the Beijing incident of the summer of 1989, and of similar incidents that are bound to occur in the future, was, and will be, extremely muddled and chaotic in the absence of a true opposition party that represents the free economy. The result will be the collapse of Chinese society and anarchy. We have ample evidence showing that the organized elements of the urban resident united front that strongly resisted the Army and policy during the Beijing incident were extremely diverse. They consisted of a small number of young leaders who demanded radical reform and complete institution of a capitalist system, workers and government cadres who feared such reform and demanded complete revival of the old order, and wandering peasants who had no political goals at all, but only wanted to destroy all order and use the opportunity to vent their undefined anger against the world. Most numerous were the natural participants in every campaign against authority, namely young students. These forces, whose effect radiated, coalesced that summer to give the government trouble. Thus they accurately demonstrated that dangerous anarchistic tendencies exist among the country's population of 1.2 billion people. An

anarchic, powerless, and disorderly China would drag all of Asia and even the whole world into a catastrophe.

China is an ultra-large complex system in which control and authority are the key links for its maintenance and continued operation. Control of this complex system is not a matter of technical or mechanical experience, but purely a matter of exchanges or trade offs. It is a matter of total balance between the controllers and the controlled in giving, paying back, and giving up. If I give you the freedom to create wealth as you please, you must repay the country with wealth. If I give up harsh ideological control, you must give up anarchic and irresponsible speech and conduct.

Following his 1978 rehabilitation, because of his painful experiences in being overthrown twice by a dictatorial system, for a time Deng Xiaoping spared no effort in advocating the practice of a democratic system and the building of a legal system. Political system reform took precedence over or occupied an equal position with economic system reform on his agenda for a time. For this reason, he chose as CPC general secretary two officials in a row who would vigorously carry out a political liberalization policy. However, as reform progressed, and one domino after another fell, abandonment of economic control finally evoked an outcry against political liberalization. The government's authority was weakened. Of necessity, Deng's attitude became more stern. Thereafter, under direction from the central government, the goal of control mechanisms in building a legal system and experiments with a democratic system focused on a single point, namely stable order in national life. Political control measures coming from the central government also became tougher because of the weakening of the grass-roots control network. As to whether these compensatory actions helped social development and whether they truly produced control balance, events in every quarter of Chinese society provided the answer: A decade-long high speed economic growth was one answer; another was the existence of a large amount of crime directed against the economy and society. In addition, there was the growth of a malignant economic tumor.

These facts foretell two trends in decisionmaking among China's supreme decision-making level: First, encouraged by high speed economic growth, is a continuation of reform in which the delegation of central government control authority is the main component. Second, faced with the threat of a crumbling of the social order and fiscal collapse, control methods proven effective in past years, including traditional CPC thought deterrence and ideological dictatorship will be revived. The 1 July speech that incumbent CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin made about the administrative platform shows this trend.

China scholars in western countries are inclined to predict that the Chinese government's domestic policies will begin to shift toward the right over the next three

years. This is not a mechanical response to foreign intervention but a positive response to the country's economic woes. America's TIME magazine reported that an article by economist James Walsh said that China's "new prosperity is largely false. Credit, prices and money supply are out of control." (TIME, 22 Feb 1993). A Japanese expert's analysis is that a substantial portion of U.S. dollar investment in China has been siphoned off to huge illicit profits there. When the Chinese government finally realizes the local protectionism of its local governments, the venality of officials, and that the incipient bubble economy also constitutes a "favorable" element in the investment climate; when it senses the low efficiency covered up by economic overheating, loss of control, and high speed; and when this false prosperity ultimately angers its own people, not only will it take up the old weapons of the past, but what other choices may it make?

The decline in Deng's enthusiasm for reform also stemmed from another important reason, namely that after Chinese society freed the peasants from the forbidding zone of the fields, extraordinarily simple yet unforeseen changes occurred.

Because of pursuit of Mao Zedong's policy of shackling the peasants for 30 years since the founding of the people's republic, Chinese society is actually divided into two parts—a relatively cultured urban society, and a secluded, impoverished, semiliterate peasant community. If the peasants are not taken into account, China's urban society has the preliminary conditions needed for natural formation of a democratic political system in terms of economy, education, quality of life, and cultural awareness. Were a transformation to a capitalist economy to be carried out only in industry and commerce, within several years, a plant manager and a businessman stratum would emerge. Then, the degree of enlightenment of the society would be spurred and developed to a higher level by the seizure of political power by these strata.

At this time, Deng would have all the reasons and conditions to carry out the "system" reforms and building he craves.

However, Chinese society is a totality. A huge peasant community that is two times again as large as the urban population is a living reality that cannot be disregarded or not taken into account. Once this community bursts through the gates to mingle with urban society, the quality of society overall will fall several levels from that of the urban society alone, and it is this low quality community that is the real component of Chinese society.

Once social separation is demolished, the political plan that was originally designed solely with the urban community in mind will immediately reveal its true outmodedness and separation from reality. Then the situation will be like when you are in an intellectual artistic salon and you can play Beethoven and Tchaikovsky all night

long, but when you are at a music party in a gymnasium, you must shout yourself hoarse singing low-class popular songs. Statesmen who are unable to change their own tune on time, such as the two general secretaries, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, are not suitable singers. All they can do is leave the stage.

Chinese statesmen and international statesmen who lead or interfere in China must truly understand the Chinese peasants.

Chapter 3: Young Chinese Intellectuals—Lonely Warriors for Democracy

Summary:

Who should bear the blame for the summer of 1957? Surging down the path to power, intellectuals must cross over a bridge. It was Mao Zedong who cultivated a rebellious spirit in a whole generation, but this generation then turned its suspicions on Mao Zedong. For settling of accounts of the Cultural Revolution, the reflections of the sober-minded and the inner consternation of those in power. Big character posters made illegal—did this completely cut off all means of expression? The Democracy Wall at Xidan. Two goals: freedom of the press and of expression. The end of the old-style democracy activities—the Beijing incident of 1989. The democratic idealism of young Chinese intellectuals: freedom, freedom, freedom; the forceful counterattack by the government: responsibility, the masses! Melancholy, loneliness, jumping into the sea.

An examination of the political activities of Chinese intellectuals against the governing party in mainland China during the 40 years from the establishment of New China in 1949 to the Beijing incident of 1989 does not lead to an encouraging conclusion. On the one hand, we see that the young intellectuals of China have suffered countless attacks under the single party dictatorship of the CPC, but have untiringly persisted in the pursuit of their ideals of freedom, fairness, and democracy, launching many tragic assaults. On the other hand, not a single one of these struggles or movements has led to an ideal conclusion. This does not refer to the tragic results for the participants in these movements, but to the less than ideal impact of these movements on the advancement of social development. Accurately speaking, the struggles of China's intellectuals have not furthered the progress of democratization of society. Regretfully, we can reach only this conclusion.

China's intellectuals have attempted to demand greater freedom of thought and freedom of expression from the governing CPC and have attempted to use democracy to recreate power. To this end, they have launched movement after movement. We can only call these movements old-style democracy movements.

First, these movements have primarily been ones of the governing party or reflections of internal struggles within the governing party. The goal is political power and

forms of political power. These activities, therefore, are not independent. Although intellectuals had an ample opportunity to express their views and call for democracy in the Cultural Revolution, in the end their enthusiasm and courage only proved to be political tools.

Second, although these activities represented a healthy, rational trend and raised demands for democratic government, the logical conclusion of the continued development of these activities would not be the realization of those demands but, on the contrary, an inevitable counterreaction to their motivations. Thus, it can even be said that, given the specific conditions in China, democratic movements of the intellectuals have been somewhat reactionary in nature. Each effort by the intellectuals to move rock and bricks has only strengthened the walls confining them. This is not caused by tactical problems. The natural development of China's specific political system must take this form.

Finally, the democratic movement did not create an organized political force which truly represented the interests of one level of society. These activities were always limited to the realm of intellectuals without political or economic independence. Thus, these activities could only be lonely, melancholy, fruitless, and empty expenditures of energy and could only produce a few anxious, depressed, and helpless thinkers exiled abroad.

Before they ponder the problems of China, they should ponder even more their own problem—what is, after all, the intellectual group of China?

1. The Tragedy of 1957: Blame and Punishment

There is one consistent conclusion held by specialists and scholars who study Chinese issues. This is that the estrangement between the CPC and China's intellectuals began with the "anti-rightist movement" in the early summer of 1957. Because the CPC was not able to pass over this hurdle smoothly and was not able to grasp the opportunity to really gain the understanding and help of the intellectuals, the party started down a bumpy road from that time on of more mistakes than correct moves.

To this day, however, no one has put forth a convincing conclusion explaining the connection between this and the inferences described above. Prior to the early summer of 1957, did the CPC really take actions based on a desire for sincere cooperation with the intellectuals? Was this type of cooperation merely a wish or an objective possibility? Were the reasons for the break down in cooperation coincidental factors, objective conditions of history, or subjective reasons relating to one of the parties?

The rational understanding of these issues will be a key to an accurate picture of the basic nature of the issues of China. Through this we can not only gain a clearer understanding of the governing history of the CPC but, more importantly, can accurately understand China's

intellectual class, because we look more to this class for the hope of democratizing China.

In 1949, the CPC changed from a peasant party rebelling against oppression to a national governing party. To adapt to this transition, the CPC not only had to attract the participation of intellectuals as much as possible in the building of political power, but also had to undergo a process of becoming more professional and intellectual. Mao Zedong's understanding of this issue was very clear-headed. He even elevated the issue of whether or not to unite with the intellectuals to the level of whether political power could be solidified and warned his party colleagues of this repeatedly.

Mao Zedong's suggestion was undoubtedly challenged by the generals of peasant background within the CPC. This passage by Mao Zedong illustrates this situation. Mao Zedong said: "Some comrades have made some remarks which are not smart. They said we could do without the intellectuals. This is wrong! Now is the time for technical revolution, cultural revolution, and revolution against stupidity and ignorance! It will not work without them, we cannot rely only on us old coarse types."

Mao Zedong certainly had a clearheaded understanding of the function of intellectuals, but this understanding carried a hidden danger within it. If we also examine other comments by Mao Zedong on intellectuals, we may discover that Mao Zedong's views on intellectuals included the following points: Intellectuals had an important function in the Chinese revolution (especially after entering a period of peaceful construction), and whether their role can be fully brought into play will be determined by whether they surrender to the proletarian class and its political party and change their standpoint. Therefore, we want to strengthen the education of the intellectuals. We must remain cautious about maintaining the leadership power of the workers and peasants, and the intellectuals must accept their leadership.

Mao Zedong was a brilliant leader. He displayed the appropriate spirit of generosity and tolerance towards the intellectuals, but ultimately he could not completely separate himself from the narrow views and arrogant thinking of a peasant leader who had seized political power with a gun. This is a key reason why the CPC could not make a smooth transition to become a governing party. Mao's views on intellectuals became the guiding thought which afterward continuously influenced the CPC's policies on intellectuals.

During the antirightist movement in 1957, however, 300,000 intellectuals were labelled "enemies" and subjected to abuse. The continued deterioration of the plight of China's intellectuals from that time on was not related to these biases in Mao Zedong's views. If Mao Zedong must bear the blame, it would only be for mistakes in judgement, and the reason for the mistakes would be issues of emotion, understanding, and experience. It was not a scheme to set up an ambush and tempt the intellectuals to stick out their necks and get their heads

cut off in one stroke, as when Mao later called for "enticing the snakes from their lairs." These comments were not overly clever attempts to cover up.

From the point of view of the intellectuals, they were pleased when the CPC took over national political power from the Kuomintang. This was not only because they had long ago become disgusted with the corruption of the Kuomintang but also because they hoped that a period of peace had arrived so that they could utilize their talents to repay or even save their country. This is evidenced by the large number of science scholars, such as Qian Xuesen, who returned to China in droves from overseas after 1949. The attitude of most intellectuals at the time was characterized by enthusiasm, hope, and unrealistic fantasy. Thus were planted also the unfortunate seeds of later tragedy.

Both the intellectuals and the CPC yearned to unite, and each side made moves which were most sincere and full of good will. But during the earliest phase of cooperation, they already came to blows, leaving serious emotional wounds, and were never emotionally close again from that time on. Here lies the seriousness of the problem. Can it be that the CPC, this party which relied on peasants to seize national political power and vowed to rely on workers to construct a modernized party, and intellectuals are really natural enemies?

Ke Qingshi, one of Mao Zedong's students and one of the old guard of the Chinese Communists, made this assessment of China's intellectuals: "There are two words which can describe China's intellectuals. The first is lazy. They are typically not willing to examine themselves critically, but are always strutting their stuff. The second is base. If they go for three days without getting spanked they think they are so great."

Ke used terms for the description of women of ill-repute to state his views of China's intellectuals. Thus officers of lower rank in the CPC could then view intellectuals as they would prostitutes. Ke had a very high rank within the CPC, as almost the most authoritative interpreter of Maoist thought and as a high-level advisor on the party's ideological work. His derision and insulting attitude toward intellectuals was quite representative of attitudes within this peasant-dominated political party and reflected a dangerous trend of the governing party to reject intellectuals emotionally.

Mao Zedong also rejected intellectuals emotionally, but this did not prevent him from using reason to reach accurate conclusions. In early 1956, Mao had already pointed out that the closed doorism of rejecting intellectuals was a dangerous maladaptive syndrome which had appeared after the party assumed rule and that this syndrome would seriously damage the quality of their political power. Mao even discovered that his party was also becoming distant from the workers and the peasants at the same time. He saw this as bureaucratism. Bureaucratism and closed doorism are the early signs of political power becoming corrupt. During this period Mao

frequently mentioned to others the historical example of the Dashun reign led by peasants 300 years ago who were speedily overthrown only one month after they seized national power. He believed that the reasons that the Dashun Emperor, Li Zicheng, lost political power so quickly were: First, the officials rested on their laurels and became arrogant, greedy, and taken in by luxuries, quickly becoming the new bureaucrats; second, Li Zicheng should not have killed Li Yan, thus depriving his political power of intellectual support.

At this time, Mao subtly revealed a certain view, which was that one could rely on workers and peasants to attack the seat of national power but to control national power one could not do without intellectuals. Although his conclusion made him unhappy, it still led him to adopt two measures. The first was to call for all the ministries of the central government and all levels of government to enhance the training of their "own scholars." In this announcement, which Mao wrote personally, he emphasized that "the proletariat must have its own intellectuals." The second measure was to carry out efforts against closed doorism within the party to try to break down the thick walls keeping out intellectuals and thereby obtain the support of intellectuals for the ruling party (or at least not remain enemies with intellectuals). This would also allow the party to truly make the transformation from a peasant party to a party of all the people, a political party with the ability to lead a large, complex society.

It must be said in fairness that when Mao saw that barriers had emerged between his party and the people, he first criticized himself, identifying himself as the one who should take the main responsibility for the crux of the problem and accept a flogging. At the same time he clearly demanded that the CPC move toward adapting to society. All this was extremely rare for Mao. At that time, Mao even experienced a tendency toward undue leniency. He seemed like a kind and patient parent comparing all of China to a "large family" which could get along in harmony. Of course there are debates and struggles within a family, but these types of conflicts should not threaten emotional wounds and should not be "thunderstorms," but simply the "light showers" of temper displayed in comedies.

To create this type of atmosphere and unity, Mao strictly demanded that his party open the door to correct work-styles and accept the criticisms of all aspects of society including the intellectuals.

This was definitely not an impulsive, romantic move by Mao Zedong. A large faction with few members but much influence still existed within the party which vehemently demanded that the party change with the times and seek renewal. The leader of this faction was Liu Shaoqi. Therefore, comparing the nation to a large family definitely was not a softhearted fantasy or a hypocritical propaganda slogan but the subjective thinking and good intentions of the highest level of leadership within the CPC. This intention was to sincerely, steadily, and warmly build the fatherland for

themselves and for all the people and bring to reality the dream of generations of Chinese about a strong nation.

At the Eighth National Party Congress of the CPC in 1956, Liu Shaoqi, with the support of Mao Zedong, took three important actions of unusual significance which consciously and unmistakably indicated the determination of the party. These three actions were: 1) The phrase "Mao Zedong Thought" was removed from the party charter. (Deng Xiaoping even openly raised the issue of opposition to the cult of the individual.) 2) It was clearly indicated that the Mao thought which had led the party to victory in war would not continue to be used in a peaceful period of economic construction. 3) It was announced that basic class struggle and political struggle were to end, and that from that time on the mission would be to carry out economic construction.

Western scholars who study Chinese issues are often puzzled or mystified by the CPC. The decisions made by the party are sometimes unthinkably imbecilic and sometimes extremely and admirably clever. Without question, the decision which the CPC arrived at completely independently in 1956 was historically the wisest judgement and choice it had ever made. Regardless of the reasons, this could temporarily cast off the decayed dogma of class struggle and steer the goals of the party toward economic construction. This illustrated that the party did have a substantive workstyle and the moral concept of placing national interests first. Even more importantly, the party was able to carry out a renovation of the party's guiding thought, protecting at the same time the authority of the leaders, and took steps to prevent the emergence of individual personality cults and individual dictatorships in the future. Of all the governing communist parties in the world, only the CPC has tried to renew itself through self-feedback. It is a rare example. Of course, if China had been able to follow steadily from that time on this route selected by the CPC and had been able to stick to that Eighth Party Congress path without interference, then it would be a first class economic power in the world today.

Twenty-two years later, when Deng Xiaoping proposed the reform line for the CPC at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, to a large extent he was just reviving the line of 1956. And on the issues of opposing personality cults and strengthening collective leadership, as well as on carrying out democratic decisionmaking within the party, there was an even greater awareness than that of 22 years ago.

Exactly how did things change? What caused the CPC to change its direction immediately after making a correct decision and head down a bumpy road, with one absurdly erroneous move after another, to finally drag the country into the ten years of continuous calamity of the Cultural Revolution? People now have found many reasons to explain this deviation or revolt, but these are not adequate. What we need to know even more is exactly which factor first took effect then served as a

catalyst to bring into play other factors which finally acted as a combined force to propel the CPC to slide from a correct position into one of absurdity.

It is especially important to the Chinese people to seek out the initiating factor. Political movements in a country with a single party dictatorship repeat in similar ways on an extremely short-term cyclical basis. Shouldn't the Chinese people have more accurate information in order to avoid repeatedly committing similar mistakes?

China was in a difficult international situation in 1956. The Americans had organized an international alliance against China as an enemy and had actually deployed a military barricade along the southeastern coast of China. Chiang Kai-shek also seemed to be waiting impatiently in Taiwan, urging a counterattack against the mainland to "liberate the people." These situations would of course make the Chinese Communists nervous and cautious, but they would not impact upon basic Chinese Communist decisionmaking and would especially not have a decisive impact upon its domestic line. Prior to this, one million Chinese troops had proceeded to the Korean peninsula to assist with the military expansion of North Korea and fight against American and United Nations troops. This war, which inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, had still not ended at that time, but it did not prevent the Chinese Communists from reaching that correct judgement in 1956. Therefore, if the international situation played a role, it was only to serve as an excuse for the Chinese Communists to implement domestic suppression and was not the primary factor.

There were also many incidents within the socialist camp during this period. The "Poznan incident" in Poland and the "Budapest incident" in Hungary were used for propaganda as malicious evidence that international imperialists were conspiring with domestic restorationist forces to overthrow socialist countries. The CPC attitude toward these two incidents was as hardline as that of the Soviet Union, particularly toward the Hungarian incident. CPC top leaders Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping each communicated with the top leadership of the Soviet Union on this issue, urging the Soviet Union to send in tank troops to carry out absolute suppression and secure the socialist camp.

Now, however, we can find two items of evidence to show that the Chinese Communists and the Soviets did not completely share the same view on this issue.

During the Eighth National Party Congress, Mao Zedong played a malicious trick with clear political intent. He decided to receive a Soviet delegation and a Polish delegation, two delegations with opposite attitudes toward the Poznan incident, at the same time. As soon as the meeting began, Mao's leanings toward the Poles were quite obvious. He repeatedly praised the leader of the rebellion in the Polish party, Gomulka, and encouraged the Polish Communist Party Secretary

Ochab, who was present at the meeting, to describe Polish anti-Soviet feeling in the presence of the Soviets. After Ochab spoke, Mao made two comments with a big smile on his face: China and Poland have been friendly partners in the past and now are still friendly partners; if Gomulka were in the CPC, we would not strip him of his party membership but would allow him to state his views frankly. The Soviet delegation leader Mikoyan looked extremely ill at ease. In great anger, he lumped Poland (Ochab) and China (Mao Zedong) together and called them enemies of the Soviet Union. He said: "People who make these types of remarks against the Soviet Union can only be treated as enemies. This applies also to those who like to hear this kind of propaganda."

Mao Zedong then chuckled as he watched his Soviet comrade get angry. Actually, Mao not only liked to hear "this type of (anti-Soviet) propaganda," he was full of sympathy and respect for the Poles.

When the Budapest incident erupted, Mao Zedong's attitude was obviously vague. It was only after a few days that he decided to support the Soviets' hardline position. It was on this issue that he and Liu Shaoqi first clearly diverged in views. The lesson which Mao learned from the Hungarian incident was that attention must be paid to struggles in the ideological arena, to prevent similar incidents from occurring in China. Liu disagreed with Mao's conclusion. He refuted Mao bluntly, stating that only developing production as quickly as possible and improving the lives of the people would be the best guarantees to prevent similar dangers from emerging in China.

The restorationist incidents which occurred in the socialist camp had an impact upon Chinese Communist policies but not a decisive one. Liu Shaoqi's views were not completely rejected by Mao Zedong. This illustrates that although CPC policies were altered by this, it cannot be confirmed that the change in direction was a retreat from the position of the Eighth Party Congress. There is even less justification for claiming that this resulted in the targeting of the nation's intellectual class. (It must be acknowledged, however, that the Hungarian incident had a great impact on Mao Zedong, to the extent that he always remembered it for the remaining 20 years of his life and developed a paranoid reflexive response to similar conditions. The words "Beethoven Club" and "Nagy" flashed frequently in his mind, and he frequently threw these heresies like hats at the people around him. This nightmare continued until shortly before his death. In 1976, he attacked Deng Xiaoping for "playing a Nagy role.")

It must be pointed out that if it is said that the shock of the Hungarian incident began to destroy Mao Zedong's lenient fantasy, then those he viewed consistently for the next 20 years as the main rebels against his "big family" were his compatriots within the party and not intellectuals. He looked on intellectuals with derision and did

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not see them as a major threat. Hence, the Hungarian incident could not have been the impetus for the "anti-rightist struggle" of 1957.

After entering the period of peaceful reconstruction, the CPC could not avoid the emergence of internal schisms. There was a great readjustment of the relative influence of the different original factions. The high-level military officers of barely literate peasant background who had been elevated to high-ranking positions based on their battleground achievements lost the opportunity to play on their own strengths to obtain further promotion. Thus, many of them felt lost and bitter, and harbored increasing enmity against the intellectual cadres who were given increasing responsibility. When these generals were sent into the cities to take up the responsibilities of managing them, they developed severe feelings of insecurity due to their shortcomings in knowledge, experience, and ability. Due to this, they placed extreme emphasis on personal prestige and authority of position. The traditionally arrogant style of China's intellectuals posed a threat to the dignity of these inept generals. The conflict between these two sides was acrimonious even if it had not yet come to the surface. Top Chinese Communist leader Gao Gang once in a moment of hatred crudely compared the intellectuals to the male reproductive organ, "if you say get hard, they get hard."

Mao Zedong's basic position naturally favored the peasant compatriots who had helped him seize power, because the cruelties of war had amply proven the loyalty of these people. Mao repeatedly ordered the intellectuals to abandon their "stinking airs" and be obedient to the illiterate supervisors leading them. He also threatened the intellectuals by saying that whether intellectual cadres had a future would be determined by the degree of their submissiveness. There were huge real differences, however, in the education, knowledge, breeding, and practical working abilities of both sides. Thus they have always been two groups with incompatible interests and different futures which carried out fierce arguments around the issue of "whether those who seize national power can stay in control of national power."

Many researchers have pointed out that a major part of Mao's thoughts on ruling were incorporated from the ruling techniques of ancient dynasties. After seizing power, emperors of every ancient dynasty of China, without exception, carried out widespread executions and censures against the ministers who had assisted them. This was a successful and essential political step to consolidate political power and create prosperity. "The crafty rabbit is dead, the running dog is cooked; enemy nations are defeated, and the loyal ministers have been slaughtered" is the sigh and conclusion of history.

Mao Zedong did not admit to being emperor of a dynasty. He insisted that there was a fundamental difference between the nature of the revolution he led and that of the establishment of the feudal kingdoms and dynasties of history. Taking this distinction to the

extreme and making it absolute was precisely the source of Mao's errors. He completely overlooked the shared fundamental aspect of these two types of revolution which was that the insurrectionary armies were all peasants. Mao decided not to abandon those who had contributed.

Even though this was the case, he still encountered much resentment. Another group of responsible CPC cadres were definitely whispering continuous attacks against intellectuals in his ear and attempting to move Mao with the support and friendship which peasants had given him in battle. In these surroundings, Mao Zedong's emotions were painful and conflicted but he was still able to remain clearheaded. At that time, although he was still not thinking of shifting personnel and making greater use of intellectuals to build and govern the country, he had at least recognized that his colleagues with peasant backgrounds were far from competent to lead the work of economic and political reconstruction.

Around 1956, a large number of military officers were demoted and sent back to the country or sent to educational institutions for further training. At the Eighth National Party Congress meeting, the position of Peng Dehuai and other peasant leaders of the insurrection army began to decline. Peng complained, "I am old and of no more use to Mao Zedong. I am no longer important."

Only a few years before, Peng Dehuai had risked his life to serve as commander of the volunteer troops in the Korean War. His complaint expressed the objective nature of the situation. The function of peasant cadres was unavoidably in decline. (Two years after the severe antirightist attack against intellectuals, Mao Zedong launched another antirightist movement primarily aimed at Peng Dehuai.) The target of both of these campaigns was "rightists," so the people continually concluded that Peng was an ally of the rightist intellectuals. This was actually a great misunderstanding. The people would only have to look over the text of Peng's speech of 1957 to see how this old Marshal deeply detested rightist intellectuals. The only point of commonality between these two was that they both directly or indirectly attacked Mao's autocratic style, and every struggle within the CPC afterward was similar in this regard.

People who forget old friends do exist, but this applies not to Mao Zedong, but to an intellectual group who had always played an important role within the CPC and who clearly rose in position and were sent in to manage the cities after the victorious end to the war. Most people feel that the leader of this group was the second leader of the party, hardliner Liu Shaoqi.

The intellectual cadres in the CPC were primarily of two types. The first were those who were said to have eaten bread. These had been systematically trained in Marxism in Europe or the Soviet Union and later sent back to China by the Comintern to participate in the

struggle. However, due to the cruel environment of the long period of war and the even crueler purges within the CPC, only a few great achievers of this group, including Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun, were left in the high-level decision-making circles of the party after the country was established. (It is precisely because they were few in number and had relatively less influential backing that they were able to remain steady in high-ranking positions.)

Another type were the locally trained urban and rural intellectuals who had joined the CPC and its peasant army. They were not only numerous but also relatively capable in the peasant army and their importance was gradually coming to the fore. During the war, most of the political work among the troops and the management of base areas was undertaken by these intellectuals. And all of the intelligence gathering work in the cities and efforts to instigate anti-government activities in all aspects of society were carried out by these party members. Actually, China's rural intellectuals (primarily from peasant families) not only had much practical experience, but also had relatively high intellectual standards. They were just the leadership force most appropriate and most needed for China during that period.

As soon as this force was formed within the CPC it immediately indicated its desire for power and democratic ideology. They not only bluntly asked for more power and higher positions, but also unabashedly displayed their contempt for their colleagues with purely peasant backgrounds. At the center, Liu Shaoqi attempted to use the form of democracy to weaken Mao Zedong's absolute power within the party.

With the CPC's Eighth Party Congress as a beginning, the uniting of the party could only be maintained in propaganda slogans. Within the party, the conflict between the peasant generals group, represented by Marshal Peng Dehuai, and the intellectual civil officials group, represented by Liu Shaoqi, was evident everywhere. Mao Zedong positioned himself as mediator and arbitrator. Although he could skillfully manipulate political techniques and control the relative advances and retreats of each side with ease to maintain a balance, his leanings or position would determine the political fate of either side. Therefore, while both sides expended every effort to win him over, they also naturally developed even greater hatred for him at the same time. In his casual, carefree play at philosophy, poetry, and power, the god of all gods sometimes became the target of public criticism, squeezed between different forces of pressure. Perhaps this was exactly the strategic philosophy which Mao was fervently studying—dialectics.

There were also other factions within the CPC. At that time they were almost irrelevant. All they could do was follow Mao very closely, studying his every mood, and either wait for opportunities or seek protectors (such as Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, or Marshal Lin Biao). This was a stable triangular framework. The angle between

the marshals and the civil officials formed a stable fulcrum of power. Many analysts feel that all Mao actually had to do was find ways to maintain this balance, and he could rule by doing absolutely nothing. Actually, none of the three sides could be really non-aggressive or passive. Their sense of mission and sense of responsibility to the people caused them to actively further their own positions, ultimately driving all to lay their cards on the table and turn to open hostility. When Liu Shaoqi calmly watched Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai battle at Lushan, he must have felt pleased. After the Marshal was defeated, however, Liu was forced to confront Mao Zedong directly. Thus, his fate of becoming the number one enemy and be defeated was determined. After Mao Zedong instigated the Cultural Revolution and finally destroyed Liu Shaoqi, he was left with neither personal enemies nor qualified allies. At this time, those officials near him who had been dejected and lonely for so many years finally had a chance to display their abilities. They developed Mao's biases and prejudices to an extreme and ultimately succeeded in defeating Mao. As the curtain fell on this tragedy, what the audience saw was that all sides were defeated and wounded and the people suffered.

The CPC is this country's governing party with no competitor. Without competition, it does not have a smooth and peaceful means of adjusting and reforming itself, and just happened to try to renew itself to shift the focus of its work. This could not but instigate fierce factional infighting. This is the only way to substitute for avoiding the inevitable failure resulting from a lack of competition. In 1956, Mao Zedong found himself in a difficult situation within the party, hesitating to make a move and with difficulties on all sides. On the one hand, the peasant generals' complaints and resentments rose up, grabbing at Mao and wanting him to clear things up and make everything just. On the other hand, the civil officials, hoping to accomplish something, urged him to quickly abandon the old and attempt the new and truly shift the focus to economic reconstruction. Mao could not but retreat slightly under the pressure from both sides and ponder unhurriedly on which direction to strike first in his counterattack.

Prior to this event and while the event was proceeding, Mao never really contemplated that this strike would hit the intellectuals outside the party, who were irrelevant to the struggle of views within the party. Actually, he decided to suppress the peasant generals first, because their behavior after entering the cities had caused Mao to lose face repeatedly. His first move was to leave Peng Dehuai off of the list of Politburo Standing Committee members during the elections at the Eighth National Party Congress. Following this, Mao announced that the big door of the party was to be opened wide for a "people's battle" against "three 'isms.'" Of these three 'isms, if one says that bureaucratism involved all of the civil officials or bureaucrats, then commandism and closed doorism also had clear antecedents. These two great hats or big sticks were designed especially for the

Chinese Communist cadres of all levels from peasant backgrounds who had acted ignorantly and arrogantly after entering the cities. Matters had become clear. Mao Zedong, after a painful decision-making process, finally began to temper his emotions and make the decision to move against his old friends, his faithful ministers and beloved generals who clearly did not suit the needs of the times.

One can leave a strike unreturned but never without crying foul, complaining, or arguing for oneself. Foolish people like Peng Dehuai took the counterattack approach of if you attack my woman I will attack yours. At the Lushan meeting in 1959, he finally seized the shortcomings of Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi and was openly hostile to them, even cursing them with crude language. Mao then handily slapped the hat "Beethoven Club" on him and knocked him out with one stroke.

Many generals and local officials used approaches that were much more effective and clever than that of Peng Dehuai. Wasn't it said that "the enemies are demolished, the loyal ministers slaughtered?" In that case, I want to prove to you that the "enemy countries" have yet to be demolished! A large quantity of evidence that "the political power of the CPC is still not solidified" and of "class enemies" which were prepared to launch a counteroffensive at any time flew onto Mao's desk. The movements of generals in Taiwan and minor incidents of instigation within the country were described as signs of imminent danger to frighten Mao Zedong.

The facts proved that these threats were dangerous and also effective. A few years later Mr. Mao even developed a paranoia syndrome which was never cured. In 1960, he issued orders instructing that "class enemies still exist and will never give up," so we must "never forget class struggle even for a moment." With worry and doubt, he suspected almost all of his previous friends as "time bombs" and struck them down with determination, so that in the end he was alone and came to a lonely death from illness.

As of 1957, Mao Zedong had definitely opened his eyes to suspicion and caution and had begun to search all the surroundings he could see for hidden class enemies. However, the origins of the heavy attack against intellectuals that year, with a large net cast for them all at once, cannot be traced to the this faction's lobbying of Mao. This lobbying only provided one condition, and this condition required other conditions to play a role.

Although it was not a primary cause, this does not mean that it was not a continuing reason or an exacerbating reason or a prerequisite. When you really show that it is not right and also provide adequate evidence to explain the issue, this large group of worker, soldier, and peasant cadres fighting for their existence will definitely not close their mouths or pretend not to see. The public opinion force which they formed made use of their inseparable feelings of closeness and friendship with Mao Zedong and played a very important role.

And the "baseness" of China's intellectuals was demonstrated very amply at this key moment. When a man smiles at you, you flirt, "tossing your tail" or even pat the man's cheek, without any understanding of how to take into consideration strategies of the highest interests of the future of the people [that is, when given favorable treatment, intellectuals become giddy and self-absorbed rather than taking their responsibilities seriously]. The intellectuals must all unite with and respect the older Chinese communist cadres from peasant backgrounds and must resolutely yield on the vast majority of issues.

The history of 1957 illustrates that China's intellectuals at that time fell far short of having the knowledge, experience, ability, character, and prestige necessary to manage this huge and complex country by themselves. The country also was far from the level where it would be compelled to bring intellectuals into management or maybe it did have this need, but it did not have the necessary requirements for intellectuals to participate in government.

The CPC take over of national political power was the result of the combined effects of historical conditions, and the installation of a group of worker, soldier and peasant cadres at all levels of political authority was a historical necessity. Therefore, the situation which developed after 1956 was such that whenever the intellectuals were slightly less than adequate in their unity, or their yielding to or respect for the worker, soldier, and peasant leaders (even if administrative orders were extremely inappropriate, ignorant, and laughable or bureaucratic orders which would bring about great losses), they would offend the political authorities. They brought suffering to themselves and were considered to have committed crimes which damaged the country and the advancement of the people. Fundamentally, there were no specific rights and wrongs here, only a greater right and a greater wrong and the reality of history.

All of this was too difficult for China's intellectuals. The demands placed upon them were too great, because they were not at all a mature social group. Politically, they were as immature as children. (We will see later how it appears that violating history is an inherent defect of China's intellectuals.)

Now, 25 years later, the intellectuals who are fortunate to remain still feel injured. They refuse to acknowledge that they were scheming at that time to grasp power from the CPC. Perhaps that was not the intent of every specific individual at that time, but the opinions which they offered to the CPC clearly indicated an unmistakable tendency. Could they have been more obvious in their political motives when they cried "amateurs should not lead professionals" and when they announced vehemently that "the CPC is not as good as the Kuomintang?"

In 1956 and 1957, China's intellectuals' lack of understanding of the times and of the entire situation brought

a massacre onto themselves. The entire problem or the original cause of the problem can only be found within this immature group itself.

We should know what China's intellectuals did at that time.

During the summer of 1956, a large-scale, momentous student movement arose in Wuhan, the largest city in China's heartland. The students took to the streets for demonstrations and marches. (They were primarily university students, but a fairly large number of secondary school students, teachers, and shopkeepers also participated.) Some of the marchers shouted "welcome the return of the Kuomintang, welcome Chiang Kai-shek!" Some of the students made speeches to the residents of the city exhorting them to "bravely rise up and overthrow the tyrannical government." A few individual speakers tearfully accused local CPC officials of evil actions.

According to later intelligence reports of the CPC, these troubles were the result of instigation by hidden Kuomintang spies. This does not seem believable. Even though two "spies" were later caught, there were also complaints of unjust accusations. If the students had not been excited and indignant, then the instigation would have had great difficulty succeeding. This disturbance should be seen as the first time after the CPC took over the government that young intellectuals launched a demonstration activity aimed at gaining political power.

The Wuhan student movement did not start a chain of momentum. After a few people were caught, the movement was soon quelled. The main significance of the student movement was that it provided an important symbol or, one could say, warning for both the CPC and the intellectual youth. The traditional antagonism of intellectuals against political power did not cease when the CPC, the self-styled party representing the interests of all the people, began governing. On the contrary, this antagonism broke out repeatedly in ways which brought emotional wounds to both sides. To avoid this antagonism, both sides should have adopted an attitude of caution and restraint.

Perhaps this was an indicator of the difficult path which China would follow from that time on. What is unfortunate is that neither side grasped from this the message which they should have. Each side mistakenly chose the struggle approach. Ten months later, a national movement of resistance and accusations finally exploded against the CPC.

The error made by Mao Zedong and the CPC was their choice of means to quell the conflict. The Wuhan incident had revealed the seriousness of the situation but Mao Zedong still decided to open the door for rectification of workstyles. Perhaps this was because he was overconfident. He had too much confidence in the magically close relationship between the party and the masses. Regardless of how he arrived at this decision, it

was a very inappropriate moment to initiate an open door rectification of the workstyles of the CPC and "hope that friends outside the party will help rectify the errors and shortcomings of the party" when the conflict was becoming more acrimonious and the extremely immature intellectual youth were in a fiercely antagonistic mood. Perhaps his motives were benevolent. Ameliorating or eliminating the resentment among the masses by undertaking criticism of the workstyles of the CPC and its cadres was very statesmanlike. The timing, however, was chosen very poorly. Just when a young student, misunderstanding events, jumps to commit suicide, you tie a noose on him. This could not but cause some to suspect Mao's motives.

Many people testified after the event that Mao actually said things like "inciting the snakes out of their lairs" about the open-door rectification campaign. A leader of the masses enticed the masses to commit transgressions and then attacked them. This not only damaged Mao's image but also sullied these people's own spirits. With analysis of more facts, however, this line cannot prove that Mao had planned in advance to massacre the intellectuals. It also cannot prove that his political psychology was insidious and cunning. On the contrary, it only proves that his actions were unaware, blind, and confused. Actually this phrase was only a clumsy cover-up performance by Mao after the event to conceal his own errors and console his old troops. It was just like a naughty woman who first throws herself into the arms of a man and later cries rape but swears in the end to a statement that she was only using her female charms to trap a bad man. The suffering of politicians is often stated with insincerity.

At first the situation was relatively controllable. The excessive force used to handle the Wuhan incident made intellectuals afraid to speak. Chinese Communist officials at all levels, on orders from the Central Committee, did their best to mobilize the intellectuals. (When the situation turned, some of these officials were also labeled rightist. Most of them carried a burden on their political consciences.) When the intellectual youth finally began to raise their objections, the situation quickly turned ugly.

On university campuses in Beijing, Shanghai, and other big cities, meetings held to help with the rectification of the CPC quickly turned into gatherings to accuse the CPC. A male university student held up a jacket covered with blood stains and, weeping, accused the CPC of abusive actions toward his landlord family during the land reform in the countryside. A female student then revealed the story of how a peasant CPC cadre had forced her to marry him. On the night of the wedding, the peasant bit her, leaving wounds all over her body. A young instructor described with bitter irony the ignorance, coarseness, and ineptitude of leading cadres assigned to the university by the CPC. These meetings often concluded with "down with the CPC" or other similar slogans.

Even more accusations and exposures were spread by sticking up big character posters in prominent places so that people could copy them and pass them on. A rumor that the CPC was about to fall from power circulated in society. Most of the masses in society seemed pleased at this rumor and did not object to it.

Senior intellectuals with more political experience used milder methods and language in their criticisms of the CPC, but the issues they raised usually struck right at the vulnerabilities of the party with little time in power, no governing experience, and low caliber cadres. The president of a university in Shanghai complained that he had no real power but the party member vice-president wielded great power. Once when this vice-president was going to leave the university for a few days to go to Beijing, he issued an announcement shortly before departing that during his absence the president would temporarily carry out his responsibilities!

These materials for ridicule naturally caused widespread dissatisfaction and resentment among the masses against the governing party.

The surrender and admission of guilt by some CPC cadres was evidence of further exacerbation of the situation. (In fairness it must be said that there was no precedent for this in the previous governing party, the Kuomintang. What does this mean?) One CPC cadre at a university in Beijing, after hearing the accusations of a student, felt great shame and discomfort. He bowed to the accuser three times in public. Stating that he "represented the party," he acknowledged the errors, apologized, and offered comfort to the student. There were also some young party members who announced in public their resignation from a "corrupt, distorted, and tyrannical" party. It is unquestionable that these actions by basic-level CPC members strengthened the ambition and fervor of the intellectual youth. Students in Beijing and Shanghai had already begun to leave the campuses. A ripple could evolve into a destructive riot.

Therefore, Mao Zedong had to take action. The results were tragic. Several tens of thousands of young students and talented intellectuals were labeled "rightists." They lost their rights to work and were sent to the countryside or to factories for reform through labor. An entire generation of intellectuals was never again trusted by society after this. They were not able to play the role which they should have had, and the governing party lost many friends and allies.

This tragedy belonged to China's intellectuals and to the entire Chinese people. A people need a stable and healthy governing party. They also need their own intellectuals. This movement appears to have caused the people to lose both at the same time. After the CPC and the intellectuals lost this opportunity to unite, China lost a key requirement for the advancement and development of its people and thus idled in place for an entire 20 years. This is probably the most important "result" of the first democratic movement launched by China's

intellectuals under the rule of the CPC. The intent was to gain democratic progress but the result was the retreat of the entire nation. This really is unimaginable, but it is an irrefutable fact. Not only was it like that the first time, but the next time was the same!

If it must be said that the primary cause of this tragedy was the immaturity of China's intellectuals, this seems difficult for people to completely accept emotionally. This is because the intellectuals, apart from their knowledge and their warm blood, had almost nothing. And during the unfolding months of the subsequent 20 years, they were repeatedly abused, manipulated, and persecuted. Among all the classes in China, this is the group which suffered the most persecution. Actually, another meaning of the immaturity of the intellectuals is that this group was progressive. When the entire people and society did not yet have the ideology of democracy, diversity, and science, the enthusiasm and imagination of the intellectuals could only separate them from society and make them an isolated and weak group.

Looking back at the history of 1957, the tendency of many Chinese and western scholars is to place the blame on Mao Zedong, pointing at his political character and suspecting him of having a split personality. After following the above analysis, we can see that this type of inference is not only lacking in accuracy but also unfair. At the same time, the masses of over one billion Chinese could never accept this conclusion. A magnificent people with a long history of civilization would never be stymied for 20 years because of only one person.

The tragedy of 1957 can only explain one fact: The intellectuals created by ancient Chinese culture and civilization (including the intellectuals of modern higher education) have a congenital defect impossible to overcome. Thus they cannot unite with the governing party, the national political power, and the primary force leading the people forward and thus bring their own great abilities fully into play.

This can be the only response. "When the scholars rebel, ten years are not enough." When Mao repeatedly used this ancient saying, he was actually describing the tragic tradition and history of China's intellectuals. They are only a pitiful group supported by others and the instrument or possession of this class or that class. Their will was emasculated long ago, because they have never formed an independent part of production in society.

Only after intellectuals, as a group in society, combine with production capital can they gradually approach national power and alter this power based on their own requirements and understanding. This is not only a step which intellectuals should take in order to gain liberation but also a necessary process for the advancement of the nation.

China's intellectuals historically have never had an opportunity to get close to production capital. After the CPC began governing, intellectuals were even more

thoroughly cut off from this possibility. As China implemented a completely nationalized economy, only the bureaucratized state had control of production capital. Intellectuals could become bureaucrats, but not the true owners of production capital. Therefore, their enthusiasm and ideals for the reform of political power and their seeking of democratized and scientific policy-making systems could only be reactions unsuited to the society of the times and with no practical significance at all.

A well-known young poet of the democracy faction in China said: "Our sacrifices today will be the stones to repair the road for the progressives who come later." The poetic line is beautiful and full of imagination, but this is still a pretty but empty phrase. The evolution of a political system is not an independent process. Therefore, a scientific and democratic policy-making system is not to be gained through the predictions, blood sacrifices, or persistent struggle of predecessors. It is like the CPC which sacrificed countless lives and finally seized political power but did not seize the democracy, equality, and even wealth which it idealized. (Some young intellectuals were disappointed that the CPC did not fulfill its promises of fairness and democracy. This complaint is unreasonable, because how could the CPC give to others what it was unable to get even for itself?) A scientific and democratic policy-making system is an economic product. It is the appropriate reflection or expression of a scientific, natural, reasonable, and effective socioeconomic order. Only when the intellectual group is able to unite with production capital, and thus raise the level of production technology and make the economic growth order more rational, will a democratic and rational political system become inevitable.

This conclusion is an appropriate evaluation of all the movements for democracy launched by China's intellectuals and is appropriately used to analyze and observe the many political movements which have occurred in China during the past decade. It is not that these movements had no possibility of gaining success and victory, but what they gained was definitely not democracy and justice.

2. The Great Cultural Revolution—Heaven and Purgatory for the Intellectuals

Whether it is Chinese politicians or Western scholars, all agree that the Great Cultural Revolution was a tragedy for Mao Zedong personally and also for the entire people. They also have determined that the origins of this tragedy lay in Mao's desperate seeking of revolutionary purity and his fear of, as well as his allergic reaction to, capitalism and revisionism. The older generation of revolutionaries in China are more willing to place the blame on two groups of plotters—the military clique led by Marshal Lin Biao and the civil clique led by Madame Mao. They believe that the chief guilty culprits who brought calamity to the nation and suffering to the people are these people, and Mao was just used and tricked.

It goes without questioning that the launching of the Cultural Revolution (please note, we refer to launching here) was related to the theories of Mao Zedong. He believed that the restoration of capitalism was widespread and dangerous. He concluded that the people who had followed him to grasp political power were now becoming bureaucrats over the people. They were ruining revolutionary work and were beginning to form a "bureaucratic class." Launching the masses to rebel and mobilizing the masses to undertake a struggle against the bureaucratic class was the only way to solve the problem.

Of these three theoretical leanings of Mao described above, speaking fairly, only the last, to launch the masses to rebel, is biased or even completely wrong. And it was this error which led to all the damage and disasters of the Cultural Revolution. In the first two statements, Mao was only expressing an existing reality. It was also in this way that, from the beginning, the Cultural Revolution was seen as the view of Liu Shaoqi, the number one leader of the defeated capitalist-roader faction.

On April 10, 1967, Liu's wife, Wang Guangmei, made a stubborn defence of Liu as she was "interrogated" by the Red Guards. She said: "Liu Shaoqi did not yearn for capitalism. He wanted socialism. You say he was furiously wanting restoration, but it isn't like that. He wanted socialism. He talked especially about the problems of preventing revisionism, opposing revisionism, and opposing capitalist restoration. He thought about it often, but was unable to think of a way. He could not find a way and did not have the ability. He did not have Chairman Mao's boldness to conduct a Cultural Revolution."

In extremely desperate straits, Madame Wang Guangmei still wanted to publicly satirize Mao Zedong's "boldness." It is clear that she did not understand this type of boldness and even hated it. Actually, those who struck out and those who were struck down only differed in this respect, that is on the question of launching the masses.

Some people in China now do not admit that China at that time had a bureaucratic class, and there was "a danger of restoring capitalism." They believe that if there had been no calamitous cultural revolution, China's work would not have been discontinued, and China would have made greater achievements in socio-political, economic, and cultural reconstruction. It is not astute to attribute the developments and discontinuations of history to the psychological oversensitivity or impulsive policy-making of one person. This also does not conform to the facts.

If we discuss this issue from a different angle, perhaps it will appear simpler and clearer. If the Cultural Revolution had not occurred in China in 1966, would there be any political crisis in China? What factors created this political crisis? In what form would it erupt and in what direction would it take China? What would be the other methods of resolving the political crisis?

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Mao Zedong obviously had a clearheaded understanding of the existence of a political crisis. During his later years, he recognized that the Cultural Revolution did not resolve this crisis. Near the end of life, he once spoke of his innermost feelings to Hua Guofeng, Wang Hongwen, and a few other loyal followers.

Mao Zedong said: "I have done two things in my life. One was to struggle with Chiang Kai-shek for over a decade and finally chase him off to some islands. After eight years of the War of Resistance, we finally sent the Japanese back to their home. Not many people disapproved of these things. The other thing you all know about. That was launching the Great Cultural Revolution. Not many people supported that, and many people opposed it. These two issues are not over with. This inheritance will be handed over to the next generation. How will it be handed over? If it can't be done peacefully it will be done in turmoil. If it is not done well, how will the next generation manage? They will have to undergo a foul wind and a rain of blood."

"A foul wind and a rain of blood" is the complete upheaval of order. Mao was very depressed that he was about to leave this life, because at that time his existence was the entire requisite condition for the maintenance of order in China. As soon as this requisite condition was lost, how would order be guaranteed in China?

Due to his sense of responsibility to the people, fear of dissolution of order was a heavy burden in Mao's consciousness. Actually, as of 1965, the signs that China would experience a political crisis had all already been revealed. The long-term dictatorship of one party exacerbates social conflicts. In an edict on December 12, 1964, Mao wrote: "I also agree with this view. The bureaucratic class is diametrically opposed to the working class and the middle and lower peasants. These leaders who follow the capitalist road have already or are in the process of becoming capitalists who suck the blood of the workers... These people are the targets of struggle and of revolution."

The signs of crisis enumerated by Leonard Binder in his book *The Crises and Consequences of Political Development* all occurred in China. The most important characteristics of crisis were demonstrated especially clearly in China: a low degree of activeness or use of subjective will by the laborers in economic development; the creation of high consumption and low efficiency and huge wastes in human effort; the lack in society of the motivation or mechanisms of interests to spur the economy forward; a surge in antiauthoritarian feeling among intellectuals; opposition between officials and the people and widespread unrest on campuses, as anarchic tendencies ferment; and, in order to stabilize the society, the adoption by the government of coercive measures for moral education and unified ideology and the creation of "enemies of the people."

These phenomena completely matched the situation at that time in China. The campaign to imitate Lei Feng in

1963, the socialist education campaign in 1964, the movement in 1965 to study the works of Mao Zedong, were all attempts to use moral education and thought purification to strengthen control of society. "Catching class enemies" among the masses is typical of dictatorships and terror. These phenomena showed that politics in China required this and that the existence of a crisis could not be ignored.

Binder believes that a sociopolitical crisis is actually a challenge issued by change in society to the existing political structure which causes it to waver. The social change in China was demonstrated in that under the governing conditions and under the conditions of an actually completely state-owned economy, the relationship between CPC members, especially high-ranking party members, and the masses had already evolved from that of a shared fate of life or death to that of managers and those being managed, the relationship between agents of the state and employees of the state. The emergence of a new upper level of society, or a class with control over capital, created a change in the nature of the dictatorship of the people. A political power which was really built upon the foundation of support of the masses of the entire nation had never solidified and had begun to waver. If we understand phrases like "revisionism" and "capitalism" in terms of their actual meaning, we reach entirely the same conclusions as Mao Zedong did.

There is only one way to resolve a political crisis. That is to implement reforms which are very effective, with appropriate measures, controls and order. Without this, the crisis will naturally come to a conclusion. But before it is concluded, the country will inevitably undergo a fundamentally unavoidable and difficult phase, with chaos, rebellion, violence and even war and revolution.

When the crisis presented itself to Mao, it faced Liu Shaoqi in the same way. They basically had no room for choice. They could not just gaze on while the work they had created "naturally came to a conclusion" in internal chaos. Neither could they take it upon themselves to lead "reform," due to the restrictions of their theoretical biases. These theoretical prejudices, such as the state-owned system, cooperatives, raising the consciousness of the people as a top priority, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the planned economy system, etc., were above suspicion and could not be touched at that time. Even Deng Xiaoping, who was later the architect of reform in China, as CPC general secretary at that time definitely was not thinking of disturbing, negating, or reforming these "Marxist principles." These stubborn and prejudiced theories were the common constraints of that generation of politicians which emerged during the Second World War (including the leaders of the Soviet Union and the politicians of the West; their biases had a different content but were even more entrenched). These constraints absolutely could not be overcome. Even Mao, with his attitude of derision for dogmatism, could not break free of history. Therefore, we cannot place undue blame or praise on any specific person.

Mao Zedong's personality and boldness were perhaps well demonstrated in this aspect. He pondered over the chess board, looking for a way to escape out of a dead end. (Perhaps he had the tragic consciousness of a doctor seeing a dead horse as a live horse, but he still appeared very optimistic. Because he resolutely believed that as soon as the masses were launched they would definitely find a way to resolve the crisis. This type of populist thinking with extreme reliance on the masses was also a constraint on that generation of politicians.)

Mao Zedong decided to launch the Great Cultural Revolution. This chess move of his was actually derived from an ancient Chinese strategy, which was to conquer chaos with chaos. "Put the enemy in chaos," said Mao. Since the political crisis would naturally bring about rebellion and lack of order, then I will use the preemptive launching of a rebellion movement to release its force and thus always keep that rebellion and disorder aimed in the direction of attacking the enemy. The enemy referred to here is of course the bureaucratic class hidden within the CPC. Therefore, all of the phenomena and facts can prove that China's Cultural Revolution was deliberately launched by those holding political power as a revolution designed to be aimed at its own government. It was Mao Zedong, "this person who had conducted a revolution against the old system of China, now seeking to launch a rebellion against the new government structure which he himself had created." (Harry Harding, Brookings Institute)

In other words, the Great Cultural Revolution was an unnatural but inevitable result, a special form of result, of the political crisis.

Mao Zedong's tragedy was not that he launched the Cultural Revolution, but that he took it upon himself to shoulder the burden of this inevitable result of history and attempted to use his own power to make this result a controllable process. He failed, however. The reason for his failure can be explained in that he simply could have used supplementary means to delay the eruption of the political crisis (the crisis of the Soviet Union was delayed for a full 20 years), but he impatiently had to light the fuse personally, resulting in his own melancholy death in the midst of that tumultuous crisis. During the 10 years of crisis, each time he attempted to control the situation, he inevitably was used by opportunist politicians. First it was Marshal Lin Biao, and later Madame Mao and the Shanghai literati clique. The emergence of these conspirators was but another form of Mao Zedong's error. They may be judged, but the origins of the crisis cannot be excessively attributed to these people. (Other so-called bad people who had a great impact, such as Wang Hongwen, Zhang Tiesheng, and Li Qinglin were completely ordinary people prior to this.) The basic reason was the limitations in understanding on the part of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and other politicians of that generation. According to Mao's explanation, no one can escape history.

The above conclusions can be verified by the historical function of the Cultural Revolution. Another advantage to undertaking this type of verification is that we can avoid becoming excessively caught up in the question of "whether a political crisis really existed in Chinese society before the Cultural Revolution." After the Cultural Revolution ended, all of the old CPC cadres who reassumed their titles and regained power absolutely demanded that everything return to the political model and social order which existed prior to the Cultural Revolution (before 1965), and they made sincere efforts to do this. Deng Xiaoping made similar attempts, including advocating once again the study of Lei Feng, expending great efforts on carrying out propaganda and education on the superiority of the socialist system, and other activities. The reaction of the masses, however, was not only indifferent, but even angry. The officials demanded a complete rejection of the Cultural Revolution, but the people demanded reflection upon the 1965 model which had created the disastrous Cultural Revolution. This separation in view between officials and the people was actually an internal reason for the several student movements of the 80's. It is also the most important mass public opinion force which Deng Xiaoping has been able to rely upon in advancing economic system reform and political reform.

History could not be picked up again at the end of the Cultural Revolution exactly where it had been left off before. The great masses of China have also objected to this plan. This not only illustrates that the 1965 model was not appropriate but also that the Cultural Revolution has an important place in the evolutionary process of history.

The Cultural Revolution was a movement of the masses personally launched and led by Mao Zedong. This characteristic determined that it would bring into play each of the politically important points of China's 1965 model (including, of course, a somewhat longer period prior to that, according to most explanations, back to 1957) to an extreme degree, so that these political points would be revealed as ridiculous in actual practice and erroneous in theory.

These political points included: a) class struggle; b) integrated leadership of the CPC; c) the natural rationality of mass movements (to rebel is justified); d) the use of Mao Zedong Thought to guide everything; e) the superiority of absolute ownership of production materials by the entire people; and f) the highest leaders of the party are geniuses. Any one of these points could be seen as the villain culpable for the chaos of the Great Cultural Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution ended, society and the public that had come out of this suffering inevitably demanded that the new political leaders acknowledge and accept their feelings and clarify each of the political points listed above to gain a new understanding of these issues and not just simply reject the Cultural Revolution and be done with it. The goals of reform must be carried out to the extent of rectifying

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these points. Before reaching this step, the gap between the views of those above and those below will exist for a long period and will become a new source of instability in society.

When the people began to be suspicious of the political points described above, they actually had already begun to waver with regard to the socialist ideals and plans of 1965. It was hard to imagine that this advance in understanding and practice would occur at any certain time in the '60's or the early '70's. Without the Cultural Revolution, the people would have been much slower to realize. If the reform theory raised by Deng is a revolutionary change under the conditions of socialism, then this revolution also follows the logical progression of a "political crisis-rebel, chaos-change."

Politics is the concept of overcoming fate. But when fate and the rules are conceptually equal, the people can only submit to its control and arrangements. Because this period of chaos could not be turned around, almost every family and every person suffered hardships during the chaos, and this calamity was the product of the subjective will of the god-like leader. Therefore, the people mainly saw it as a man-made disaster which could have been avoided and, for this reason, many blamed Mao Zedong. This blaming was emotionally and rationally apt, but also extremely harmful. True politics is also the overcoming of the subjective will of individuals or groups. It has its own path. This path is completely natural, inevitable, and logical. Only when the Chinese people truly understand this will they be able to emerge from the stains of the Cultural Revolution.

Western politicians often use the Cultural Revolution as an opening to satirize or show contempt for China's political party or masses. To be certain, China's political party and public society were not adequately mature or aware at that time, and they could only follow the evolutionary path of history into that episode of insanity. However, they had their own true leaders. That was their pride. Mao Zedong was a failed hero. He saw history clearly and tried to use his own ability to change it. Deng Xiaoping was a victorious hero. As soon as the disastrous change ended, he quickly began a process of reform. The Chinese today have advanced a great deal since 1965. Thus, the future of the Chinese will not include another pitfall.

The Great Cultural Revolution was a deformity in the process of history. This is the conclusion.

For China's intellectuals, the Great Cultural Revolution was a test with special significance.

To each individual Chinese intellectual, the ten years of chaos was a process of great hardship and suffering, which brought persecution, death, and then rebirth or perhaps no rebirth. To China's intellectuals as a community of society, however, the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution was a rare historical opportunity to test oneself. In a state of complete anarchy, with the masses

extremely unruly, and subjective thinking in a fairly chaotic state of emptiness, it was up to this community to imagine, design, and practice, as well as test, its own political ideals, ability to manipulate, and caliber as a community. And the character, quality, ability, defects, and historical position of this community, as a representative of progressiveness in Chinese society, were all amply displayed during this process. The files of the Cultural Revolution provided very complete information on what this community of people are and what they are not, what they can gain and what they cannot gain, and whether their struggle is constructive or destructive. It is just as if you were facing a lie detector. Because the test was conducted in an unethical manner, you would be completely justified in throwing out the results, but as you debate the issue you have also put all the data into a computer network.

If intellectuals are still puzzled by these answers, refusing to accept them, and have not absorbed these answers into their own consciousness to become part of their own consciousness of self or capital, then this illustrates that the Cultural Revolution actually did not end at that time as far as intellectuals are concerned and continued until 1989 or even longer.

China's intellectual stratum has always been held up as a model of aloofness from politics and material considerations, sacrifice, and the placing of principles above material interests. More modern ideas such as intelligence, adaptability, effectiveness, and social values have not entered their moral realm. Therefore, for as long as 30 years, we have seen China's intellectuals use a rigid method of thinking to develop themselves and attempt to develop society. They won't give it up even when blood runs from wounds in their heads. The courage and blindness of their actions is a non-standard form of antiquity and stubbornness. The fierceness of their self-consciousness and their lack of self-awareness, the vague emptiness of their ideals and their painstaking seeking, these chaotic thought forms are not only the inevitable results of having been nurtured and poisoned by ancient culture and ancient civilization, but also the results of the painful, chaotic living conditions for intellectuals in an environment of ignorance, isolation, force-fed thinking, and a completely publicly owned system.

In a situation with a closed system and communications exchanges interrupted, China's intellectuals, this most progressive group of society, had evolved to become a subsystem which was continually in a state of entropy, stagnated and blind and therefore completely lacking in order. At this time, they had only two sources of information. One was tradition. The other was thought indoctrination by the rulers. By accepting the former, they maintained their pride but could not assist with the progress of society. By accepting the latter, many intellectuals became accomplices to the conspirators during the Cultural Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution ended, only a small, limited number of people really accepted new information. Most people remained in a

state of ignorance or could only accept information which had been refracted or filtered. Therefore, this class retained its tendency toward movements and became a factor for instability within the larger social system.

It can be seen in the performance of the intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution that outmoded concepts are the fatal weakness of this class. When we place our hopes for renewing politics in China on the intellectuals, they must first undergo renewal of themselves. The basis and standard for this renewal is that they must have self-awareness, self-consciousness, and a clear consciousness of human rights. These two types of consciousness are the indicators of modernization of this class.

To a large degree the Cultural Revolution was targeted at intellectuals and was conducted through fierce internal strife among the intellectuals. Although this internal strife was fierce and people were clearly pitted against one another, it also produced many martyrs who went to their deaths for ideology. There were very few examples, however, of those who truly thought of people's rights and human rights. Most of the heroes, such as Madame Zhang Zhixin who was later quite idolized, stood up to defend "the purity of truth." Zhang was thrown into prison for attacking Mao Zedong as a traitor to himself and for defending Liu Shaoqi. It is said that she was beaten and raped in prison, but she never changed her commitment to uphold true Marxist principles and criticize or accuse the current policies. Her sentence was extended several times, and she was later executed.

Other heroes similar to Zhang Zhixin were later rehabilitated, one by one, after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Their spirit and courage in bravely resisting the authorities naturally made people admire them, but their actions really did not have the significance to awaken society. This is because their thought weapons for doing battle and what they were resisting came from the same arsenal and belonged to the same system. Therefore, this type of resistance could only reveal courage and not gain any other results. Actually, Zhang Zhixin was not understood by almost any other person at the time.

The one hero of the Cultural Revolution who really struggled for human rights was Yu Luoke.

Yu Luoke was a young citizen of Beijing with a high school education. His exhortations to the CPC on class theory in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution started a fierce attack. He revealed that "family background has been a serious social problem for a long time." "The children of the five red types of families are natural revolutionaries, and those who don't belong to the five red types can never enjoy the same type of political treatment. They can even become the targets of dictatorship. They are [treated as] natural criminals, so that many innocent youth have died violent deaths, drowned in the abyss of the theory of background class origins."

Yu Luoke's essay, entitled "On Class Backgrounds," revealed many facts and incisively illustrated the feudal

nature hidden in the revolutionary slogans of the time. He fervently demanded that all people be considered as having naturally equal rights. He said, "A person's fate should not be determined while he is still in his mother's womb. Regardless of what your background is, all should enjoy equal political treatment."

This was the earliest declaration on human rights which we had seen in China up until that time, and was a rare example during the Cultural Revolution of independent thinking and the use of the weapons of free ideals to criticize the ruling thinking. And it was due to this reason that Yu was arrested by the regime in 1968 and was executed on March 5, 1970 after a public trial.

Yu was not an isolated hero. "On Class Backgrounds" had countless readers in Beijing and throughout the country. When this essay of thoughts truly against the tide first appeared as a printed pamphlet, many copies of it were immediately hand-copied or reprinted and passed around throughout the country. Later, a group of secondary school students distributed the essay as the first issue of a new publication, "The Secondary School Cultural Revolution News." Ninety thousand copies of the first issue were snatched up immediately. Yu then used this non-governmental publication to issue a series of essays which continued to accuse the authorities and to expose their feudalist face.

Yu was rehabilitated 10 years after his execution (in 1980). The bloodline theory of "a person's political fate is determined in the womb" was thus prolonged for 10 years and only gradually abandoned by the regime after entering the '80's. What was strange was that after Yu was rehabilitated, public opinion in the newspapers only praised his opposition to the bloodline theory but did not mention a single word on the significance of his struggle to liberate people. The issues of independent thinking and human rights were completely avoided.

Compared with Zhang Zhixin, Yu Luoke today is a forgotten hero. People are willing to acknowledge that the Cultural Revolution was an error but this acknowledgement and reflection on the Cultural Revolution has strict limits. One can use Zhang Zhixin as a weapon but it is not permissible to use Yu Luoke's method of thought as a weapon. Perhaps this is still the inertial movement of the Cultural Revolution.

Mao Zedong's original intent in launching the Cultural Revolution was to undertake an alteration of the old political power in order to resolve the political crisis which would inevitably be created by the nature of this political power. But as soon as the Cultural Revolution began, this hope of his was lost. Marshal Lin Biao and Madame Mao, under the pretext of the protection of Mao Zedong thought, used the force of political power and dictatorship to strengthen the political points of the old political power and divert the Cultural Revolution from its course and turn it into a raw struggle for political power concealed in wild revolutionary slogans.

Under these conditions, those who really used Mao's thought to examine the issues were all labeled "counter-revolutionary elements" without exception. Spreading these thoughts of Mao Zedong became "putting out poison" and intellectuals who truly understood Mao Zedong's intent and dared to "put out poison" were rare. The earliest material which can be found now is an "open letter" written to Marshal Lin Biao on November 15, 1966, by a high school student in Beijing. This letter openly criticized Marshal Lin Biao and Madame Mao for distorting Mao Zedong's original intent and was the first time in mainland China that suspicions were put forth regarding the iron-clad principles of "the socialist system" and "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The author of the "open letter" was Yilin Dixi. The letter blamed Lin Biao for having "not incisively intuited what would be brought out as the Cultural Revolution unfolded, namely the need to improve the dictatorship of the proletariat and reform the socialist system. The party and the organization of the government are in extreme need of change. The people's democratic dictatorship and the People's Republic of China established 17 years ago are outmoded. Now we need to create a state mechanism which is suited to the special characteristics of China and has never before been seen in this world. And this demolition without strong firepower, this vibration without strong bombardment, this smelting without a high temperature, will it do the job?"

If the views of this high school student had been spoken 10 years later by a high-ranking official of the CPC, they would have been seen completely as a declaration of reform policy. The significance of this open letter was that it proved that Mao Zedong's intent was to undertake reexamination and revolution of the system of 17 years, and that this intent had some resonance among young intellectuals. What is unfortunate is that Yilin Dixi was only an exception. Most CPC members and intellectuals, as well as Marshal Lin Biao and Madame Mao, did not permit anyone to utter doubts about that system, much less did they allow the undertaking of "bombardment" or "smelting" of it.

The fate of Yilin Dixi is unknown.

Mao Zedong once placed his hopes for the success of the Cultural Revolution on the intellectuals. He placed his hopes especially on the young students. On September 2, 1965, Mao issued an instruction like a curse to the entire party, "whoever suppresses the student movement will not get away with it." On September 7, he wrote a letter to Lin Biao absolutely opposing any "interference by workers and peasants with the student movement." If the young students had been able to think independently, if the views of Yilin Dixi had been transmitted broadly and accepted by more intellectuals, if the intellectuals had not been caught up with striving for power but with thinking, if a faction or wave formed by them had gained the support of Mao Zedong, then the Cultural Revolution would have had a different face. Of course, these

"ifs" are like myths or complete fantasies, because China's intellectuals at that time did not have the ability or the right to think independently. When they did gain the right to think independently 10 years later, they had not been able to strengthen their ability for this type of thinking for a long time, so they either had a blind faith in authority or in the "Voice of America." Therefore, this stratum in China only gained hope when they became able to think independently.

Although the Yilin Dixi phenomenon was isolated, it was representative to an extent. Another student in a university, Tan Lifu, became famous among student circles by fervently advocating the "bloodline theory." However, even this person with a strong feudalist consciousness was able to express doubt about the orthodox ideas maintained by power. He denied that Mao Zedong was a god and did not agree that Mao Zedong's every word was the absolute truth. He even called some of Mao's ideas "outmoded" at a public meeting. Due to his heretical statements, Tan was arrested by his outraged classmates and sent to prison.

Whether it is Zhang Zhixin, Yu Luohe, or Yilin Dixi, all of these could be called individual phenomena among the intellectual stratum. The performance of the vast majority of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution was disappointing. They did not lack in courage, but their thinking fell into strange realms from which they could not escape.

If we exclude the effects of Mao Zedong's authority and the female plotting of Madame Mao, as well as other contradictions, we will still discover a cyclical, triangular structure in the understanding process and logical thinking of the intellectuals: I consider issues from the standpoint of the proletariat, therefore I am correct and I will definitely succeed; my success proves that my standpoint is that of the proletariat.

The main pillar of this structure is "correct," and the value is in "the standpoint of the proletariat."

The two biggest problems created by this type of thinking structure were incessant correction and god-making.

Because the standpoint of the proletariat is both the beginning and end of the thought process, when one reaches "success," it should be attributed to or based on the correctness of the standpoint. Thus, in order to achieve continuous success or to gain benefits as individuals or as a faction, one must always hold firm to this standpoint. When encountering frustrations or failure (actually intellectuals had very few opportunities for success during the Cultural Revolution), one could only examine the biases in one's own standpoint and undergo correction. The only way to guarantee that one could stand permanently on the correct standpoint was to "reconstruct one's worldview" and change one's thinking and feelings, and completely alter oneself to become a true element of the proletariat. This required constant correction and struggle with oneself. During the

Cultural Revolution, China started a fervor for the study of Mao Zedong's works which lasted 10 years. To a large extent, this wave was self-directed behavior and not coerced. At least among intellectuals, the attitude toward study was very sincere. And the real proletariat—the workers and peasants—when they studied the works of Mao, it was often perfunctory.

Constant correction was not only a legal rope binding the thinking of intellectuals, it was also a rope hobbling the pace of progress in Chinese society. "Keep the doctrine of heaven, demolish the desires of humans." For thousands of years, change in China has been created by violent uprisings of peasants who did not study any books. Intellectuals have very seldom participated, or if they did become involved, it was within the bounds of "the doctrine of heaven." Thus, Chinese society could only revolve and repeat itself on a cyclical basis.

The main pillar of the triangular structure is "correct." If the meaning of "correct" is the truth, then all problems no longer exist. The face of truth is vague. It can be searched for. Even if one grasps an absurdity and spends one's entire life defending it, it would not be frightening, because actually the boundaries of truth are always imprecise. The problem with China is that people are determined to make the "truth" very specific, with clearly defined boundaries and no vagueness. This requires finding an arbitrator to determine what is correct and what is not.

This is an incident which a Chinese scholar studying in the United States personally experienced. Rural peasants were divided into two factions based on different family backgrounds and "viewpoints," and they often argued nonstop. Once a fierce argument erupted over a big character poster attacking the "Director of the Revolutionary Committee." One faction stated "Mao Zedong says the Revolutionary Committees are good." The other faction stated "Mao Zedong says that to rebel is justified." As the argument went on, an electrical repair worker happened to arrive in the village. The two factions asked this young "proletarian" to arbitrate. Finally, the electrician, fumbling awkwardly and nearly tongue-tied, said something which condemned one faction to the "death sentence."

The arbitrator needed by urban intellectuals was the highest authority in society (as soon as a person in authority became an arbitrator then he too became the target of fierce struggle.) Therefore, two problems emerged. One was that constantly looking to authorities and gods to prevent argument produced no results. The second was when the judgements of the arbitrators were misinterpreted or when the arbitrator himself had biases, fierce struggles ensued which accomplished no results.

To make "correctness" vulgar, absolute, and specific was not originally part of the Chinese cultural tradition. The Taoist philosophy which originated so long ago and was the essence of ancient Chinese civilization never advocated absolute affirmation or absolute rejection as explanations or judgements of things and events. Mao Zedong

married Taoism to Marxism and derived dialectic thought. His explanations of things and events was also very free, and he did not advocate absolute conclusions.

The problem is that after Mao included three other concepts in his thought and understanding process, these were cheerfully accepted by the intellectuals. These three concepts were:

1. The progress of society. According to Marxist descriptions, the ultimate form of society is a communist society. Therefore, the CPC and the proletariat represent progress and the future and only they have a future. All other classes are "dying."
2. Class struggle. The consciousness of every person is imprinted by class. His future, fate, success, and failure are all determined by his class category.
3. The dictatorship of the proletariat. For the collective prosperity of all humankind, it can only be this way. There is no other choice.

Mao was a politician. These theories of his were full of political wisdom and practical value, and they have repeatedly been proven to be powerfully effective tactics. When he faced his tough political opponent Liu Shaoqi and the powerful ranks which Liu had built up, all Mao had to say was that Liu and his ranks were all part of the bourgeois class. A deep-rooted group formed of over one million officials which controlled most of the administrative power in the entire country collapsed in an instant. An interesting subtheme was that after Mao effortlessly did all this, he personally received Liu. He deliberately and with deep meaning recommended the book "Mechanical Materialism" by the German zoologist Dr. Heckel to the defeated general. It was like someone defeating his opponent and then, with an air of great professionalism, giving his sword to the dying opponent to look at.

Mao was equally successful in his treatment of the military group led by Marshal Lin Biao. In Mao's "One of My Views" which he wrote on August 31, 1970, he said to the entire party: "We can only take the standpoint of Marxism." Just this phrase was enough. All of the soldiers became occupied with altering their "standpoints." Marshal Lin Biao was thus deprived of all the power concentrated in his hands. One year later, Lin Biao was compelled to run away in terror and perish in the desert of Mongolia. Lin's death verified Mao's verdict on his "standpoint." Lin Biao's son, Lin Ligu, once predicted: "All it would take is one word from Mao, and Lin Biao would be brought down." What is interesting is that, in order to prevent this kind of disaster, Lin Ligu once plotted to use violence to eliminate Mao Zedong himself. But when Lin Ligu and his armed clique started to really carry out this plan, with the code name "Project 571," they discovered a problem difficult to resolve. After they killed Mao, how would they come up with a reasonable explanation for the public? Obviously, no one had the arbitrating authority to announce that

Mao had committed an error in his "standpoint." Because this problem finally could not be solved, the plan was left in the notebook.

If anyone really attempted to control power in China, he would not need to concern himself with grasping a governmental title. The only thing he would have to do would be to establish his position as an arbitrator. Seizing this position would not require any law or party procedure. This is an open secret in Chinese politics and is the greatest defect of this type of politics. All the masses and the officials can do is hope that this arbitrator does not get befuddled.

This thought framework which Mao Zedong constructed not only mobilized hundreds of millions of Chinese masses but also became a fixed mode of thinking planted deeply in the consciousness of China's intellectuals. Not only would the older generation of intellectuals continue to use this mode of thinking to participate in the life of society, but the younger generation of intellectuals would accept this thought legacy even more, although from early on they found Mao's thought unfamiliar and they confused or altered the concepts of standards of right and wrong.

It is difficult for us to establish whether the political attitudes of young people are progressive or dangerous. They cannot tolerate the existence of a god, but, with that entrenched mode of thinking, after rejecting one god, they create even more gods. The many gods are not in balance but fractured, because the status and backgrounds as well as the content of these gods dredged up or pulled over to act as substitutes are all very suspicious. If the American political system or President Bush or Mrs. Thatcher are embraced by the young as the arbitrator or standard of right and wrong which they believe in, then this country will either split up or go through another 1957.

The gods are plentiful and varied. During the Beijing incident of 1989, young university students defied the government by fasting in Tiananmen Square. They were full of righteousness, awed by upholding justice, and they believed absolutely that their actions were correct. Each young person who responded to questions from journalists could bring up "standards" which proved his righteousness. Student leader Wuer Kaixi, a student with central Asian ancestry, said: "All of us students who participate in demonstrations and marches are patriotic!" The attractive Miss Chai Ling's complaint against the government was, "what is the error in striving for democracy and freedom?" And her fiancé said: "The broad masses and most of the government officials all sympathize with us."

People who have no understanding of politics crave involvement in politics. This is the tragedy of the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution and also the error of Chai Ling and others. The concepts which they used as standards are all absurd according to logical extension, but they are seen as the arbitrators. Patriotism does not

preclude leading the country astray or creating chaos. The Dowager Empress and the Boxers were patriotic at that time. Seeking democracy and freedom does not mean that one will achieve these. During the Cultural Revolution, young people were full of enthusiasm for seeking democracy but what they gained was extreme dictatorship and terror. The support of the masses in the vast majority of situations will cause a movement to become reactionary and push the leaders of the movement into the mire. Experienced politicians have never been swayed by the momentary enthusiasm of the masses. Mao Zedong brought down Liu Shaoqi with the support of the masses. Of course, the masses of China had given Marshal Lin Biao their sincere support. That type of sincerity and fervor was like the support of the Germans for Hitler during earlier years. These should not be considered shameful for a people, because a people only become mature gradually.

To inaugurate a political movement, one must seek the realization of political interests and the ample mobilization and completion of each necessary step during that process of realization.

Two factions of the masses with different points of view engaged in a fierce struggle on a national basis during the Cultural Revolution. What were the ultimate political interests of each side? Was there a difference? Actually they were all battling for pure political power and to protect the authoritative position of Mao Zedong. So was this just the realization of the political interests of Mao and his wife? What relationship did this have to the interests of the masses?

The Western public are quite astonished by the enthusiasm for politics and the lack of understanding of politics on the part of China's intellectuals. One characteristic of Americans as a nationality is their lack of interest in politics, but they do care about individual interests. During presidential elections every four years, when the American public votes, they do not concern themselves at all with the interests of the politicians, but base their decision on whom to choose based on their own interests. Individual interests commonly take the form of economic interests, but within the scope of the masses, economic interests and political interests are completely consistent. The American political system is not without critics. The social condition even displays certain types of serious pathologies. The American public, however, are basically healthy in their form of political participation and their mode of political thought. This guarantees that the political path of the nation will not become severely sidetracked due to the degeneration or erroneous judgement of one politician.

To manage a nation, particularly a nation of over one billion people and a relatively backward culture and economy, the best political model is one which leads the masses to concern themselves more with economic interests (first with improvements in individual economic incomes and quality of life) and not spend their efforts

gabbing about participating in politics. The method used for many years by the CPC, however, has been the exact opposite. On the one hand, they expend every effort to cultivate the consciousness of mastery [of society] among the public. On the other hand, they make politics mysterious, to make the public feel anxious about participating. This is the fundamental reason for misunderstandings.

Using the method of moral education to control stability in society often has side effects. The hope of creating a kind of high-level atmosphere of harmony through striving for purity of thought and ideology and superior and advanced development will usually be disappointed. This is because this will result in most of the public being not accustomed to or unable to distinguish between the ideal realms of morality and the necessary reality of society. The people's political goals and desires will be much higher than their realistically possible political interests. In this way, the public will inevitably be extremely particular as it watches the government. As soon as the public sees a government which does not conform to its ideals, strong feelings of having been fooled will be stirred up and a blind force will gather to impulsively attack the government and destroy order. At that time, the government will not only be criticized at every turn but also will have a diminished ability to respond to challenges and crises. The scandalous actions of one official can shut down the whole government. When the American public gets too proud and worshipful of their own democratic politics, they cannot handle the attacks of "political breakdowns" like the Watergate incident. Excessive gaps between ideals and reality are the main reason for continuous disturbances in society. After a long period of this, a nation will lose its specific and clear goals and destroy itself in superficiality, rashness, stubbornness, and ignorance.

3. The Xidan Wall—The Emergence of an Opposing Political Faction

The Xidan Wall was a gray brick wall about 200 meters long on the southeast side of Xidan Street, in a bustling commercial area of Beijing. This gray wall faced the broad Changan Street which is connected to Tiananmen Square, the two sites being about two km apart.

During the Cultural Revolution, the Xidan Wall was one of the sites in Beijing where countless big character posters were pasted up. It was not unique. There is only one point which makes it worth mentioning. Near the close of 1966, some Qinghua University students with gambling ideas took the risk of violating a ban and openly pasted big character posters with the headlines "Down with Liu Shaoqi" and "Down with Deng Xiaoping" on the Xidan Wall and several other places on Changan Street. This was the first time that the fierce conflict and struggle within the party was openly revealed to society. According to some essays of recollection, there were tens of thousands of people watching at that time in front of the Xidan Wall. Changan Street

and the Xidan intersection were jammed with crowds. After nightfall, city government workers and plain-clothes policemen ripped down these two headlines. A small number of students tried to stop them and a minor argument ensued. After daylight, there were still quite a few elderly salaried workers and blue-collar workers standing dumbfounded or in tears in front of the wall.

The end of the Cultural Revolution was marked by the arrest of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and her three male colleagues on October 6, 1976. After this, Beijing experienced another wave of big character posters. The main content of these were headlines and slogans calling for the CPC to eliminate the "gang of four" but these quickly became subdued.

After the arrest of the "gang of four" and the end of the Cultural Revolution, many people all over China demanded resolution of the attacks or false accusations by which they were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Because the CPC had not yet had the time to study specific policy issues, local governments had no blueprints by which to handle these long-pending or old cases. In addition, the individuals with real power in the local governments were mainly beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. They would not actively seek to rehabilitate those falsely accused during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, tens of thousands of Chinese citizens from all provinces of China gathered in Beijing to demand that the central government look into their problems. All the central government could do for the majority of people's problems and demands was to offer consolation and advise the people to believe in the central government and have patience. According to the formulation of the People's Daily, the mouthpiece of the central government, "bad old practices die hard."

The people who had come to plead their cases impatiently looked to public opinion for assistance. At that time, big character posters were the only form of media which the common Chinese masses could use. Thus, beginning in the height of the summer of 1977, the number of big character posters in Beijing quietly rose again. The quality of the posters also rose. Almost every one used blood and tears to accuse the "gang of four" of crimes. Writing big character posters not only could help people muster the force of public opinion to gain faster resolution of their problems, but it also satisfied a psychological need to release their internal anger. This was precisely the two important relationships between the public and the media. Unfortunately, big character posters as a medium of communication were not only crude and less effective but also very easily became free dissemination of distorted, inaccurate, or extremist material which was difficult to guide, select, control, or give feedback to.

During the summer of 1977, the Xidan Wall became a concentrated area for these types of big character posters. This happened spontaneously. As for the reasons, the primary initial reason was that the location and

geographic, human, and cultural environment surrounding this wall allowed these posters to function more fully as media. However, as soon as there was a concentrated place for pasting up big character posters, they immediately became characterized by expanded gatherings and increased effectiveness. The effectiveness and shortcomings of the big character posters in disseminating information were exaggerated at the same time. This immediately left this primitive media form unable to carry this heavy load and created the next problem, as expected.

There were many onlookers. During the entire fall and winter, the Xidan Wall became a sightseeing spot in Beijing. Many travelers got off the train and came straight to the wall. The citizens of Beijing, especially students and young teachers from institutes of higher education, were frequent visitors to the Wall. Some of these had been the backbone elements in the movement in Tiananmen Square in the previous year to support Deng Xiaoping and oppose the gang of four and later became famous persons in the democratic movement among the Chinese people.

There were two other types of people who had an important influence on later changes in the big character posters on the Xidan Wall. One was journalists from foreign press agencies stationed in Beijing. The other was plainclothes policemen sent by the government.

The foreign journalists were generally aware of the Chinese government regime's prohibitive attitude toward them, but they either were unwilling to follow the rules or unable to resist the temptation which this gray wall presented to them. They not only saw this wall as a holy place to search for news material, they also used every means possible to come into contact with the young people among the crowd and to interview those who were putting up big character posters. At that time in China contact with foreigners was a very sensitive and even taboo issue, but there were some people filled with fury who appealed to the curious interviewers to carry their tales of injustice to the international scene. They were not afraid of anything and even hoped that the foreigners would take pictures of their big character posters.

The general view of the government was that most of the foreigners were not well intentioned. The Xidan Wall was where all the scandals and misdeeds of the past ten years were revealed in one place. It was embarrassing to have so many foreigners taking pictures here.

The police in plainclothes in front of the wall illustrated that the government did not want to relax controls but did not know what extent of controls to adopt. During the Tiananmen Incident, Mayor Wu De also sent policemen to play the same role. The later facts proved that the effect of the police in that incident was far from glorious. The blacklist of names which they recorded was later used by Madame Jiang Qing as the basis to issue orders for the arrest of those people. (Of course, the

people who actively sought out those young warriors, called "the social base of Deng Xiaoping," were also from the Beijing municipal government and its police.)

The appearance of police made the public watching the big character poster activity afraid and also angry. They undoubtedly were directly reminded by the police of the policies of terror and thought restriction carried out by the gang of four. This terror was a feeling shared by almost every Chinese citizen. The content of the big character posters later quickly shifted from general grievances to a more political direction. Of course this cannot be blamed completely on the police, but the mood of antagonism between the public and the government and authority had to be demonstrated through some intermediary.

According to a report by a German reporter, he witnessed a conflict between the public and a plainclothes policeman in front of the wall. The policeman had not been adequately cautious. He had only changed his shirt and had arrived on a bicycle with a Public Security Bureau license plate. Several young people surrounded the policeman and demanded that he surrender the "blacklist of names" which he had written down, but the policeman refused. A larger number of city residents stood far away and emitted a strange yelling sound. According to the observation of the German reporter, the policemen seemed very isolated.

This minor incident had far-reaching implications. It illustrated the antagonistic feeling between the public and the government which had developed during the Cultural Revolution and also that this feeling had not disappeared after the gang of four was brought down and new people took over the government. This mood had erupted once before, in 1976, when the people used the occasion of the Qingming Festival to mourn Zhou Enlai and show support for Deng Xiaoping. However, this was only a release of feelings which would not disappear upon the reaching of a goal. (Deng regained power somewhat later in 1977.) This feeling had no goals, only targets. Speaking fairly, this antagonistic feeling was the inevitable result of the dictatorial policies of the gang of four. It was therefore a dark legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Whether the new government wanted to or not it had to accept this and find a way to dispel this feeling. However, this was not something which could be done in a short period. Madame Mao and her colleagues could be eliminated from the government overnight, but the cases of injustice and error from the Cultural Revolution would require several years before all could be rehabilitated or made right. Dispelling the antagonism and fierce distrust among the masses would take even longer. During this even longer period, there would be simply too many possible opportunities for this consciousness or inner psychology of the masses to explode. Any minor issue which is slightly wrong—a victory or defeat in a soccer game, rumors accompanying an adjustment in prices, nationalistic feelings stirred up by trade imbalances with Japan—could become a land mine and

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suddenly explode. Finally it was the death of former CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang which set off explosion after explosion of this feeling. The problems left behind and the pain caused by the Cultural Revolution will probably take several generations to completely dispel. This pain is suffered by the masses and even more by the government.

The government is always the target of this antagonism and distrust. Thus, if we use this feeling as evidence to judge the policies of the Chinese government, we will be committing an error of "standpoint." Feelings cannot distinguish right from wrong and truth from falsehood and can be totally irresponsible. Many careful and sincere Western politicians, however, mistakenly see the existence of this feeling in China as a democracy movement. This is truly a huge misunderstanding. If authority and order were really to collapse due to this feeling, China would then enter an era of great destruction.

The Chinese government appears to lack an accurate assessment and ample understanding of this feeling. They especially want to believe that this anger is the result of provocation from the West and is an "enduring self-destructiveness." This is also a misunderstanding. Some politicians and social groups in the West actually do have a supportive attitude toward the anti-governmental activities among the people in China. The origin, however, of this feeling was not brought over in airplanes from the West. It is the product of the Cultural Revolution and dictatorship, and the Cultural Revolution is China's own history.

Only when we have an accurate grasp of the history and current phase of Chinese society can we stand above and detached and see clearly the true picture of all the antagonism and conflict which has happened in China. Only then can we truly understand the people and government of this nation. After the people had suffered a full ten years of oppression and manipulation, their anger would not completely disappear just because of a coup by a Hua Guofeng. If it were really like that, this nation would have lost hope in its weakness and helplessness. But if it is permanently bound up in the feelings of the past with no way to escape from this, this nation will give the world an impression of ignorance, stubbornness, and lack of wisdom.

The various types of big character posters on Xidan Wall reached a peak at the end of 1977. Unlike the big character posters of the Cultural Revolution, there was no mutual criticism or rejection among the big character posters on the Xidan Wall. They were all mutually encouraging, sympathetic, and supportive, and formed an atmosphere of indignation which gradually shifted the content of the big character posters toward politics.

The first political essay came from the hand of a primary school teacher from Guizhou who called himself "Zhong Ming." In a big character poster entitled "Whose Guilt," Zhong asked in anger, "for all the countless cases of woeful injustice exposed at the Xidan Wall, the people

cannot help but ask, who is the guilty villain? Was it the gang of four? Then how did the gang of four gain influence? What kind of system guaranteed their power and allowed them to do malice?"

Zhong Ming continued where Yilin Dixi had been ten years previously and once again turned the attack against the "system." At the end of the essay he asked anxiously, "who can guarantee that another gang of four will not lord it over us again? How can we see that our descendants are not dragged into another Cultural Revolution? Using what?"

Zhong's big character poster received a quick reaction. The blank spaces on this big character poster were filled with penned in supportive slogans. Several more sharply worded essays were then pasted on the wall next to it.

It is difficult to say what significance Zhong Ming's essay had, but it can certainly be said that the intent of his question was to lead the people to doubt and reject the socialist system in China. This was a political and strategic error. Obviously, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution had just subsided. Opening up another earth-shaking debate would undoubtedly create even greater chaos. China already could not handle this type of shock. Viewed from this angle, even if Zhong were rudely labelled a "bad person," and his freedom were limited, it would not be in error, whether he was really concerned about the country and the people or an opportunistic risk taker. (Viewed from the later practical results, Deng Xiaoping's strategy, which was to set aside theoretical issues and directly engage in economic reform, was the only feasible way for China to gradually resolve the problems.)

Doubts and criticism of the "system" were the main issues discussed by radical intellectuals for the next decade. There was not a single movement which did not drag the system into it. Criticism of the mistakes of the government all began with an accounting of the system. The activists of the Chinese democracy movement who are now exiled in Europe or the United States put their main efforts into exposing the gloomy sides of the system and proving the irrationality of China's political and economic systems. If compared with the farsighted and careful planning and accomplishments in reform of Deng Xiaoping, these young professional politicians of China look very recalcitrant and shallow.

Another type of essay that was even more political appeared in large numbers on the Xidan Wall. These essays amply embodied another tradition in Chinese politics, which is the active interjection of society and public opinion in a non-programmed fashion in the selection of the highest level of leadership in the central government. This interjection is usually very accurate. The degree of accuracy is awesome. Hence, it is very difficult to judge whether high-level personnel shifts are leaked or public opinion really has an effect.

Western journalists, unable to get any evidence at all, decided that there must be a secret channel of information between the offices of some important persons and

that filthy gray brick wall in Xidan. The children of many high-level cadres loitered by the wall, as if to prove this guess. (The children of high-level cadres form an important force in Chinese-style political movements. During the last period of the Cultural Revolution it was these people, with their close connections to information, who continuously disseminated some of Madame Jiang Qing's scandalous behavior to society. This not only destroyed Jiang's reputation but also greatly enhanced Deng Xiaoping's prestige. According to the analysis of many experts, the Qingming Festival incident was orchestrated by a secret political organization of high-level cadre children.)

In the spring of 1977, many slogans calling for the reemergence of Deng Xiaoping began to appear on the Xidan Wall. These used the form of public opinion in society and exhortations from the masses to exert pressure on the most powerful organs of the central government and fervently demanded the return of Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and others of the older generation of politicians. One year later, these old people actually did return to the political stage in China and became pillars of the highest circles of policy-making. The party, government, military, and all organizations then began using the old cadres, and a large group of cadres who had been brought down during the Cultural Revolution and had reached retirement age returned to leadership positions.

The top two names leading the black list of cadres whom the Xidan Wall demanded that the central government remove from office were two politburo members heavily relied upon by Premier Hua Guofeng, Beijing Municipal CPC Chairman Wu De and Wang Dongxing, commander of the central security guard troops. At that time, Hua Guofeng enjoyed great prestige, and the Chinese masses, with their talent at creating gods, were making him into a new god to replace Mao Zedong. It is difficult to believe that for the Xidan Wall to begin attacking Hua's political allies at this time meant that this public opinion was mature and accurate.

During the Qingming Festival incident one year before, Wu De had succumbed to pressures from Mao Zedong and the gang of four and had played the role of director of the suppression of the masses. There was plenty of reason for the general public to feel deep dissatisfaction and hatred for him. It did seem strange, then, that Wang Dongxing was included in the blacklist. Wang led the security guard troops of the central government organizations. Due to the secrecy of his work, most of the public really did not understand much about him. In addition, according to widespread rumor, General Wang had played an important role in Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying's actions to bring trouble to the gang of four. This was believable. Without the support of the security guard troops, it would have been absolutely impossible to arrest the gang of four. Some essays on the Xidan Wall, however, directly listed his name and fiercely demanded his removal from office.

What is really food for thought is that because there were no other materials which could have been used to incite public anger against Wang, the Xidan Wall could only use the traditional weapon of China's big character posters, invectives, and rumor mongering.

The curses used by China's intellectuals are richly graphic. Just putting the ugly title of "eunuch" on Wang's head was enough to evoke the rich imagination of the public and thoroughly destroy the public image and political prestige of this Politburo member.

The rumors spread were full of holes and could not withstand close scrutiny. But the mentality which Mao had cultivated among the public of suspecting everything and resisting authority had reduced their ability to discriminate to almost nil. Many essays on the Xidan Wall repeatedly exposed or exaggerated one scandalous news item, that Wang was in the process of a grand construction project to build an underground palace where the central organizations of the CPC were situated. Some essays even included more detailed reports, saying that this underground palace was called "The Relaxation Pavilion." (If this name is understood in terms of the literal meaning of the words, it implies decadence, and if understood in terms of Chinese social customs, the title of this building sounds like a brothel.)

The deeper implication of this rumor was that it not only furthered Wang's image as a eunuch, it also, by implication, attacked Hua Guofeng, the one in charge. If there were eunuchs, there must be an emperor. Who was the new feudal emperor? After reading the essays on the Xidan Wall, you can imagine as much as you like.

These two political leaders who were attacked by the Xidan Wall a short time later were also attacked in the Politburo. In March 1980, they were both removed from office. Wang's errors were obvious. On February 7 1977, Wang ordered the PEOPLE'S DAILY, JIEFANGJUN BAO [THE LIBERATION ARMY NEWS], and HONGQI [RED FLAG] magazine to publish an editorial laying forth the concept of "the two whatevers" and emphasizing Mao Zedong's "contradiction between socialism and capitalism" as a guiding principle under which all thought falls into place. (The reason that Deng Xiaoping was brought down by Mao for a second time was that he opposed this thinking.) He had indicated a resolutely negative attitude on the question of whether Deng Xiaoping could resume working and had shown scorn for Deng personally. Wang said that Deng Xiaoping had already had his two chances and he didn't make it! "If we let Deng Xiaoping come back to work immediately, where will we put Chairman Mao? Are we going to follow Chairman Mao's instructions or not?"

Not long after Wang said these things, the Xidan Wall immediately began to attack him. It was shocking for Chinese politics to become public to this extent.

There is no longer any significance to investigating whether there were people secretly manipulating or

taking advantage of the Xidan Wall, and there would be no conclusive results. Regardless of how correct the exhortations of these big character posters for Deng Xiaoping to come back to work or to oppose Wang Dongxing and Wu De were, or how they may have actually affected public opinion, this political method leaves people disgusted. If a political leader of a country can be slandered by the irresponsible invectives of the people, regardless of whether the actions of this leader should have been criticized or blamed, it is an indication of the weakness of the political organization of that country.

Examination of China's mass political movements often causes people to wonder whether the masses really can be given the right to "freedom of speech." If politics had transparency, then China's intellectuals and general masses probably would have committed another fatal error in their political choices around 1980, because they usually make choices based on a person's moral character and personality. They liked Hua Guofeng, who seemed sincere and slow as a block of wood. Therefore, when they used the Xidan Wall approach to discuss and criticize every strength and shortcoming of politics which they had absolutely no way of understanding, just an issue like the "two whatevers" could probably be debated for decades. Thus, how would reform ever get started?

If politics is not open and not transparent, free speech has even less meaning. If all of the speech and demands on the Xidan Wall were completely spontaneous expressions of the public and only influenced by instinct, mood, suspicions, and impressions, then it would be extremely easy for these to be manipulated and taken advantage of. From 1957 to the Cultural Revolution, and then to the Xidan Wall, when has the "free speech" of the Chinese masses not been taken advantage of?

Gaining the right to free speech must still be linked to certain advances in social historical development. The political indications of this progress are true political equality and political independence. When the movement began around 1957, the first essay attacking the "rightists" was written by a Kuomintang member as he fired the opening cannon shot for Mao Zedong's editorial in the PEOPLE'S DAILY entitled "Why is this?" And the first to stand up and expose WENHUI BAO Chief Editor Xu Taocheng, the CPC's old friend and a famous democratic person, as a rightist was a legislative committee member of the Kuomintang! When Xu wrote an essay 20 years later raising this incident, he was still furious.

When there is no political independence, it is also difficult to maintain morality. One's mouth and pen belong to other people. Is it not quite tragic to actively engage in politics under these conditions?

Wu De's successor issued an order in 1978 to close off the Xidan Wall. Not long after this, the wall was torn down. It is still not there. The municipal government set

up another venue for big character posters in Yuetan Park. However, to put up one's own essays in the specially designated place for big character posters in Yuetan Park, one must first ask the secret police there to inspect one's identification card. Thus, this poster spot exists completely in name only.

The motives of the Beijing municipal government in closing off the Xidan Wall are unknown. The reasons openly given were that it was irresponsible and easily taken advantage of, etc. These are also true. The closing off of the Xidan Wall was received with united protest by Western journalists and many politicians. They believed that this was another example of the use of political power by the CPC to suppress freedom of speech and political democracy. However, whether this is right or wrong, only God himself can arbitrate.

Another important political product of the Xidan Wall was the organization of secret political groups. The people not only went to Xidan to look at the big character posters; an even larger number of young intellectuals rode their bicycles from the western suburbs of Beijing to Xidan to "experience the political atmosphere there." Exerting mutual influence and forming secret linkages, many of the young democracy faction players used this place to link up with others of like mind. According to the estimate of one French journalist, as of the spring of 1978, Beijing alone had over 20 different secret political groups. Some of these groups were very tight organizations; others were quite loosely organized. Their political goals, however, were all consistent. These were to express doubts about the country's political and economic systems and weaken the leadership authority of the CPC.

If these groups are analyzed on the basis of their membership, these secret political groups can be divided into three types.

The first type consists of those from other areas who had come to Beijing to appeal for redress of wrongs. After more strongly political big character posters began appearing at the Xidan Wall, the essays of blood and tears of wrong and mistreatment no longer attracted much attention. In addition, the problems usually lingered on for a long time without reaching resolution. While the supplicants waited impatiently and anxiously, they were spontaneously inclined to help each other, and like homeless people, these accusers naturally developed a sense of group consciousness and a desire to become a group.

The unique characteristic of this group of supplicants was that it was loosely organized. The members were quite mobile, and they had no fixed core members. The quality of the members was quite mixed, and there were even greater differences in their political attitudes. (Some people truly supported the CPC but were labeled counterrevolutionaries. Some people were labeled counterrevolutionaries only because they truly opposed the CPC.) Three kinds of members in this type of group were

most worthy of attention. One was those who were disappointed in the political struggles and power grabs during the Cultural Revolution. These people had both political experience and political ambition. Their only hope was to create chaos in society in order to improve their own situations. Thus, they often played the role of creator or propagator of rumors. Although they posed a significant threat to the Chinese Communist political power, it was not difficult for the CPC to handle them. Most of these people were later determined by their work units to belong to the "three types of people." This was equivalent to a political death sentence.

Another kind of member was the so-called "professional supplicant." These people had either actually been attacked unfairly or had been attacked but not unfairly. Regardless of the situation, they all shared some common points: inferior caliber, coarse personality, and demands for shocking compensation for the attacks they had suffered. Furthermore, this type of demand (the political jargon in China is "realize the policy," which was very difficult for people to satisfy, not knowing how to apply the policies) was often endless. They frequently added new demands which were impossible to satisfy, such as employment for children, housing, and huge compensation payments, as well as official positions for the supplicants themselves, etc. This made others suspect that their true goals were not rehabilitation and compensation but merely extortion. The central and local governments had no way of dealing with these people. Fortunately they were satisfied with becoming professional complainers and had no political ability at all.

There was another type of person very deserving of sympathy. These were the ones in the group of supplicants who had mental illnesses. It was difficult to determine whether these people with mental handicaps had become ill after having suffered from unjust persecution during the Cultural Revolution or whether they had been ill before joining the Cultural Revolution and thus had been attacked. A considerable number of people only subjectively thought they had been persecuted. These people deserved sympathy in that, because China basically did not have a mental health treatment network, so that this concept really did not exist, so these ill people not only did not admit to their illness, but society and the government did not treat them as ill people. The tragic situation and pain on both sides when an ill person and the government have a conflict is quite imaginable. China has no record of using mental institutions to handle political prisoners. (Mr. Liu Binyan insists that in Heilongjiang Province in extreme Northern China there has been an ugly precedent of this type. Liu's theory has yet to be investigated.) Therefore, some supplicants were later sent to mental hospitals. This should not be seen as persecution but as in keeping with the spirit of human rights.

The leaders of the groups of organized supplicants were usually those most able to debate. The caliber of these

people was not high, but they were full of enthusiasm and courage. Furthermore, in a complex sociopolitical environment, their behavior appeared very pure and sincere, and there was no reason to believe that they had been clearly anticommunist from the start. A woman named Fu became the most famous person near the Xidan Wall around 1978. Ms. Fu's fate was cruel. She had been subjected to sexual harassment by the CPC member cadre in her unit. She had tried every means to hide and resist but finally was raped by the cadre. Fu then left her position to start a period of over one year of appealing for justice. The result of her appeal was that the rape was never confirmed, the cadre did not receive any punishment, and Ms. Fu's name and reputation were completely ruined by the authorities.

Ms. Fu later organized several hundred supplicants in a demonstration to appeal to the government. (This was the only sizable march activity during the Xidan Wall period.) Due to this activity, Ms. Fu was accused of the crime of disrupting traffic order.

Some essays said that those demonstrating with Ms. Fu shouted out some excessive slogans that went too far. This is entirely possible. While the court was in the process of adjudicating the Fu case, some dramatic twists occurred. A very inexperienced judge (because China at that time had just revived the public trial system, all of the judges were inexperienced) suddenly discovered that the judgement opinion which he had already determined before the fact would meet with a tough challenge. Fu, after much consternation, had finally produced powerful proof that she had been violently raped by the Chinese Communist cadre. According to unreliable information passed among the people, Fu announced in court that she knew of an obvious unique characteristic of a very intimate part of that gentleman's body, and the persecution which she had suffered afterward proved that they had not had an adulterous relationship. With that, the court could only recess and examine the evidence, and after the court recessed, no further information was passed on.

The strange aspect of this case is why was it that the facts of the rape case had to be made clear during the disrupting traffic case? Could it be that a woman who has been raped has the right to attack or disrupt social order? Ms. Fu was one of two cases which Hua Guofeng identified for legal punishment due to an uncooperative attitude (the other was Wei Jingsheng). Perhaps, in sympathy, the totally inexperienced judge used some artful method to protect her.

The second type of secret political group were various "discussion groups" formed by the young intellectual children of cadres. The unique characteristics of cadre children were that they had access to news, they were politically sensitive, and they had a broader range of knowledge. Because these young people had a strong "just us" consciousness, their resistance to the government appeared extremely thoughtless and even spoiled.

The demands of the cadre children on the government were not clear. They paid excessive attention to practical political goals. The demands on the Xidan Wall for the rehabilitation of the Qingming Festival incident, for the reemergence of the old cadres, as well as for attacks against and the destruction of factional cadres, were basically written by these young people. Many Western experts believe that the cadre children have the most political sense in China, because they always connect political goals closely to their own personal interests and do not have impractical and empty dreams. During the Xidan Wall period, they were most concerned with regaining the social position which their parents had prior to the Cultural Revolution. This was because if everything were done according to the previous, stable working order in China, their political bloodline would completely ensure that they would have more opportunities than the general public did for further training and advancement. This superior position meant that they would never become an opposition force to the regime. Nor would they become active participants in the movement for democracy. These would conflict with their own personal interests. Furthermore, the progress of reform, with its orderly destruction, would make them feel threatened and lost.

Wei Jingsheng was the chief editor of a secret publication, "Exploration." The main content of this publication was an attack on the government at the time. The members of the editorial staff and the surrounding people who were connected to them were mainly cadre children and the children of high level intellectuals. They formed a loose organization similar to a secret political salon of high levels of society. Produced out of the wildness, rashness, and ignorance of the cadre children, the views of this publication were also chaotic but very bold, unselfish, unrestrained, extremely arbitrary, and extremely free in criticism of the government at that time. Of course the governing regime could not tolerate this. Wei Jingsheng was arrested in March 1979 and sentenced in October to 15 years in prison.

The political groups formed by cadre children did not lack political talent or knowledge. During the Xidan Wall period, the political work from which they derived the greatest satisfaction was the supportive attitude of Deng Xiaoping, who had the greatest power in the center, toward the Xidan Wall.

On November 26, 1978, American newspaper columnist Robert Novak had contact with some cadre children. When they discovered that Novak would have an opportunity to interview Deng Xiaoping, they made a list of interview questions for Novak. The result was as would be expected. Deng said to Novak, "the Democracy Wall is a good thing." But this highly experienced politician immediately made a completely significant correction to his error of speech. He said this does not mean that all of the big character posters on the Xidan Wall are correct. In this way, he was able to keep all of his power to initiate grasped tightly in his own hands. For those young

warriors who loitered in front of the Xidan Wall, getting this first quote from Deng overwhelmed them with giddiness. They were then to commit their second erroneous step.

The cadre children class is a relatively independent political and social community. They have played a fairly noticeable role during the past 30 years of Chinese history and have become a unique phenomenon in Chinese social life. These 30 years can be calculated from 1965 when Beijing cadre children under the instigation of Mao Zedong rebelled against the old educational system all the way up to recently, when a number of high-level cadre children have entered the highest leadership organizations of the Chinese government and party. During this time, the two most glorious periods were the Red Guard movement during the summer of 1966 and the Qingming Festival incident of 1976. During the former incident they brought down Liu Shaoqi, but also their parents at the same time. During the latter incident, they struggled with ordinary citizens against the gang of four. This was a process of awakening.

What must be pointed out is that the gang of four, which absolutely opposed the legal rights of the capitalist class, and the extreme leftist faction were the deadly enemies of the cadre children. During the anti-Lin Biao, anti-Confucius movement during 1974, Jiang Qing forced in the addition of a phrase about opposing the use of back doors. Opposing the use of the back door meant opposing the practice of cadre children using the influence and relationship networks of their parents' generation to avoid being sent to the countryside to work as peasants and to go to university or get promoted to cadre in a military camp. The goal of the gang of four in opposing the use of back doors was still to politically attack the old cadres. This was unspoken, but the surface content of the plot against the use of the back door received a great degree of support among the public.

After the gang of four was brought down, opposition to the use of the back door and opposition to special privileges has regularly been a fierce cry of the masses in the democracy movements. And during the 1989 Beijing incident, this issue was the one which aroused the most public ire on university campuses.

If we leave political questions aside and only consider the issues from the angle of social consciousness and feelings, we will discover that on the issue of opposition to special privileges, the extreme leftists of the Cultural Revolution and the current mass democracy movement faction are a linked historical line. If we engage in even more detached analysis, we will perhaps be able to gain this conclusion: The long-standing democratic consciousness of the masses was the most appropriate fertile soil for the extreme leftists to take power during the Cultural Revolution. The current democracy movement and its thought clearly carry some of the thought vestiges of the extreme leftist faction of the Cultural Revolution.

With further logical inference on the basis of this conclusion, one can obtain an answer with the significance of a warning. If there is no reform of the social order to make it more stable and democratic on the bases of competition, equality, and risk, and there is another shift in power, then the democratic consciousness and leftist thinking of the masses could possibly arise together. Do the Chinese people want to go through another Cultural Revolution?

Deng Xiaoping's change in attitude toward the Xidan Wall demonstrated the practical personality and rare wide-ranging outlook of this superior politician.

In addition to telling Novak that the Democracy Wall was a good thing, Deng had made this comment to a Japanese reporter which clearly revealed his attitude: "Our constitution permits the writing of big character posters. We have no right to reject or criticize the actions taken by the masses to develop democracy... The masses should be allowed to express their dissatisfaction!"

It is clear, however, that China has never had (especially currently) the qualifications to further implement democratic government. The basic proof of this is that this type of debate on democratic government would quickly develop to the stage of emptiness. This would not only damage the stable and unified social environment needed for the four modernizations. Analyzed in terms of the current specific political situation, if Deng had further advocated the democracy movement and had been lenient on the big character posters on the Xidan Wall, he would have become another Mao Zedong. Because the developing momentum of the democracy movement would have attacked the interests of the old cadres, and Deng at that time temporarily lacked a reliable force to use in place of the old cadres to help him eliminate the whatever faction (Hua Guofeng and his allies), he solidly held on to political power.

At the end of March 1979, Deng said: "Some bad elements have raised various demands which currently cannot be realized or are basically unreasonable and have incited or tricked some of the masses into attacking the organizations of the party and the government... Not only is this the case, but they have also raised some sensationalist slogans like 'oppose hunger' and 'demand human rights.' These slogans have incited some of the people to march and demonstrate, with the intent of having foreigners widely disseminate their speech and actions in the world."

Deng finally said in anger: "There is a so-called China human rights committee which has insisted on putting up big character posters demanding that the American president 'be concerned with' human rights in China. Can we allow this sort of behavior which publicly demands that foreigners interfere in our internal government?"

The members of the third type of small political group were almost all university students born to common

people around 1949. Due to family or personal reasons, most of these people suffered political frustration or attacks during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, their demands for political equality were even more fierce. After they had suffered alone for many years, when they found people at the Xidan Wall of the same age who had suffered the same history and spoke the same language, their topics of conversation and their thoughts flew from the surface phenomena of society in much deeper directions. Doubts and dissatisfaction with the social system were the shared feelings which bound the members of this type of small group together.

After the Xidan Wall, this type of group was preserved via a loose form of single lines of contact. For a period as long as ten years, at each peak of the democracy movement in Chinese society, the members of this type of group were almost always the activist and backbone elements of the movement. The demands which they raised or the political goals which they wanted to reach were always more politically significant than those of the intellectual youth. Most of the more mature and professional democracy movement activists currently active in exile in Western Europe or North America were from this group.

According to an investigative report by some scholars from the United States and France, the reasons that the political groups formed by the Xidan Wall were able to sustain themselves, and in exile are the possible backbone elements of a future opposition party in China, and the reasons that these people finally split with the CPC are as follows:

1. Due to their family backgrounds, these young people suffered relatively serious wounds politically and, during the formative periods of their adolescence, they felt oppressed and inferior. Thus, they harbor strong feelings of resistance and political enmity toward society and the CPC.
2. Relatively high cultural levels and natural assets enabled them to derive political nourishment and fresh ideas from foreign realms of thought. Initially, these people just felt close to some works on thought by branch factions or altered forms of Marxism. Only later did they gradually come to believe in extreme free capitalism and existentialist philosophy.
3. Beginning with the Xidan Wall, the main members of this group have always maintained contacts outside China. After the '80's, most of them used their qualifications to get into universities in Europe or the United States to go abroad one by one. The relatively less constrained environment there allowed their heretical thinking to develop in a systematic fashion.
4. After the Xidan Wall incident ended, basic level organizations in the CPC adopted an attitude of political prejudice against the intellectual youth in their units who participated in the Xidan Wall, nongovernmental publications, or later activities. This made these people feel

politically hopeless and severed the possibility of their cooperating with the regime.

Chinese intellectuals with different political views exiled in Europe and the United States have formed a party organization with a definite scope and clear political goals. However according to the judgements of experienced experts, this party organization does not have the possibility of becoming an influential opposition party in the near future. This is not only because these organizations are far away from their origins and have almost completely lost all possibility of influence on the Chinese domestic public, but also because these professional and ambitious political groups, after separating themselves from the domestic public, have fallen into a chaotic vortex of purely political discussion, hysteria, financial crises, and struggles for leadership. Thus, these types of political groups permanently lose the possibility of becoming viable political organizations with the ability to use feedback systems to modify their thinking and policies.

Looking at the present and the relatively distant future, the Chinese opposition faction in exile will not pose a real threat to the political power of the CPC in China. They have never been and are not now a component of political life in China, but are just a small angry and helpless group which has been tossed outside the circle.

Within China, there are no indications of the possible existence or emergence of an opposition party. The CPC has intelligently implemented market economy reforms and relatively relaxed political controls. Most of the intellectuals have shifted their attention from a narrow political arena to the much broader commodity market. An extremely polarized political situation will not recur in the near future. Of course this does not exclude the possibility of sharp criticism and accusations from the intellectuals if the national economy experiences a severe setback or errors in guidance. If these accusations are directed at an irrational social system, there will not be a replay of political antagonism, because the CPC has already included this issue within the scope of system reform. It will not again be awkwardly included in the guiding principles as class struggle or conflicts of political standpoint. Thus the party will not continue to set up political enemies or develop its own opposition factions. This is an example of correct political relaxation.

If the accusations from intellectual circles or the public are relatively specific and clearly directed against a certain CPC leader, there will be a certain danger. The results of economic reform have yet to have an impact on the system produced by the CPC leadership. Thus, this type of criticism or accusation would involve, to a greater degree, attacks on or rejection of the leadership of the CPC. Thus, the feelings of resentment it would create would cause the government or the CPC to respond erroneously. Severe counter criticism usually provokes

antagonistic feelings among the masses and results in small scale conflicts which leave wounded feelings on both sides.

What really constitutes a serious threat to society is the emergence of societies with a religious tone. According to the exposes of some Chinese publications within China, these types of societies or spiritual organizations have currently developed to the point where they cannot be contained. The largest among these can often expand within a short period to include hundreds of believers. There are instances of local branch party secretaries, cadres of rural governments, as well as officers from police precinct offices, participating in and becoming backbone members of these societies. A large percentage of the Chinese masses, especially the peasants, are illiterate or have a low level of education. They accept more readily the bewitching fraud of this low-grade mysterious propaganda. As economic reform is able to offer more opportunities to acquire wealth and greater differences arise between these opportunities and the growing desire of the peasants for wealth, there is a significant social target group for this type of mysterious propaganda. In addition, as soon as peasants leave the countryside and come into the cities, a stronger gap arises between their expanding field of vision and their own difficult economic straits. This creates in them vague feelings of anger and destructive desires which provide an opportunity for the proselytizing of strange religions.

The sudden interruptions in the process of economic development, or the man-made or natural adjustments to irrationally rapid growth, will be key points for the eruption of various types of antigovernment thinking. Unrealistically optimistic feelings of the public about their future and excessively confident propaganda by the government on future prospects not only enlarge the false aspects of prosperity but also create greater disappointment and anger when these interruptions arrive.

4. The Beijing Incident of 1989—The End of Old-Style Democracy Movements

Due to ignorance or inadequate knowledge of Chinese society, the judgments of Western society on Chinese issues have repeatedly been erroneous. The most recent example is the student unrest which occurred in Beijing in the spring of 1989, after the death of CPC Secretary Hu Yaobang. Western politicians had been very hopeful about this unrest. They thought that this was a natural element in the chain of collapses within the socialist camp.

This conclusion included a serious bias. Actually, without the active participation and support of several democratic Western countries, this student unrest would have just been a minor incident not worth much attention in the process of a series of disturbances in Chinese society. The only effect would have been the collective release of pent-up feelings in society. During the ten years after 1979, many similar incidents of unrest have

occurred, and there is also the possibility of a gradual transition to a pulse of unrest which meets the needs of normal social order. If the target goals of this type of unrest can be separated from extremes and guided toward the specific, and if the government does not overstress political conclusions in handling these events, then petition activities and demonstration marches can be a normal and healthy social means of exposing contradictions and explaining divergent views.

It is easy to understand that the Chinese government, which is accustomed to unified thinking and orderly calm, has difficulty tolerantly accepting a great degree of this type of public dissenting behavior. The components of society are complex. Conflicts tend to be acrimonious and there is a widespread lack of legal system concepts among the public. The existence of a large number of these phenomena of instability in society mean that any minor incident of unrest can possibly grow into a large-scale social turmoil. Even a society like the United States experienced the Los Angeles incident. The tension and rigidity of the Chinese government during the early phases of this unrest, as well as its erroneous responses based on anxiousness to settle the unrest, should be seen as pardonable. Actually, the government had never had any experience of any better way to handle demonstration marches without lingering problems. Even so, all of the situations have been quelled.

But the Western participants actually caused a great change in events. As the time grew prolonged, one aspect of this change was the expansion of the scope and influence of the event as well as the explosive nature of the form of protest. This was not the most important aspect, however. The influence on Chinese society created by the direct involvement of Western democratic countries in that society's democratic unrest was in direct contrast with the hopes of those Western societies. Feelings and capacities were released to the highest limits, and there were the bravest actions as well as the discovery by those persons in those actions of their own blindness, lack of vision, and helplessness. In addition, the government's final choice, after a painful process of decisionmaking, was to use a more modern means of resolution—violent dispersion to quell this emotional disturbance which lacked a clearly defined meaning. (Compared with psychological terror and governmental prejudice, armed dispersion is a more civilized means of dictatorship). After all of this was finally finished, the entire society, including officialdom as well as the masses, entered a highly detached state of disgust with politics and fear of antagonism. This detached state will last for a fairly long time and has formed a blank period of relaxed feelings in society and alleviation of antagonism. If the CPC adopts even more relaxed political measures during this blank period and does not commit any serious errors in the direction of its economic policies, the blank period could be extended indefinitely. It may even be that for a very long historical period, political conflict will no longer be the major topic of Chinese society.

Thus, the 1989 Beijing incident may be the final conclusion of the constantly recurring old type of democracy movement of the recent past in China.

Modern Western sociology and Leninist theories of the East both believe that revolution is the only rapid way to resolve social contradictions. They both also emphasize, however, the importance of the objective requirements and foundation for revolution. Revolution must be a pressing need of society. It is a natural form of social movement which would otherwise be irrational in the process of social development. Artificially created revolutions not only seem unnatural, with no foundation, but also are often damaging to society and to revolutionary force itself.

The disintegration of communist party political power in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union did perhaps have some revolutionary characteristics, but in China, society has never and could not ever make those types of political demands. Up to the present, the basic demands of Chinese society on the CPC are still the gradual relaxation of economic controls and the appropriate strengthening of political controls. This society fervently demands security and stability. For this, it may sacrifice some obvious revolutionary goals. For example, the society has been unbelievably tolerant and forgiving of the corrupt behavior of CPC officials. Thus, it was a major error in judgement to conclude that a revolution had arrived which would topple the CPC from political power. It was a lowly and ignorant error to support a disturbance which looked like a revolution and cause it to expand into a social upheaval of great proportions and impetus. It was like undertaking a caesarean section to take a fetus from a virgin. This is an insult to modern testing technology and to all medical doctors.

German journalist Baker Brausen [bei ke bu lao cai en 6296 0344 1580 0525 6846 1869] said about the failure of the West: "It was only a year after the incident that Westerners finally discovered in shock that those young people with different political views were using the West. They did not care about the end goals of the movement, but only about the movement itself. Hence, when they described the illusion of fierce conflicts in Chinese society, they were actually using every effort to encourage the West to become involved and expand their isolated and weak camp of resistance. These were young rebels with relatively little sense of respect and even less political experience. But they dragged the Western countries with their much greater experience into this mistake at almost the same time."

Brausen's views represent the general feeling of the Western public after the incident passed. They felt cheated, as if they had only played the role of one who was used in a middle ages-style political game about roping in allies and friends.

The basic characteristic of old-style democratic movements was that the goal was to call for striving for the implementation of political democracy. However,

because the corresponding requirements were not there, there was absolutely no way to use these moments to attain democratic government. It was not even a successful effort in a gradual process of change but purely a release or explosion of hidden feelings of exasperation in society. The reason this type of intermittent democratic unrest is called an old-style movement is not that the organizational style was scattered or that the leadership was incomplete but that, after rejecting the old models, there was no intention or basically no ability to establish new models different from the old ones. Socioeconomic and political development have not made demands for a new political model. Hence there is no way to confirm the boundaries and framework of this new model. Thus, even if a political authority topples in social unrest, as with many revolutions which have taken place in Third World countries (these revolutions are often supplemented by military coups, or else few would succeed), the new political authority must still establish order within the pattern stipulated by the old model. "Revolution" can bring satisfaction but absolutely cannot achieve development.

Since the CPC took over the government in China, China has become the country with the most active of old-style democracy movements. These movements started with the attack launched by the intellectual groups in 1957 against bureaucratic workstyles of the CPC. The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 and the Qingming Festival incident in Beijing and the demonstrations in major cities all over the country against the "gang of four" in 1976, were all illustrations of fierce explosions of this type of movement. After the Xidan Wall incident in 1978, the student movement erupted in Beijing and Shanghai almost every two years.

The scope, influence, and organization of these democracy movements were all far greater than the Beijing incident of 1989. Of these, the Cultural Revolution was launched, organized, and led personally by CPC Chairman Mao Zedong. During the early phases of the movement, Mao used his power to bring all levels of governmental authority and the bureaucratic system throughout the country to collapse. In this he showed the world clearly and without hesitation that his goal in launching this movement was to destroy the old bureaucratic model and establish the democratic politics which he envisioned (perhaps a Paris Commune-style system of committees with equal voting). The result, however, was tragic. After destroying the old government, Mao could not see at all clearly what the new governmental authority would be. Chinese society did not achieve any progress at all in this raucous clamor for democracy. On the contrary, the cultural gang which had clamored so strongly for democracy changed their tune as soon as they gained control of political power and became tyrants who were not about to give the masses any democracy at all. During this democratic revolution, the only thing the people experienced was disorder, irrationality, and oppression.

When Mao Zedong decided, as he approached death, not to give succession rights to the ignorant practitioners of his own democratic thought—Madame Jiang Qing and the other leftist warriors—his heart must have been filled with sadness and pain. This democratic political experiment which had had such superior conditions and such noble and kind motivations had not only gained nothing, but had ended by provoking complete opposition. Of course Mao was very clearheaded. Responsibility for the failure did not lie with "international imperialism," and there was no way to shove the blame onto Liu Shaoqi's revisionist line. The reason for failure was the unbreachable chasm between the conditions which society could provide and the democratic ideals.

A deep analysis of the Qingming Festival incident which occurred in Beijing in 1976 will help us understand the path and fate of the old-style democracy movement.

The instigating cause of this incident lay in the traditional Chinese mourning festival of Qingming. The residents of Beijing engaged in conflict with the Beijing municipal government over the mourning of the death of Premier Zhou Enlai. Substantively, this was a social disturbance provoked by a political crisis. All of society had known for some time that Mao was severely ill and would not live much longer. So which political factional force would take power after Mao died? After Zhou Enlai, there was a political power vacuum.

Mao Zedong clearly had his own definite views on this issue. No matter what happened, he could not let Deng Xiaoping automatically take over Zhou Enlai's position as premier of the State Council, although Deng gave the eulogy at the memorial service for Zhou Enlai and, according to Chinese practice, the person who gives the eulogy is the natural successor. During the last few months before death, Mao was sometimes lucid and sometimes unconscious, but he never relaxed in his vigilance against Deng. If Deng were allowed to become Zhou's successor, then Deng's position would become unshakable. Then, as soon as Mao was no longer in this world, Deng would definitely use his iron rice bowl to expurgate Zhang Chunqiao and the literary clique from the party center. This result was laughable. Since the Cultural Revolution had brought down Liu and Deng and then brought Deng back to his position, what did the Cultural Revolution leave behind? It was very clear. He had to either bring Deng down now or all would be buried and lost.

Mao Zedong also did not want to choose someone from the extreme leftist faction to fill the vacuum left after Zhou Enlai died. In analyzing the reasons for this, Harvard University Professor Roderick McFarquhar asserted, "Mao had basically decided long ago that he could not consider allowing one of the radicals to succeed Zhou. A radical premier would not only not be able to maintain Maoism but would also have a strongly disadvantageous impact on the development of society which could then force him from office and then bankrupt the guiding principles."

Mao Zedong's final choice of Hua Guofeng was still based on protecting the greatest benefits of the Cultural Revolution. Hua was a beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution. During the era after Mao, he would have to resist attacks from both the radical culture people and the conservative old cadres and would need to walk a relatively balanced line down the middle.

The Chinese public, however, expressed a strong reaction to Mao's choice. Although they lacked an understanding of Hua Guofeng, between Deng and Madame Jiang, they would have preferred that Deng have the controlling power. After Deng was pushed out of office a second time by Mao, their anger finally exploded. Beijing residents, full of aggressive spirit and the tradition of involvement in politics, gathered spontaneously on the day of the Qingming Festival and expressed their demand to achieve liberation by influencing the selection of the power-controlling authority. They also clearly expressed their feeling of exasperation with Mao Zedong.

On April 4, the day of the Qingming Festival, a crowd of 500,000 people gathered in Tiananmen Square. This was the largest spontaneous gathering of masses of people in the world up to this time. This movement was also the most clearly successful of the democracy movements in China's history. It not only indirectly overthrew one power group (Hua Guofeng, to a large degree, relied on the force of the mass opposition to the gang of four to launch the coup and successfully hold onto political power), but also shook the position of a god. Due to Mao Zedong's order to suppress the masses who participated in the gathering in Tiananmen Square, he finally lost all prestige. Before Mao died, political jokes about him were passed around in Beijing, Nanjing, Xi'an and other places. Not long after Mao died, rumors were spread about his two illegitimate sons. These rumors were clearly untrue, but the political intent and effect was just as obvious. These were to destroy respect for the god and shake the god's unshakable power.

The problem was that the Qingming Festival incident did not achieve anything on the issue of democracy. The gang of four was overthrown by an organization as secretive as a palace coup. After Hua Guofeng and his allies took political control, they immediately raised high the flag of Mao Zedong and used belief in the "two whatevers" and a personal letter from Mao Zedong as the legal evidence for their right to govern. Politically, everything remained in place, and there was no advancement. What was very interesting was that for the next three years, Mr. Hua Guofeng, with his obviously conservative thinking, was consistently held high by the majority of cadres and the masses as a "wise leader" and was worshipped sincerely as a new god.

We have discovered that god-creating activities are the only activity during several episodes of democratic unrest in China with a clear goal and direction. It is difficult to say clearly why the Chinese people use this

method, which violates the spirit of democracy, as a path or bridge toward the goal of democracy. A possible explanation is that the public, lacking in independent character and subjective thinking, can only place their hopes for political equality on the honest character of one politician. They have never attempted to contemplate issues from the angle of humanity or humanism. Therefore, they participated in political movements as democratic movements and have never been able to make strict distinctions between these two. This special characteristic is not only a characteristic of all manifestations of the old-style democracy movement but also the fatal affliction of this type of movement. There is no politician or authority who could allow the blind public (the extent of the blindness of the public was exacerbated under the conditions of political secrecy) to rely on their emotions to interfere with his use of power. The clever Deng Xiaoping is also this way.

Although logically the democracy movements and political movements are the same, they are completely different in value. The value of the democracy movement is in people for themselves and in people as the main topic and not in the overriding gods and idols held above people, much less in who necessarily or coincidentally holds the highest power in the government.

Thus, the old-style democracy movement was just passively drawn into political struggle and power rivalry. (This point was demonstrated especially clearly during the 1989 unrest.) The Chinese public and intellectuals have bravely jumped into struggle after struggle to strive for political equality and democratic power. But they have never truly launched a movement for democratic power and political democracy. Therefore, they have been only an instrument of politics and power in the struggle. The more selflessly they entered into the struggle the more they felt cheated. When they finally cast off politics, perhaps their democratic consciousness had begun to awaken.

According to more consistent Western views, the most talented and intelligent generation in Chinese society to date has been that generation of middle-aged intellectuals known as the "old third group." What is regrettable is that this generation, which has now become society's elite core intellectual group, were involved from their early years in the capricious Cultural Revolution and thus cultivated a strong sense of political responsibility and group consciousness. This means that they have almost no consciousness of democracy. This situation is probably also a small tragedy in the advancement of democracy in China.

That the Beijing incident of 1989 was sparked by the death of Hu Yaobang is a detail worthy of much attention. This detail to a great degree reflected most of the social content of this incident. At least four types of social feeling were concentrated on Hu.

1. After the Cultural Revolution, Hu was the main advocate and implementor of the rehabilitation of the

large number of wrongful cases which had accumulated over history. Among those who were rescued were some old communist warriors, but an even larger number were intellectuals who had been oppressed for long periods. In the eyes of these people, Hu was not only an honest official but also one with the image of having been a target during the Mao Zedong era.

2. After Hu assumed the office of general secretary of the party, he advocated liberated thinking and called for the creation of a relaxed political environment to enliven culture and thought. He also adopted an unprecedented and tolerant attitude toward the liberalization tendency among young intellectuals. Although this made him a political enemy of the old cadres, in the eyes of free thinking university and secondary school students, he became a protector of liberated thinking and enlightened politics.

3. During and after Hu held the office of secretary of the CPC Discipline Inspection Committee, he enthusiastically called for the resolute elimination of all manifestations of corruption within the CPC. He undertook public examination with extreme severity of one or two of the most malicious cases. The cases which had the most shocking impact in society were the "two bears case" which happened in Hangzhou and the "case of the two princes" which happened in Shanghai. The shared aspect of these two cases was that both involved the sons of high-ranking cadres using their parents' influence to trick and violate the daughters of common families. Hu Yaobang and the public shared tremendous rage at this. He ordered party newspapers to openly expose this case and to give them thorough coverage to demonstrate the party's resolve and ability in eliminating corruption. The result of this was severe damage to the prestige of the old cadres who had resumed positions of power after the Cultural Revolution. It did earn, however, the enthusiastic support of the public.

Of course, these actions by Hu were just demonstrating to everyone the realistic contradictions between social strata in society, the deep contradiction between the cadres with power and the common masses. The result of these actions was to bring out a feeling of distrust among the people for the government. (Another explanation is that it damaged the image of the party.) Another aspect is that it offended the old cadres. But faced with this realistic social contradiction, Hu emphatically stood with the masses.

4. Hu Yaobang's actions and thinking, criticized as extreme, were obviously detrimental to Deng Xiaoping's efforts to maintain an overall situation of unity and stability (but they were not detrimental to Deng's path of reform). Many old cadres, after being forced to retire and give up power, released their anger against Hu. Letters of complaint filled with feelings of anger and with curses continuously flew into Deng Xiaoping's office. Hu's careless tolerance of "bourgeois liberalization" damaged the leadership function of the party and damaged the

purity and unity of ruling thought in society. The background behind Hu's resignation from his post as general secretary is not known, but it was certainly related to the liberalized thought trend around 1987. Hu's removal from office, in a situation which lacked political transparency, made him a wronged hero. In the eyes of some other people, he became an opponent of Deng Xiaoping and his reform line.

In 1989, Chinese society was in the midst of a chaotic period of transition from old to new. The economic reforms and the old economic system were experiencing conflicts which formed a chaotic two-track system using both the market and the planned economy. Political reforms met with frustration and resistance among the existing interest groups. In the process of gradually advancing reform strategies, the muddled accumulation of contradictions was originally a long-term preexisting social condition which conformed to Deng Xiaoping's working principle of using a little chaos to release great chaos. The danger of this was the possibility that various social classes or interest groups might become dissatisfied or disadvantaged (in ideology or feeling) by the reforms at the same time. The opportunity for success with these strategies is quite great. To be able to take small steps forward, one must also be able to take small steps back and not fall into the dilemma of only being able to advance and not retreat. What is even more important is that almost all levels of society all benefit from reform. (Those who have yet to benefit or have been harmed are the military groups. In order to develop the economy, military spending had to be decreased by a large amount. But during the critical moments, the military stood by Deng without any hesitation. This is difficult for people to understand.)

What Deng and his colleagues did not expect was a serious crisis in the moral system of the society. The pervasive commodity behavior formed a powerful assault not only on the preexisting economic order of the society, but also on its moral system. When the public, who were accustomed to living and thinking according to the old order, faced this assault, they felt an extreme sense of crisis and insecurity. The large-scale transition and succession of power caused the widespread occurrence of the abuse of power as well as the use of power for personal gain. The social reality of opportunities available due to the uneven distribution of power were suddenly demonstrated in front of the people. This caused the people to feel great mistrust and resentment toward power and to feel disheartened, anxious, and fearful about the future of society.

If the functions of society and the economy had been operating normally at this time, the crisis described above perhaps would have quietly passed. However, due to the inflation caused by the pull of demand inspired by desires in an excessively rapidly growing economy, the speed of increase in the prices of goods during the fall and winter of 1988 reached a peak. (Most estimate that the purchasing power of a unit of currency fell over 20

percent.) The feelings of insecurity and anger multiplied several fold with the rapid increase in prices.

Dissatisfaction and complaint were widespread feelings in the society. The weaknesses of the strategy of advancing reform in small steps were exposed at this time. When economic results are clear, everyone is a supporter and a beneficiary. As soon as economic development is interrupted, reform policies no longer enjoy strong, fixed social support. Almost all classes of society will display rebellious attitudes.

The death of Hu Yaobang provided an appropriate moral excuse for this type of rebelliousness. All classes had reasons to see Hu Yaobang as themselves or as a model and felt deeply wounded by his death. Thus, the memorial activity quickly evolved into a political demonstration. Different classes with opposing interests formed joint antigovernment ranks. Young students demanding an increase in the pace of reform and common residents who demanded a return to the old order lined up as marching troops. Therefore, wild abandon and lack of reason became the obvious characteristics of the disturbance.

Compared with the history of disturbances with mass participation, the Beijing incident of 1989 seemed even more chaotic, with even more irrational goals and more venting of emotions. It was even further removed from an advanced movement of a mature nationality. The multifarious ideas and strategies of various plotters and politically immature people gave the movement a more political air but the mainstream of feeling never weakened.

This incident was still a replay of a traditional Chinese mass movement, because it did not depart from the general framework of those movements: blind support or blind anger against authority, opposition and self-destructive damage to the normal advancement of society, and a reactionary and completely ineffective result.

A description of some of the dramatic details of this disturbance must be emphasized. The move for coerced fasting by several thousand young students on Tiananmen Square seemed tragic and rash. This Eastern type of protest method seemed especially inappropriate at this time. Self-sacrifice to illustrate one's will is a famous method used by the loyal, chivalrous followers of Confucianism. Killing oneself in public to create a threat illustrates that one has existing value. On the one hand, China's university students used this suicidal method to demonstrate how they had suffered by the government's lack of understanding of them. On the other hand, they attempted to use the tragedy of suicide to arouse national feelings against the government. This inherently contradictory strategy caused what was purely a protest activity to take on the air of an unfathomable plot.

The most welcome news on the square was of the support of members of the Western world for the protest activity

and of the Western world's pressure on the Chinese government. This made people realize uncomfortably that the intent of the sustained protest activities by the students was to arouse the sympathy and even the interference of the international community. Thus, this democratic movement became even more detached from the democratic spirit. A complete character and independent character are the indicators of the growth of democratic consciousness. Hope for foreign aid or attempts to borrow foreign force to coerce or drive one's own nation toward progress is a typical example of the slavish intellectual personality. The youth of China should not have debased themselves.

In taking an overall look at the general history of the movements for political democratization launched or actively participated in by China's intellectuals since the CPC took over the government, we can discover that Chinese society, including the most progressive stratum of society, currently does not possess an aware and complete democratic consciousness. In addition, their use of democratic concepts has a clear feeling of utilitarianism. Thus, the realization of democratic politics in Chinese society is still a goal for the fairly distant future.

China's intellectuals must be warned that true democracy in society is the product of the harmonious development of interlinked and consistent content and form. Its external form is only an appropriate organization of which there are many varieties and different characteristics. Its internal spiritual development is the principle of shared progress of humankind. The nurturing and development of the democratic spirit and democratic consciousness are the fundamental content and only goal of movements for democratization.

Due to the unique development process of the democratic consciousness of China's intellectuals, this consciousness has been formed with serious defects; which are primarily demonstrated in the following symptoms:

1. A lack of independent character. From the point of view of psychology or behavioral science, the intellectuals in the movements all demonstrated clear tendencies to mass or common behavior. They have not had the custom of or courage for independent thinking and decisionmaking. Thus, they have been more easily stirred to action by extreme feelings and foreign propaganda. They have had a thirst for guidance from authority and enthusiasm for protecting or recreating authority. Due to these biases and limitations, China's intellectuals have never become an independent or primary force in these movements. Thus the nature of all of the mass democratic movements has not been democratic.
2. A lack of a spirit of self restraint. Shortcomings in moral training and awareness of self control have caused the behavior of China's intellectual youth to display low moral standards and a natural illegality. The unconstitutional speech during the process of raising objections against the CPC in 1957 and the excessive speech and

behavior during the rebellious activities of the Cultural Revolution, as well as during the several periods of unrest after the Cultural Revolution, were all seriously self-destructive behavior. All of this changed the nature of the movement from the beginning and resulted in the separation of the movement from its goals. In addition, stubborn, one-track thinking has seldom created an atmosphere of fair debate with progressive meaning in Chinese society. Fair debate is the only feasible route for a nation to achieve progress in understanding. After the Beijing incident of 1989, the university students who participated in the unrest had an excellent opportunity to engage in an open conversation with representatives of the government. However, the university students, with their lack of awareness of self restraint, were unable to rely on their own ability to reach a self-controlled judgement of right and wrong and were unable to restrain their own actions to stay consciously within the law, and they casually relinquished this opportunity for great benefit to the entire nation.

3. Lack of consciousness of political equality. Equality is the soul of democracy. Under the constraints of the concept of equality, the subjective consciousness of the intellectuals would not have become distorted to extreme individualism. The reason that the democratic goals raised by China's intellectuals in repeated movements lacked rationality was that they did not conform to the principle of sociopolitical equality. The demands for the CPC to relinquish leadership power in 1957, the demands on the Xidan Wall to implement a system of three separate branches of government, and the demands in 1989 for completely open speech, all these demands for democracy were but the exterior designs of democracy. They are pretty and attractive but not consistent with the state of development of Chinese society. Here lies the interests of a minority intellectual elite, but not the shared interests or common welfare of all the members of society including the several hundred million semiliterate peasants. Therefore, the conflict or gap between the interests of the intellectual community and the public interest of the national society demonstrates that the intellectual community has yet to possess a spirit of true political equality. The equal rights which they strive to obtain from the CPC and the government are not the truly significant political need of the main members of society.

Chapter 4: China's Cadre Problem

Summary: The fifth modernization—administrative officials' collection concept and employee awareness. Either poverty or wealth could constitute the conditions for alienation from authority. Battling the bureaucracy. Mao Zedong died with a grievance. The tearful compromise was made for political stability. Oversight authority is also power. The illusion that oversight authority is not subject to pollution. Placing one's hopes on democracy is like marrying one's daughter to a devil. Keeping an open eye on the law was to keep it from becoming a rope, but it has

taken its present shape of being a net that cannot catch anything. The only option and remedy—a firm restriction of power!

When observing the state of Chinese society, it is difficult to either avoid or make an accurate judgement on the questions of what is the actual state of conflict in the relations between the CPC cadre ranks and the public, and what is the nature of jurisdiction and form of resolution of such conflict.

Mao Zedong called CPC "senior officials" "bourgeois," which was obviously not the wrong term to use when emotions were running high. Experts who have studied the history of Mao Zedong's old age hold quite unanimously that Mao's approach at the time in dealing with all social strata obviously carried a flavor of the common people's orientation and anger at the world, with his basic motive for launching the Cultural Revolution being to purge "those in power who are taking the capitalist-road" within the party.

Who were Mao's specific targets as "those in power who are taking the capitalist-road?" If we accept the current interpretation, that they were Liu Shaoqi and his supporters who took the path of emphasizing economic growth at the expense of politics, then it is very hard to understand why Mao used the form of disrupting all order in mobilizing the masses to resolve this struggle over simply the ideological line. Moreover, such an interpretation also deviates a very long way from Mao's original intention.

Mao Zedong regarded the internal party bureaucracy as a class to be opposed. His conflicts and struggles with them were a class struggle between the common people and senior officials.

Clarifying this issue is extremely crucial. This is because a correct interpretation of the "class struggle" concept that was in Mao's mind could be the key to understanding the basic sequence of the development of conflict in Chinese society, as well as to finding a more logical and persuasive explanation of Mao Zedong's actions and guiding principles and policies in his later period.

As all know, Mao Zedong's basic view of the nature of conflict in Chinese society underwent a sharp change after the summer of 1957. If it is said that before then he had illusions about building a pastoral society of congeniality, understanding, and a pronounced family atmosphere, then afterwards he turned especially pessimistic, repeatedly stressing the intensity of class contradictions and the inevitability of class conflict, even to the point of being alarmist about the deterioration of the country. This sense of danger was immediate and urgent, with Mao at times betraying emotions such as dread and depression. What were his grounds for this?

Chiang Kai-shek and his defeated army no longer posed a threat to Mao, who had never paid them much account

anyway. The surviving domestic hostile-class forces were actually also insignificant and, while Mao had said that "they are still here, not having given up," it would have been very hard for those isolated individuals to launch a genuine offensive against the republic. In fact, Mao was quite at ease about national security, saying that: "What is the actual state of elimination of counterrevolutionaries in our country? While flaws do exist, we have done a better job than other countries." While Mao was stressing in the early 1960s that class struggle had to be emphasized at all times, he was still taking a very tolerant approach to the surviving landlord elements. He favored remolding, indoctrinating, and splitting them, while asserting categorically that some landlord elements had already been remolded well. Significantly, he even told his four vice premiers in May 1964 that: "While we need to pay close attention to class struggle,... we cannot stress the theory of the unique importance of class origin, as neither Marx, Engels, Lenin, nor Stalin were born into the working class."

The class struggle that Mao was speaking of there obviously did not refer specifically to or even include that between family members during the period of land reform, when hostile classes were designated purely in terms of wealth.

While the military might of international groups with enmity toward China headed by the United States did pose a certain threat to China, their existence was still not the main cause of "the change of national political color." Mao's assessment of the U.S. military threat was both relaxed and accurate. He said in March 1960 that: "While the enmity between the United States and us has grown somewhat, it is still not daily general opposition to China, with there being some intermittance as well. And while this intermittance is less now, it will be greater in the future." If we interpret this intermittance as a temporary easing or resolution of the conflict, then President Nixon's visit to China a decade later confirmed Mao's prediction. But Mao still constantly emphasized after that the threat of class enemies and the danger that the country faced of a change of political color.

Who actually were the class enemies in Mao Zedong's view? And who actually made up that class? The key to clearing up this matter is understanding Mao Zedong's course of ideological transformation concerning class struggle.

The earliest issues should have occurred during the 1957 anti-rightist struggle and afterwards. It was generally held that rightist intellectuals spoke insolently against the CPC, even calling publicly for a return of the KMT, which words were extremely irritating to Mao Zedong and subsequently responsible for changing his judgement of the state of class struggle. This inference is logical and has clear factual grounds—300,000 intellectuals were identified as "rightists" and wore this label marking their political status for life.

But this inference overlooks two crucial matters.

1. Who were the targets of Mao's struggle when he launched the open-door rectification campaign in which intellectuals made suggestions to the party? When Mao affirmed that rightist intellectuals were enemies, did he also revise his rectification targets? If he did not, with bureaucracy, commandism, and closed-doorism remaining the major enemies in his eyes, then what operational steps would he take and what time would he choose to reopen hostilities against the "major enemies" within the party?

What is certain is that immediately upon ending the anti-rightist campaign, Mao shifted his major focus of attention to the struggle against enemies within the party. He even went so far as to deal leniently with rightist intellectuals, while absolutely not slackening his attention to internal party problems. In April 1958, Mao Zedong generously provided a way out for rightist intellectuals, saying that "after a few years, when they have been remolded and bared their hearts, we will remove their labels." Such baring of the heart remained his approach and method in dealing with family members. But almost at the same time that he was saying this, Mao posed a startling new idea about the trend of class struggle in socialist society, the privileged elements among party cadres were germinating into a new class!

To fundamentally prevent the formation of such a class, Mao held the "Beidaihe Conference" a little later that year where he suddenly and especially naively proposed a resumption of "the supply system," or the system practiced during the war years of rationing daily necessities to cadres at low consumption standards. While Mao's suggestion was theoretically primitive and clumsy, its purpose was very clear. Once all means of production had reverted to state ownership, cadres would hold the control over the means of production on behalf of the state, leaving them directly linked to the means of production, unavoidably developing from holding special privileges to exploiting workers and peasants, to finally producing a new bourgeoisie in this form. Mao Zedong said that "the bourgeoisie can be regenerated, which is the case in the Soviet Union."

Mao Zedong tried to find grounds for this in Marxist theory. Marx's discussion of "bourgeois rights" in *Critique of the Gotha Program* was repeatedly mentioned and creatively developed by Mao. Mao tried to use this concept to show that even reasonable and fair "rights" were still bourgeois rights. The popular and politicized interpretation was that cadres received more remuneration due to their wartime service and assumption of leadership responsibilities. Such remuneration that was much higher than that of ordinary workers was a bourgeois right. Such rights, as well as attempts to maintain and expand them, automatically turned cadres into a new class.

In a 1964 speech, Mao Zedong made a most severe criticism of certain cadres for striving for higher rank

and more wages, deciding to hang around the necks of the most hated of such cadres signs saying "neobourgeois elements." One week later, upon earnest consideration, Mao solemnly announced that the CPC had two factions, a socialist faction and a capitalist one, with the two-faction struggle being the particular expression of the major social conflict.

Mao launched the Great Cultural Revolution to overthrow Liu Shaoqi and his bureaucracy. But while Liu's "reactionary line" was systematically criticized during the Cultural Revolution, this criticism was forced and harsh, being still impossible to this day to clearly find any essential difference between Mao and Liu as to the basic political and economic strategy that should be adopted to build a socialist country. Liu's wife, Madam Wang Guangmei, in response to illegal interrogation by Red Guards, was also extremely puzzled by this, summing it up angrily as being due to Mao's intolerance and defense of personal honor. She said that: "I hold that his (Liu Shaoqi's) greatest mistake was not advocating that the whole party and people make an intensive study of Mao Zedong Thought. As to his position, importance, and Chairman's Mao's trust in him, while he should have suggested this [study] much earlier, he did so only by 1966, which was his greatest error." As to Liu's other crimes as set forth by the Red Guards, Madam Wang Guangmei proved one by one that almost all of Liu's work was performed only after requesting instructions from Mao.

This shows quite clearly that Liu Shaoqi's "greatest error" was not having found common ground with Mao Zedong in opposing "bourgeois rights." Mao Zedong's concern was hidden in his innermost being. But while Mao repeatedly and openly warned about revisionism in the party and a change of political color by the country, such comments were often lumped together with talk about class struggle, making it essentially impossible for his colleagues to guess his real intent. The more Mao talked, the more Liu and his colleagues emphasized a bitter struggle against the apparently surviving hostile class elements, even committing massacres during the Red Guard period to physically wipe out such elements. As to Mao's secret inner concerns, there were probably only a few, such as Zhang Chunqiao, who truly understood them.

Another interesting fact can also verify this point. According to as yet undisclosed data, before Deng Xiaoping was exiled to Jiangxi Province to undergo reform through labor, he once had a talk with Mao Zedong. In this discussion, Deng commented on Mao's choice of Marshal Lin Biao as his successor, saying that Lin Biao was "undeserving." Whereupon Mao Zedong laughingly responded that "there is no need for you to get so upset about that."

Deng shrewdly pointed out the crux of the matter, that Lin Biao had escaped the misfortune of being listed by Mao as being in the "senior bureaucratic" class due to

his long recuperation at home. There were probably also a few others who under similar circumstances subsequently climbed to high positions. Deng Xiaoping was able to find at the time only a superficial cause for the close relationship between Mao and Lin, an unenviable link between the two in one liking to be flattered and the other being adept at shamelessly flattering his leader. Deng unreservedly predicted that Lin would come to no good end. But Deng underestimated Mao, who very quickly lost confidence in Lin. While Lin's overzealous flattery made Mao uncomfortable, this was not the main reason for the loss of confidence. As Lin was undeserving, once he became a senior official (successor) and wanted even more power, he was immediately included in the ranks of the "bourgeoisie" by Mao who always kept a natural vigilance against "senior officials."

While this part of Chinese history was much like the common occurrence during feudal dynasties of the historic rise and fall of officials, it was Mao Zedong who decided which officials would rise or fall, and Mao was absolutely not a feudal emperor. What influenced his choice of officials was the ever-growing secret worry in his mind—that senior CPC officials would unavoidably come to stand in opposition to the people. But such secret worries still had not evolved into accurate and forceful theoretical language; they still could be conveyed to others only in incantation-like warnings drawing on matters such as class struggle and a national change of color. Of course, these others were also able only to blindly and groundlessly arrest "class enemies," which undoubtedly added to Mao's worries.

2. During the 1957 rectification, there were certainly some senior cadres, such as Ke Qingshi [2688 1987 2457], who slandered intellectuals in Mao Zedong's hearing, claiming that they would seize power from the CPC. But while certain extremist opinions of intellectuals also certainly angered Mao, was not the campaign's sudden midway change of direction truly a premeditated attempt to lure the snakes out of the pit? Did not the reporting by intellectuals of the fact of corruption among central cadres move Mao at all? And did he decide to refuse to listen, covering up for his subordinates?

Many students of Chinese history have overlooked that fact that during the summer 1957 rectification campaign, much data on the facts of corruption and incompetence among CPC cadres, disclosed by intellectuals and compiled by all areas, flowed to Mao Zedong's desk for a time. Mao once spent his days and nights reading this data. While he was certainly too familiar with and understanding of his own elderly subordinates and those peasants who had been promoted to high position purely on account of their wartime merit, he was fully capable of distinguishing the truth of such revealed data. And most amazing and embarrassing was that almost all of these facts about cadre corruption and incompetence were true.

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In fact, while Mao later turned his club on the hotheaded and zealously patriotic intellectuals, this was no longer a moral choice, but rather a political one, as Mao could not kill himself due to personal pollution, rather having to defend the CPC regime.

These actions by Mao were certainly disturbing and painful. After 1958, Mao Zedong underwent two crucial personal changes: 1) He retired as national chairman and from almost all national affairs work, retreating to a second line; 2) he abandoned his studies of socialist economics theory that he had once been very interested in, as well as not again for the rest of his life taking up works such as *Capital*. His secretary, Mr. Deng Lihou, says that Mao was no longer very interested in pure economics or economic realities, rather starting to pay attention to political and ideological aspects of the economic system. While this was affected by the failure of economic planning during the Great Leap Forward, a more important factor was the internal party cadre problem that was troubling him. He was considering how many were really opposed to socialism. His launching of the Great Leap Forward was also a result of such considerations, in that he tried to draw on Lenin-style unpaid labor to cleanse cadres of germs. But along with his economic failures, this process of thought remodeling was also unsuccessful. While Mao did not subsequently retest his unpaid labor experiment, thought cleansing and ideological purification did become his persistent general theme. He forced himself to find as quickly as possible the most effective means of purifying the ideology of cadres and remodeling their worldview.

But Liu Shaoqi's means were clumsy. Wang Guangmei admits that: "While he paid particular attention to certain matters of preventing and opposing revisionism and resisting capitalist restoration, thinking about them constantly, he was unable to come up with solutions." While Liu Shaoqi organized and led the socialist education campaign that started in 1964, clearly noting the need to struggle against "those in power taking the capitalist road," his campaign targets were merely the labeled local wealthy rightists and certain overreaching "minor officials." Mao's discontent with Liu grew sharper at that time, as Mao already had the bad impression about Liu that the campaign involved "a general crackdown, while protecting the few." While resisting or preventing revisionism meant preventing the appearance in China of a Khrushchev-type schemer, to solve the "senior official" problem, Liu Shaoqi was either indifferent to this or essentially unconcerned about it.

While there was certainly no lack of bootlicking within the CPC, Lin Biao's later success certainly did not derive from his skill at bootlicking, as Mao still maintained a special disposition in that area. After long and hard thought, Lin Biao drew on the advantages of his own resourcefulness and his class origin with Mao as peasants, finally reading Mao's pulse accurately, to originate a prescription for resisting and preventing revisionism: A sharp emphasis on dynamic thinking, with a bitter

struggle against any hint of privatization, and an explosive revolution in one's innermost being.

While this was in fact the same old formula of spiritual purification, Lin Biao actually stuck close to Mao's genuine awareness, thus gaining favor. Adding in Deng's claim that Lin was "undeserving," and excluding the suspicion that Lin was a bureaucrat, it was natural for Lin to be rapidly promoted and certified as Mao's successor.

A fact that is extremely crucial is that in the party's central leadership, only a few, such as Mao, Lin, and Zhu De, were genuinely accustomed to peasant-style thinking and a thrifty and selfless lifestyle. Other leaders, such as Liu, Zhou, and Deng, due to differing experiences and different interests and scholarly attainments, took different paths with differing plans. This not only apparently constituted a reason for discord, but also provided valuable clues for Mao's ideological sources in his opposition to high officials.

In 1960, Mao Zedong wrote *Reading Notes on Political Science and Economics Textbooks*, in which he emphasized the matter of the children of cadres. Mao held that as the Soviet Union had not resolved the matter of "bourgeois rights," the old-style ranking system had reappeared on socialist terms, leaving the chance to be promoted for the children of cadres alone, but certainly not for those of peasants and ordinary workers. This meant a privileged stratum of vested interests, with such a dangerous tendency also likely to pose a threat to China. But Mao in these notes set forth quite moderately his own concerns about the children of China's cadres: "The children of our cadres are quite worrisome, having no life or social experience, but engaging in quite a lot of posturing and having a large superiority complex."

While some scholars hold that Mao at the time set forth his views on the children of cadres out of concern that they would inherit the older generation's positions and privileges to form a vested-interest group and become a class after several generations, this is mostly unfounded. As the CPC's highest cadre and a father, Mao in his lifetime at most merely represented the common people's sense of injustice about the special privileges of cadre children. While the examples in his later years of helping Zhang Tiesheng [1728 6993 3932], the son of common people, go to college, and his sympathy for the parents of Li Qinglin [2621 1987 7207], a poor young man with no special privileges or back-door connections working in a production team, prove his sense of injustice, his attention was always on the first generation of powerholders.

It was around 1964 that Mao made his harshest criticism of corruption within the party: "A couple of packs of cigarettes is now enough to bribe a party branch secretary, not to speak of marrying off a daughter."

It was at that time that large numbers of organizational cadres went to grass-roots units, such as rural and urban

neighborhoods, to engage in a year or two of socialist education campaigning. The work scores of these cadres depended mainly on their ability to ferret out more scoundrels and discover more alarming facts to corroborate Mao's talk about the existence of sharp class struggle. While many such cases carried signs of artificial manufacture and even sheer fabrication, most of the scandals were true reflections of the poor education, ethics, work skills, and the arrogance and presumptuousness of the CPC's grass-roots cadres. Such data was reported in unending streams to Mao, only adding to his indignation and distress. If state power was in such hands, how could China not change color? He was always asking this of others, as well of himself.

It was also at that time that he developed Lenin's thinking. While Lenin held that the threat to socialism came from small-scale production that could at any time spontaneously engender capitalism, Mao held that such small-scale production might be combined with the powerholders in the party who enjoyed special privileges, whose corruption and deterioration might then produce a middle class. The crux of the problem was not even corruption per se, or that marrying one's son to a landlord's daughter would leave one talking on behalf of a landlord, but rather the corrosive impact of power itself. What methods could actually be used to ensure that power would not be used by individuals for special privilege, or to effectively oversee and restrain power so that it would not lead to dissent? While Mao spent the last two-plus decades of his life carrying out an arduous exploration of this problem, conducting all sorts of bold experiments, even including the Cultural Revolution, that great upheaval, to undermine and seize power, he still discovered in his declining years that nothing had changed, so that he had failed.

The general view is that Mao Zedong failed for two reasons, which also did not coexist.

1. Western scholars tend to agree with Mao Zedong's judgement, that the fact that CPC cadres held power had already set them in opposition to the public, which was a tight social knot that could essentially not be undone under the inflexible socialist model. Mao Zedong's inability to resolve this conflict was due to his too narrow experience and vision, in that he could neither draw on Western experience in democratic government or proceed to resolve the matter from the basic perspective of the system of ownership of the means of production.

This would in fact have meant learning a lesson from capitalism. Once the CPC had seized power with its peasant army, its logical social remolding plan would have been to develop capitalist-style production and construction under the protection of its autocratic regime. But China's situation was that after 1957, it thoroughly practiced public ownership of the means of production throughout the society, leaping from an agricultural feudal society across the capitalist phase directly to the next phase in the Marxist social development

chain. This meant that the literacy, knowledge, awareness, and legal concepts of the public, including cadres, were all far behind the changed economic base, which in turn meant disruptive interference with the economic base. In other words, the capitalist system and thinking that conformed to a natural social order would have had to draw on the the outer shell of socialism to tenaciously develop itself. So cadres acquiring special privileges or becoming bourgeois would have been a natural phenomenon that would have been hard to prevent. This would have been unbearably irrational for the masses of common people who were depending on socialist production to gradually raise their living standards. But the basic cause of the irrationality was the severe separation between the social substance and its outer shell, which conflict was unresolvable in a socialist context.

2. The more conservative Chinese theorists hold that class struggle within the party existed only in Mao Zedong's nervous consciousness, in fact certainly not being a universal social phenomenon. Mao's inability to resolve this conflict was due to his not having cured his mental anxiety. Another less discreet view is that Mao Zedong's fear and tension about class struggle and corruption and deterioration within the party were due to the constant blowing about it in his ear by the likes of Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng [1660 3932].

While Kang Sheng certainly did discuss the matter with Mao Zedong, his thinking was narrower than Mao's, in that he tried to follow Mao's conclusions to derive a philosophical result. Kang Sheng told Mao that the concentrated expression of the danger of capitalist restoration and class struggle within the party was the struggle in the field of thought and ideology, showing up as thought apathy and corruption among cadres.

While Mao's acceptance of Kang Sheng's conclusion is undeniable, his focus at the time remained on the detested relations between power and material profit, the inevitable result of which was the corrosion of power by profit. This was almost an unresolvable difficulty. Mao Zedong at times felt quite depressed about this inevitability. He gave a speech at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee during the Cultural Revolution, inexplicably cherishing the memory of life during the war years. He said that: "For many years, none of us received any pay to speak of. We had no eight-grade wage system, only a food ration. But we are now living in cities, which is good because Chiang Kai-shek would have occupied them if we had not, but is bad because it has not been so good for our party."

It needs to be noted that Mao Zedong's thinking was already near to the most essential crux of the matter: the social grounds for the distribution of material profits to the members of society. With the means of production under complete public ownership, power (including official position and seniority) had already in fact become a key distribution bargaining chip, which was the major aspect of Mao Zedong's discontent with the party and

anger at society. (Mao Zedong fortunately did not see the Chinese society of today, where power in many places has become a material commodity that can be exchanged directly for money). But as long as there is control, there is power, with nationalized public assets able to be controlled only by or through cadres. Power is an unavoidable objective reality.

But Mao Zedong's thinking went astray at this point. He essentially did not consider the need to take actions against power per se, such as finding ways to weaken and decentralize it, or exercising the tightest restraint on or oversight of it. His wartime experiences made it impossible for Mao to be suspicious of the centralization of power. The arrogation of all power to oneself in his view was a condition for both victory in war and an efficient economy. Of course he also acknowledged that it was the cause or a major cause of bureaucracy.

Another reason for Mao's unwillingness to decentralize power was his inability to renounce the party's leadership authority over everything. In January 1967, when Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan seized power in Shanghai, their new regime was organized completely according to the model and principles of the 1871 Paris Commune, with so-called "servants" (the members of the municipal government) generally produced by citizens through general elections, undifferentiated wages, regular work reports to the electorate to win support, and not winning support meaning dismissal. So the new Shanghai regime was called the Shanghai Commune.

Mao Zedong expressed sharp concern about this experiment in direct democracy, calling Zhang and Yao back to Beijing, ordering them to change the name from commune to revolutionary committee, and excoriating them by asking: "Do we or do we not still need centralized party leadership?"

While this experiment was a utopian illusion, able to create only more chaos in an already quite chaotic society, its occurrence and the end put to it very clearly tested and verified Mao's conflicting mindset about restricting power. He would rather acknowledge that "the party is not in such great shape," than renounce the party's absolute ruling authority, as that was the only guarantee for preserving unity in Chinese society. Mao was not fooled into abandoning social unity and stability in a struggle for fairness and rationality, although he was certainly not reconciled to the matter. While Zhang and Yao's experiment had once very likely been one of Mao's own ideas, he later had to put an end to it himself.

As he could not take action against power per se, Mao's only remaining option was to do all possible to cleanse and purify the powerholders. As stated above, while Mao Zedong, that great contributor to the nation, spent the last two-plus decades of his life completely focused on this task, his success was insignificant. Shortly before his end, he was forced to admit that the capitalist-roaders were still extant. In 1975, when he once again brought up the matter of "bourgeois rights," it was once again used

by Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao as a weapon of power struggle and rectification. It seems that no one was able to understand that man in his old age.

It was not only Mao Zedong; the use of internal rectification to keep powerholders honest has been the accustomed method of successive CPC leaders. After Mao Zedong, while both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping carried out extremely severe party consolidation campaigns, except for their openly publicized successes, their real results were certainly unremarkable. Mainland China's social climate and the work-style honesty of CPC cadres were both far from what they had been in the pre-Cultural Revolution 1960s.

So they had to find a new strategy.

We need to evaluate Mao Zedong's thinking and practice on class struggle within the party, not only because it will affect how we should understand Mao Zedong the individual, but more importantly because such an evaluation will enable us to accurately understand the conflicts in Chinese society and correctly determine their trends.

This theory of Mao's was a total failure in practice. Even excluding the exploitation and abuse of this theory to rectify people by ultra-leftists, such as Marshal Lin Biao and Madam Jiang Qing, under all circumstances, this theory resulted in practice in the expansion of class struggle and ruthless struggle within the party. While Zhou Enlai made mistakes, so did all of the others. Almost all current or former senior CPC leaders had cases of injustice or rectification of rightists on their hands. It is very hard for them to use the word conscience to shift the responsibility onto others for having performed their duty perfunctorily. This is because for a very long period of time, this thinking of Mao's was fully accepted by the whole party as a guiding principle and, as long as Mao was still alive, neither the CPC nor the whole society was capable of or had any mature or effective system that would have enabled them to curb Mao's mistakes. While the boldest resister was Deng Xiaoping, who dared to violate Mao's wishes by denying the "new things" of the Cultural Revolution, even he was quite easily run out of the Central Committee by Mao once again.

During Mao Zedong's time, the party's honest work style and cadre simplicity of life-style and public respect merited praise. What is in doubt is whether such honest administration was voluntary or forced. It is very hard to maintain that this was a result of Mao Zedong's remolding of the world view of cadres. To be overcautious, the major reason was the instability of cadre status, which was forever being tossed about by one political movement after another, forcing cadres to restrain their words and deeds.

Effective and precise oversight forces had never been established, with verification through public oversight being merely a fantasy. While the masses had the power to put up big-character posters to publicly disclose facts,

cadres per se and another part of the public that cadres were dependent on also had the power to put up big-character posters for counterattack in self-defense and for attack and revenge. From the middle and later part of the Cultural Revolution on, ordinary citizens neither dared nor were able to effectively oversee cadres any more.

Mao Zedong's power to counterattack was also unbridled. It was precisely during the Cultural Revolution that the ordinary public first caught a personal glimpse of special privilege and its impact, prior to which it had only a hazy notion of the indignant debate over Mao Zedong's view of the special-privilege issue. Once a network of connections between powerholders had been established, all commodities in short supply or dependent on coupons for supply were easily acquired through connections. Chauffeurs, doctors with prescription authority, and housing managers became the most envied occupations. In the first group of Beijing college students theoretically enrolled totally from grass-roots-recommended workers, peasants, and soldiers, the children of cadres made up over 50 percent of entering students, with 80 percent of students entering as PLA officers and men being the children of high-ranking officers. And most of the rest of the students who were not the children of cadres also had connections with the real grass-roots powerholders.

According to as yet unverified sources, Mao Zedong criticized this with his distinctive humor, saying that while the back door was closed, the walls had collapsed. Mao himself was already discouraged, sluggish, and helpless. When a Fujian grade school teacher wrote Mao complaining about his inability to get in by the back door, which was making it impossible for his children who had been sent down to the countryside to go back to the cities and find jobs, Mao Zedong could only send him 300 yuan as a consolation and apology. This constituted a "king" apologizing to a feudal subject for not having disciplined his own officials strictly.

A celebrated philosophical dictum that Deng Xiaoping believes in is that practice is the sole criterion of truth. And while the whateverist faction in the CPC superstructure conducted an earnest criticism of this a decade ago, they were unable to find its obvious weakness.

But using subsequent Chinese practice to test this philosophy, we can discover that it is severely misleading in guiding the understanding of things, particularly of theoretical matters. As a theory is a system, it is unreasonable to negate all components of the system, simply because it produces some wrong information. Just as in a multiple-step mathematics problem, one cannot completely negate the whole calculation process just because the derived figure does not conform to the correct answer.

The many tragic events that have subsequently occurred in Chinese society prove the fallacy of Mao Zedong's theory about the bourgeoisie within the CPC. This is

indisputable, and [the problem] cannot be blamed entirely on the Gang of Four. But as this theory was also a multiple-step operation, was it wrong right from the start, or only in its last step? The particularity of a theory is also that it has relative value, with the outcome of its practice likely to be totally different due to changes in time and place. Are Mao Zedong's theories completely or forever without rationality?

Essentially denying Mao's thoughts and concerns, or treating them merely as a dreadful assumption of an oversensitive and biased ruler, is unjust. One of the causes of the 1989 Beijing University disturbance was the public indignation touched off by the severe public discontent with corruption in the society, particularly among party cadres. Party work-style problems certainly grow into social problems, which was Deng Xiaoping's view in 1979. He said then in a speech to a meeting of cadres above the central-organ deputy-director level that: "The three major issues of most public concern are: 1) rising prices; 2) cadre special privileges; and 3) the housing shortage. With the general public discontent over special privileges, certain people with ulterior motives are exploiting the problem to make trouble. Those involved in the Xidan wall and a few bad eggs applying for an audience with the higher authorities to appeal for help are exploiting this."

A decade later, once the Beijing incident had been quelled, a Chinese NPC delegate, Mr. Zheng Xutang, said in an article in the Hong Kong WEN WEI PO that: "The results of voting by over 100 well-known mainland correspondents on the 10 major problems of 1989 show anti-corruption ranking in second place, behind only controlling price rises."

So after a decade, the problem remained the same. It was not that the CPC had not tried to resolve it, but that there were no signs of improvement, with even a trend of unchecked spread and deterioration. With "a few bad eggs" exploiting the problem of cadre special privilege a decade previously to create the Xidan wall incident, and then a decade later similarly exploiting the anti-corruption issue to stir up a social upheaval on an even larger scale, what is likely to occur in another decade?

Mr. Zheng Xutang asked in his article: "Why does the PRC appear so at its wits' end and weak and incompetent in the face of spreading corruption and bribe taking in party and government organs?"

This question is certain to be one that makes the CPC unhappy and is difficult to answer. It is similarly certain that the CPC had no intention of just winking at such corruption, rather being firmly determined to rectify it thoroughly. In March 1980, one of the CPC's founding members, Chen Yun, told Deng Xiaoping that he had to seize on the corruption problem without letup. He said that "the party style of the ruling party is a matter of life or death for the party, and will affect the party's very survival." Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping has repeatedly passed on this admonition-type warning of Chen Yun.

After the 1989 Beijing incident, Deng's critique of the corruption problem was that: Unless it is cured, China will change color!

Three decades ago Mao Zedong set forth the danger of China changing color. So is it just by chance that Deng Xiaoping reasserted the same warning three decades later? The only difference is that Mao Zedong was referring merely to the bureaucratic workstyle of cadres, with Deng Xiaoping in 1979 also mentioning only cadre special privilege, while by 1989, the CPC was confronted the corruption of an entire group.

So the problem remains what means should be used to control it. While some console Deng Xiaoping by saying that the method of a stronger legal system can be used to resolve it, this is merely consolation. While China's legal establishment made great progress from 1979 to 1989, with its parliamentary system drawing up numerous laws, party and social corruption seems to have grown in step with the legal establishment, with absolutely no signs of disappearing. As law enforcement is a part of social life, when corruption appears in society, enforcement actions similarly suffer the same bad fate, not being supernatural, they are unable to escape the taint. The reports from China are that China's judicial and law enforcement organs at all levels are now endeavoring to combat the corruption in their own ranks. If a society places its hopes on the law for honest government, then who can be counted on to clean up its legal organs?

But an even more dangerous problem exists. If it is said that a decade ago, officials taking even small presents still had to be extremely secretive about it, then the current large-scale bribe taking is already a semi-public matter. Ethical concepts have also quietly changed, with the underground exchange of money for power no longer being censured, but rather being tacitly acknowledged or even approved. And public morale has also become apathetic, no longer holding wild hopes for an improvement in public workstyle. A survey shows that a decade ago, while the public mindset was one of hoping for a popular Bao Gong-type honest official to create a time of peace and prosperity, with the TV series *Nova* that extolled a new Bao Gong causing a sensation throughout China, programs with similar themes are now given the cold-shoulder by most viewers.

The issues now are: Do we need to return to Mao Zedong's time? And might a Mao Zedong appear again?

Deng Xiaoping persists in holding that the bourgeoisie is outside of the party, doing nothing more than exploiting or using as a pretext corruption within the party to overthrow it. He says that despite some people's exploitation of the anti-corruption slogan as a pretext to overthrow us, we are still prepared to act conscientiously.

New CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin said in July 1990 at a celebration of the party's birthday that: We need to resist peaceful evolution!

Does this not sound much like Mao Zedong? Mao Zedong was certainly not wrong from the very start, which verdict will be reached by everyone who has no ill intentions toward China and can observe Chinese affairs from a scholarly perspective.

As Mao was a veritable god, he is likely to be understood only after some time has passed. But the matter of concern is that by the time people finally understand Mao Zedong and once again sincerely observe his teachings in action, their bad old practices will die hard, and China will have already irretrievably slipped onto another track.

But will this other track really be a shortcut? And will it lead to prosperity, wealth, stability, and unity?

Chapter 5. Social Control Plans for China That Can Be Forseen in the Next Few Years

Summary: *Crucial features of improvement and rectification have been partially betrayed or restored. Will China's third generation leadership emerge from a "restoration" movement? How will Deng Xiaoping's legacy be carried on?*

On not putting blind faith in the legal system.

All Chinese are learning from the PLA. Military expansion is to deal with the social struggle. Feasible options for local states of emergency and military control.

Unclean administrative power. Stronger power is 30 percent bad and 70 percent good. A low level of economic development requires absolute order. Autocracy is the magic that preserves order.

If forced indoctrination and planning can last for three decades, then all of the mistakes and evils of the autocratic regime will be forgiven.

Work teams will again take over control of rural political power.

A partial negation of Mao Zedong was the prerequisite for Deng Xiaoping's success.

But Deng seemed to be too impatient in negating Mao. There are no grounds for suspecting that he was proceeding from personal prejudice or merely to clear his own name, as he himself and everyone else understood clearly that negating Mao's Cultural Revolution while he was still alive would have made Deng's prospects absolutely grim, even to the point of it being certain that such action would have been suicidal right from the start, in that it would not have been tolerated by the leadership, as well as absolutely not being understood by the majority of people.

But Deng still proceeded boldly like a moth darting into a flame that brings its own destruction. During the Cultural Revolution, when he had acquired only some power and his position was still quite unsteady, he began to plot actions to negate Mao. In 1975 he openly trotted

out a program called "rectification," starting an all-out criticism and denunciation of Cultural Revolution evils in all fields, such as the military, industry and agriculture, education, and science and technology. Deng's means were the habitual reverse logic method of all rebels: Negating the Cultural Revolution through attacking the reality of deteriorating public order; partially negating Mao Zedong through negating the Cultural Revolution, thus touching off a national thought revolution.

Deng said with callous satire that: Uncle Lei Feng is dead.

Lei Feng was a symbol of a highly moral social order. But by the time the Cultural Revolution had left his name no longer worshipped and emulated, the collapse of that social order had already begun.

And while that rebel movement of Deng's failed, it still won Deng great respect among all Western nations, which judges heroes by their successes and failures. This was because Deng displayed outstanding political character and patriotic spirit even in defeat.

Deng showed that he was a mature statesman, using all feasible self-protection measures to strengthen his defense. Existing data prove that Deng Xiaoping won Mao's advance endorsement for all of the "rectification" actions he took in 1975, with "the need for rectification" also being one of Mao's supreme directives. Deng held Mao's banner high while opposing Mao's Cultural Revolution. In his bold and resolute improvement and rectification work, Deng sternly emphasized order and discipline, replacing a large number of leaders who had won promotion through meritorious service performed in rebellion during the Cultural Revolution. In just a little over eight months, he achieved remarkable successes, which turned the economy from stagnation to recovery, bringing the annual gross value of industrial and agricultural growth of 11.9 percent.

Deng's supporter was Zhou Enlai, whose stand during the Cultural Revolution is also worth pondering. While being extremely deferential to Mao on the one hand, never taking a disobedient step on large matters, Zhou on the other hand repeatedly used Mao's directives to rescue large numbers of senior cadres who had been overthrown, containing the offensives of Lin Biao and the Shanghai gang of scholars. It was due to Zhou's efforts to preserve order that the Chinese economy did not totally collapse during the Cultural Revolution.

Zhou well knew that he himself did not have the talent to lead, and that the true future leader would be Deng Xiaoping. Zhou had already reached this understanding as far back as the early 1950's, saying in a discussion with Bo Yibo that: I admire Deng Xiaoping's leadership style and talent ("of lifting weights as if they were light"—[Translator Wang Shan's note]), which I myself am not up to. And while Zhou Enlai, in his last year of life, departed from character to show a very cautious political

style, going all out to support and encourage Deng's rectification work, by the time Zhou had become so ill that he could no longer cover for Deng, Mao Zedong had also discovered Deng's anti-Cultural Revolution intentions.

Mao Zedong destroyed Deng's defense system very easily. He said: What three directives are our program? Class struggle is our program, and the other two are merely goals. Deng Xiaoping does not emphasize class struggle, never having set forth this program.

Mao put on a stern expression to announce Deng's second political death sentence. His evaluation of Deng was: He is still taking the capitalist road, wanting to settle Cultural Revolution accounts!

The antagonism was extremely grim between these two great political figures in Chinese history. It certainly did not consist of merely kicking each other under the table, rather being a genuine fight at close quarters. Neither was willing to renounce his principles on the grounds of friendship, leniency, or the sense of desolation of age, with both stubbornly adhering to their own views in the interests of the nation. In this certainly unequal struggle, Deng displayed his own patriotic values. If he had been interested only in opposing Mao, he was entirely capable of adopting craftier strategies and tactics. For instance, he could have just waited less than one year until Mao died, when his actions would have no longer been restrained. Another base but effective and widely used tactic would have been to reduce Mao to an absurdity. Adding fuel to the flames or simply being a negative bystander to Mao's line would have eventually ended its disastrous social impact, thus inducing resistance, and leaving Mao to be held responsible for all of its evil.

But Deng did not act in this manner. If such mistakes had spread unchecked the victim would definitely not have been Mao Zedong alone. China and its people would have been the greatest victims. In the Chinese political wrestling ring, it is possible only for patriots to become winners. So Deng joined the struggle as a solemn figure willing to sacrifice himself for his country.

Mao immediately deployed a counterstrike against Deng, not even waiting until Zhou Enlai died to launch a national movement directed at Zhou and Deng of "striking back against the right-deviationist wave of reversing (correct) verdicts." While Mao knew that he did not have long to live, he still turned and launched a final attack against his old comrades-in-arms and political partners, who had accompanied him almost his whole life, to defend his Cultural Revolution legacy and set a correct road for China after his death. While Mao was intemperate, it must be acknowledged that he was also a great patriot.

While Deng conducted a silent confrontation, he no longer regarded Mao as a god despite his silence. He was probably somewhat disheartened at the time, doubting whether he would get another political chance to express

his aspirations and ideals. While he was slightly younger than Mao, he was, after all, of the same generation. And while he was discontent and indignant, with Mao's arbitrariness and muddleheaded credulousness even having deeply enraged him, Deng absolutely did not have any hatred in his heart for Mao himself. As he and Mao were both pugilists of great attainments in the political ring, he attacked Mao not out of hatred, but rather to prove his mistakes. But one point can be fully confirmed, if Deng had it to do over again, he would still do his utmost to advocate criticism of the Cultural Revolution, to negate the mistakes made by Mao in his later years. But when Mao had completely become a fatuous and self-indulgent ruler who was not very clear-headed and was abusing power, Deng had still not completely negated Mao.

Deng was already equipped with the qualifications to become the next leader after Mao, partially inheriting from while partially negating his predecessor. While this did not proceed from tactical considerations, it was the only correct tactic, as complete inheritance or complete negation both would have been wrong. Either an enlightened statesman or an accomplished emperor could have filled the Chinese prescription only as Deng Xiaoping did, which method is almost a law in Chinese and even world politics. But while its philosophical and practical factors are self-evident, to genuinely grasp the limits between inheritance and negation, and to sincerely apply the policy like Deng did, was very difficult.

Ultra-left officials nicknamed Deng "the chief of the return-home corps [a euphemism for embittered youth returning home after the Cultural Revolution from forced service in the countryside]," referring to his retaliation against Cultural Revolution achievements and his restoration [of the status quo]. But young Chinese intellectuals and the ordinary public called Deng "his excellency" or "the just judge." It is very hard to accurately describe in Western languages the profound emotional coloring and political grounds implied in the term "His Excellency Deng." It symbolizes a defeated patriot, while being a symbol of resistance, with all being willing to heed his call to join the ranks of political rebellion. Deng relied on his bold criticism of the Cultural Revolution and his loyalty to his country to beat Mao Zedong by a huge score in the struggle for popular support. This shows that the fight was certainly not over.

The struggle broke out in an incident during the 1976 Qingming Festival, when the lethargic Mao came to once again, ordering a firm suppression of the troublemaking populace, as well as banishing Deng Xiaoping. Once he had completed these two tasks, Mao seemed greatly relieved, murmuring in a kingly and victorious tone that: Stability has been achieved. He was warning and reminding Deng not to make any more vain efforts. And as he had won, Mao's undue leniency showed up again when, before sinking into lethargy once more, he directed that Deng Xiaoping would keep his party membership to see how he behaved, as well as turning over

the leadership authority to examine Deng's case to Hua Guofeng, not to Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. This was decisive, very likely being why Deng kept his life.

This was not a tale about the imperial court, but rather a life-and-death political confrontation, a political succession between two great statesmen. While it was also probably an example of extremism, political succession is often and even inevitably expressed through confrontation, with the successor's inheriting but negating his predecessor, turning the succession into one pumping station on a pipeline, and providing a new motive force for social progress.

When the predecessor is already dead, attempts by his successor to change things are still not easy, as large numbers of "loyal officials" are bound to carry out a stubborn resistance to defend established principles. But when the predecessor is still alive, trying to negate him is almost completely impossible. Even Deng Xiaoping's prestige, authority, and capability could not have achieved this or, to be slightly vulgar, it is feared that it would have been hard for him to even keep his head. But such a voice of resistance against overwhelming odds is a necessary process, providing both leaders and the public a chance and a target with which to make a correct choice.

A number of China's most powerful and influential political leaders firmly chose Deng Xiaoping after Mao Zedong's death.

According to as yet unconfirmed but highly believable information, in early 1977, a faction of strong military leaders headed by General Ye Jianying put pressure on party Chairman Hua Guofeng to allow Deng Xiaoping to return to the Central Committee and take part in its decisionmaking. Under this pressure, Hua sent Wang Dongxing [3076 2639 5281] in May 1977 to contact Deng. While Hua endorsed Deng's return, his precondition was that Deng had to pledge that he would "never reverse the (correct) verdict" [on the Cultural Revolution]. Hua and all other members of the whateverist faction were very clear that if Deng was regarded as a fierce tiger, then negating and criticizing the Cultural Revolution were the sharp teeth with which he would do harm. So the pledge to never reverse the verdict was meant to cut Deng's teeth down to size. This was necessary not only for self-defense, but also to defend Mao Zedong. As Mao had entrusted to Hua the heavy responsibility of guarding the Cultural Revolution legacy just before his own death, Hua was forced to act very cautiously. Hua's sincere and kindly nature was shown in that he remained genuinely loyal to Mao both before and after Mao's death.

But Deng opposed the Cultural Revolution at all times. So the confrontation between Mao and Deng turned into one between Hua and Deng, in which Hua was far from being Deng's equal.

Deng grudgingly made the promise in carefully chosen and ambiguous terms. He just had to regain power and

the chance to speak on the central platform. In China, power is the prerequisite for righting wrongs, and it is only the center that can decide to change the party's political line. Public opinion or popular support is merely a decision-making reference term, with the public in a society without a general election system able to participate by making trouble but not having any direct ability to change political direction, which Deng knew well. (Marshal Lin Biao was also well aware of this truth, holding that the only way for political change to occur in China was through a military or palace coup. While he warned Mao Zedong about this, Mao simply snorted in contempt).

Before rejoining the Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping launched an aggressive offensive against the whateverist faction. He even used his own political prospects as an offensive bargaining chip, threatening those sent by Hua Guofeng that if they adhered to the two whatevers, there would be no need to rehabilitate him. His original words were: "According to the two whatevers, it would be illogical to rehabilitate me."

Hua Guofeng was then confronted with a double bind: Admitting Deng Xiaoping [to the Central Committee] would mean his own political demise, while rejecting Deng's entry would similarly be a political catastrophe. So Deng exploited the tide of public opinion to defend his own political loyalty, paving the way for Hua's eventual fall from power. But while a statesman who can put his opponent in a double bind is undoubtedly a master, this example shows forcefully that the Chinese public certainly does not exist simply in a state of inertia, but that its influence shows up only through exploitation by statesmen.

Deng's partial negation of Mao became a turning point in Chinese history and a new motive force for the nation to continue to advance. Once Mao's mistakes were exposed and corrected, China achieved great successes in all areas, including politics, economics, and diplomacy. In about a dozen years, this country has become a truly crucial member of the great international family of nations.

As negating Mao enabled Deng to succeed, where will the success of China's leader of the next generation after Deng come from? Might he also negate or revise certain parts of Deng's line and certain parts of his policy?

Deng's negation of Mao had two features: 1) While inheriting and adhering to the legacy of most of Mao Zedong's thinking, he abandoned Mao's mistakes. 2) As Mao's mistakes were already quite evident through full social practice and examination, abandoning them had become the consensus of the Chinese public.

A difficult problem was how to distinguish the right and the wrong in Mao Zedong Thought, without the solution to which any inheritance or negation would have been essentially impossible. But the generally reticent yet very good strategist Chen Yun quite easily solved the problem

for Deng. He divided Mao's thinking and speeches into three chronological stages, the first being those that had to be firmly inherited, the third those that needed thorough negation, and in the middle those that needed to be accepted or rejected by choice. Deng successfully used Chen's stage method to find grounds for "restoration," dovetailing his own reform strategy with parts of Mao's line, to complete the job of opening the way for continued progress along the Chinese path that Mao had started.

From a political perspective, this inheriting of some parts while negating others was able to meet most of the demands of all political forces in the society, thus ensuring national unity and social stability. Of course, Chen's stage method was also a warning to Deng, in that if he crossed any of its lines he would lose some public support, which would have led to the failure of Deng and his reform line. Later practice showed that Deng was fully aware of this.

While the time-division method was a political one, as it achieved the best results, so that we could call it a scientific one, it is absolutely impossible to clearly isolate an individual's thinking from a party's ideology. In the parts that are firmly inherited, there will certainly be primitive rudimentary components that will eventually evolve into major mistakes. And in the parts that are firmly abandoned, might there also not be rational original designs? As to a truly scientific analysis of Mao Zedong's thinking, as well as the job of exploiting this legacy most effectively, Deng has left it to his successor.

Deng's successor will be fortunate in having two rich legacies to inherit and exploit, leaving him and his successors forever able to draw rich nutrients from the treasures of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping's thinking, the basis of which they will invent and create to complete the mission—by no means easy—of leading the nation. But Deng's successor will also be unfortunate in unavoidably having to deal with that method of demarcating rough time-divisions. Politically, doctrinal discipline is also a pitfall. Once the social contradictions fully unfold, it may also be discovered that some of Mao Zedong's thoughts during the Cultural Revolution were not only wise and farsighted, but also the only correct remedies that could have been chosen. If you break through the new doctrinal discipline, are you willing to fall into the mire and take the fatal blame for "replaying the Great Cultural Revolution"?

The Cultural Revolution was certainly not the blind end of Chinese history, or a cutoff point that left no scars. Its profound ideas, not its wild practice, are what constitute the human legacy. While the CPC believes in self-purification, without which it would very quickly fall as a party, when the purification process starts, it will discover the profound significance of some of Mao Zedong's ponderings. Breakthroughs mean negation, which requires courage.

Mao Zedong made mistakes, certainly, not because he tended to be conservative and undisciplined in his later

years and wanted to stop his country's pace of progress. On the contrary, he wanted very much for his country to make the greatest progress in the shortest period of time. So he naturally had to uphold his past successful experiences. But once he developed past correct things to the extreme where they were exalted as sacred dogma, his mistakes occurred. While emphasizing the leadership of the party was a successful theory before he came to power, using the leadership of the party as a substitute for all management after he came to power was a self-destructive disaster. While mistakes are hard to avoid when making progress, insisting on correctness may also result in mistakes. Mao could not escape the two traps set by history and by his times. And while they did not damage his greatness, they certainly did bring his people the disaster of the Cultural Revolution.

The question is: Can Mao's successors avoid this trap, more wisely avoiding his mistakes? They will also have to guide the country's progress grounded on upholding successful experience.

When a nation is still able to proceed on a path of fast progress, pointing out too soon and too critically that it is making mistakes while progressing is unwise, as well as politically damaging and unfriendly. This is because at that time, comparing its mistakes to its progress can only be secondary or unremarkable, sometimes even showing the sacrifices or harmful products that must be paid for progress, the elimination of which would equal the end of progress.

There is an even more interesting phenomenon in China, in that every small breakthrough in reform and thought liberation began with an acknowledgement of moral degeneration. While the public striving for material gain and the lust for money was a humiliation to the members of Chinese society who esteemed morality, it was later advertised as a practical driving force for economic development that needed to be acknowledged. And while striving for job gains by enterprise officers once was cause for a small group of them to be arrested and publicly tried, the contract system later made such action wholly legal. The contract system is theoretically more "reactionary" than the capitalist management system, as contractors profit not only due to their management expertise, but also largely due to their participation as individuals in the distribution of state capital profits. Of course, such "reaction" is also progressive, because it is, after all, much better than the past inefficiency and waste of state property by appointed party committee secretaries or the collective leadership. While bourgeois liberalization was repeatedly criticized and rectified, certain of its criticized parts won a completely legal standing not long afterwards. And while attacking the superiority of a planned economy was considered to be typical bourgeois talk in the early 1980s, the people themselves later abolished most state planning itself.

While this may have been a case of crossing the river by groping for the stones, its process also lured people into steadily seeking out new targets to attack.

This pattern of attack, acknowledgement, and progress was the rhythm of progress, while also showing the hidden perils contained in such a setting of progress. In addition to playing the roles of freeing up thinking and motivating progress, the acknowledged "moral degeneration" was also bound to radiate and spread a harmful impact to society.

As for China today and its social problems, we cannot state with certainty which phenomena are truly mistakes, which are unavoidable sacrifices, or which were originally correct but then misread as mistakes. And reverse investigation and analysis seem to be absolutely no help at all. When tracing back the causes of such phenomena from a social perspective, you may discover that they are exceptionally grand and respectable, making you shrink at their sight. For instance, the phenomenon of teenage children dropping out of school in China's rural areas is growing ever more severe, the direct cause of which is the need for peasant families to engage in commodity production. When the peasants were still engaged in product labor on people's communes, fathers were largely tolerant toward their children's desire to learn, but since the commodity-production age has arrived, even child labor is very quickly rewarded with cash, turning fathers into work overseers. And it is absolutely useless to blame peasants for being shortsighted, as they are peasants who are simply adding up their household balance sheets.

According to Western standards, the repeated accumulation of the consequences of such incalculable causes is social polarization. If we can hold that all newly emerging negative social phenomena are caused by new social factors, or the addition of the reform factor, then we will reach a very embarrassing verdict: The consequences of reform are steadily accumulating social splintering. And while this verdict might be terrifying, its logic is certainly tight. Social splintering is class conflict.

One of the CPC's guiding ideological principles is Marxist historical materialism. As it holds that history is created by the masses, it also ought to acknowledge that the will of the people is the criterion for judging reform policy. Even if we exclude the special case of the 1989 Beijing incident in which Beijing residents degenerated into such reckless excitement and anger to the point where they could not make rational choices, we can still find that clear cracks exist between Chinese popular sentiment and the reform policy that the government is endeavoring to advance.

Cursing the mother who put meal in their rice bowls, PRC officials have begun to speak as from a height to blame the public for being ungrateful. If we could go on to employ such theories of mass backwardness as psychological lag to exclude interference by the masses with the determination for reform, then the resulting damage and potential threat to reform per se is also obvious. The most fundamental danger is that once we try to prove that the public's inevitable degeneracy and psychological tendency to long for the past is insignificant, taking this

as a rational explanation for the existence of the above-mentioned cracks, then we also reveal the heroic leanings and elite consciousness of the public leader. Because these leaders are also the formulators of policy, mistaken policies or mistakes in the timing of policies is unavoidable.

As policy should reflect truth, its validity or absurdity is determined not only by the social reality once it is carried out, but also by the movement of time. If a policy is theoretically proven, as well as urgently needed by the society in practice, but faces a severely lagging public psychology and weak public sentiment, promoting it will not only create an enormous amount of opposition, but also will ensure that the policy itself produces mistakes in execution or unorthodox changes due to obstacles that arise in the course of implementation, thus producing real evidence of and a reason for opposition to itself. History will judge such a policy to have been unwise.

China has now clearly entered a course of accelerated momentum in social change. A conspicuous sign of this is that all obstacles or difficulties encountered in economic operations can be resolved only through further reform, with new obstacles arising around reform again and again. So the pace of reform is ever faster, involving ever wider fields. Once a huge and heavy wheel is started rolling, its powerful momentum is essentially unstoppable by human might. Deng's philosophy of crossing the river by groping for stones has become an experience that cannot be put into practice, and the passivity of the people cannot be changed because the unyielding obstacles will give rise to a disastrous collision. For instance, if reform progress was immediately stopped at its present state, then many sharp conflicts in China's social and economic lives would be unresolvable, because insufficient revenues, the large losses by state enterprises, the singular and rigid money market, and the decline in peasant production initiative are almost all matters of the very survival of the state which can only be resolved through dependence on further intensification of reform. And if reform regressed from its existing base, the consequences would be even more dreadful to contemplate.

The problem with intensified reform is that it will eventually touch on sensitive issues that Deng has cleverly dodged over the past decade. In contrast to these issues, past reform could only be called a repair project. As these sensitive issues involve the basic nature of the state and society, stirring them up will bring a sharp clash with established conventions. These issues, such as reform of state enterprise property rights, acknowledgment of the independent status of banking, adjustment of the urban welfare and social security system, and the formulation and application of a labor mobility system for state and state-enterprise employees, all make up the particular substance of the basic system of "socialism." Negating them will mean making detailed changes in the basic nature of the society.

Deng Xiaoping set forth in March 1979 his famous "four basic principles," the first of which was "adhering to the socialist road." As to what the socialist road meant, Deng Xiaoping's 1979 explanation was 1) a foundation of public ownership, and 2) nonexploitation. In several subsequent explanations, he further interpreted nonexploitation as "getting wealthy together" (March 1985) or "absolutely not causing polarization between rich and poor" (August 1985).

While Deng's definition seemed to exclude two other key principles in the traditional definition of socialism, a planned economy and distribution according to work, nonexploitation and distribution according to work differ only in the literal sense of the words, while getting wealthy together clearly has a utopian flavor, in that as a principle its role is undoubtedly a wall.

Quite obviously intensified reform is going to inescapably collide with Deng's principles. Deng Xiaoping made a concession on his 1992 "southern tour," saying that the major criteria for judging "what is socialism and what is capitalism" are whether it contributes to the development of socialist productive forces, whether it helps to strengthen the overall might of the socialist state, and whether it is beneficial in raising living standards.

When Deng Xiaoping makes concessions, is the Chinese public to make them too? Deng said in 1979 that: "If China deviates from socialism, it will inevitably return to a state of semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism. The majority of Chinese will definitely not allow history to regress." If we understand the meaning of "historical regression" according to the Marxist theory of historical evolution, it differs from adhering to socialism. But once we change principles into three adaptable soft criteria, we make a very profound revolutionary change. Might people reach their own understanding of "historical regression?"

As to the Chinese public that is accustomed to poverty but also to the quite secure and equal "socialist" lifestyle, after changes occur, might they not have a general sense of apprehension, fear, and sorrow at the loss of their support, and conduct an organized boycott and resistance?

This verdict is uncertain. It will depend on the one hand on the manipulative skill and overall ability of the new generation of leaders at handling public affairs, and on the other on the overall social climate. And while the public may be able to endure a single attack (it must be acknowledged that revolution is an attack), a comprehensive attack with one disaster after another would be bound to arouse its anger.

While theoretically the government should be the victor in reform, as this reform is a progressive revolution, certainly not "historical regression," in practical terms, the government's course of victory will certainly not be smooth, as its victory rate in the face of enormous difficulties and pressures will fall sharply, even making

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victory impossible. Factors such as rising prices, inflation, official corruption, sharp competition, relative poverty, and deteriorating public order might all become fuses that touch off sharp clashes between revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces, while it will be extremely hard to artificially prevent the occurrence of such problems.

And if we go on to consider factors such as the huge population, the poorly educated cadres and public, the low per capita national income and overtasked state revenue, the ever sharper local protectionism and feudal economic separatism, and the already obvious social divisions between rich and poor, then China's leaders are certainly going to be faced with a dangerous and crisis-ridden social climate.

China's new generation of leaders will find themselves in a very difficult situation. At their back will be the reform torrents set in motion by local governments and enterprise officers forcing them forward, while they will be faced in front with a wall of difficulties and obstacles and a great many extremely well camouflaged pitfalls. It could be said that there is very little probability that they will not be sacrificed. They will need to take exceptionally hardline leadership steps just to ensure that they keep the initiative.

The form of such steps will be determined by the nature of the revolution and the makeup of the social forces. Analyzing the current situation, the two objective realities of a lagging public psychology and the fact that reform has not brought immediately evident benefits to every member of society mean that China's current revolution has clear features of an aristocratic revolution, or one could call it the cause of the elite. Its promoters are mainly composed of all groups in the upper social classes, such as state enterprise officers, local government officials, and the advanced consciousness strata (intellectuals and skilled workers), while the ordinary public can change its consciousness only under immediate pressure or system force.

So this is a revolution in which the minority have the initiative, while the majority are passive or reactionary. This will determine the essential form of the hardline leadership steps—the despotic means of a revolutionary period, which is the only feasible option.

We often suspect that China's party and government leaders have already forgotten or basically do not understand Mao Zedong. While they claim to be leading a revolution, they certainly have not, now that the revolution has occurred, made an accurate analysis of class dynamics and an evaluation of social forces as did Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong said that drawing a distinction between ourselves, our friends, and the enemy is the primary issue of revolution, so that if this issue is left unresolved or essentially unclearly resolved, central government policy will be unrealistic.

In a revolution, the government's basic stand is of prime importance. It is only on such grounds that policy

compromise and sacrificial attacks are significant. The government does not simply represent the interests of the people; an even more accurate stand is for it to also represent and lead a progressive trend and tide. While these two things should be theoretically consistent, in the process there is a huge gap and the public's concept is nearly all-inclusive in that it embodies many classes whose interests are mutually contradictory. Simultaneous suppression and support are two things that all regimes do, and which they only do.

When Mao Zedong was leading China to establish its own economic system, he successfully employed the policy of simultaneous suppression and support, forcing Chinese society to endure unimaginable sacrifices in the interests of progress through the means of powerful control of power and ideological morality. Might Mao's experience still be needed in China today? With the passing of time and change of situation, might the public accept similar despotism? No one can answer these questions.

What can be answered is that today's China still needs Mao Zedong's genius, boldness, and matchless skill in ruling.

Chinese leaders often brief visiting foreign guests by saying that China now has social stability, with no sharp conflicts or clashes between social strata, as all strata are the beneficiaries of reform. They also hold that as long as economic growth can be always kept at the right speed, the stable situation will be maintained permanently.

While there are no grounds for saying that the Chinese are making false representations to gloss things over, they are certainly overly optimistic. China has recently taken a large step into an age of sharp social change, in which the antagonism among all social interest groups is showing signs of intensifying steadily. If it was the case that when reform of the distribution modes was carried out at a time when socialist economic principles had not yet been shaken up, this provided all social strata with varying degrees of real benefits, then deeper system change will result in a redistribution and adjustment of the interests of all strata, in which the interests of certain strata or groups will be based on infringing on those of certain other strata. The grounds for this adjustment of interests will be all natural laws, including technical conditions, such as knowledge, skills, opportunities, and information, but even more importantly it will be based on the extent to which capital is controlled.

While the appearance of this situation is consistent with the order designed by Deng Xiaoping to let some get rich first, it is far grimmer than the original estimate of its designer. This is because the divisions between rich and poor have gone much further and lasted much longer than expected, while the basic means of getting rich are clearly exploitative in nature. That Deng did not again emphasize the principle of "nonexploitation" after 1979, was probably due to his tacit approval of such disgusting

capitalist means. Whether Chinese society and the Chinese public will be able soberly to face up to such a grim process of division remains a mystery.

The current momentum of accelerated change throughout China is extremely vigorous. All western provinces and regions and southeastern coastal provinces and cities are holding out their hands to the center demanding "new policies." The "special-zone policy" that was originally permitted only in designated zones has now automatically bloomed throughout China. Reckless officials in certain economically backward regions, to attract a large inflow of capital and technology and to make themselves more competitive on domestic markets, are acting on their own to pursue many unregistered and undemonstrated "land policies." It needs to be noted that the essential gist of all such change and new policy is the devolution of central power. Local governments are impatiently demanding the acquisition of powers, such as the authority to control and oversee state property, the right to auction off state land and resources, and even the power to interpret articles of law. Their aim is to release all possible energies, using the basic means of profit attraction to strengthen the nonnatural competitive power of their localities.

After Deng Xiaoping's 1992 "southern tour," China began another round of upsurge in change and development. Without high economic efficiency or capital gains rates, GNP growth topped 12 percent. All areas set up hundreds of "special zones" of all grades and on all pretexts, putting into effect countless ambitious policies, with the three "contribute to's" providing legitimate grounds for nearly all outrageous and foolhardy acts. Such an intense but chaotic situation was like a mighty force rolling in and then being forced to leave. The question was, once the flood had rolled by, what did it actually leave on the earth that it had scoured.

The social potential for crisis is very severe. While a speeding economic train can delay the breakout of crisis, it cannot make it disappear, but rather allows it to accumulate and reaccumulate. While neither the Chinese or Western nations would like to see a recurrence of an incident like the one in Beijing in 1989, wishful thinking and objective reality are after all two different things.

A society undergoing reform is very weak, with the old system having been assaulted and riddled with gaping wounds to the point where it can hardly continue to perform its functions, while the new system's social-stability function is still not completely developed, making it very hard for social stability to be preserved even when the collisions are slight. As China is an enormous social system with a population of 1.2 billion, for new information to flow in and to complete the process of accepting transformation and achieving a functional reorganization often takes more than a decade. This time gap creates de facto system fracturing and inequalities.

All of these are marked features of the transformation-stage syndrome. This transformation-stage syndrome in Chinese society has so many basic foci of infection, which are so entangled and mutually interactive, that they make up a structure of essential social conflict.

The huge gap between rapid economic reform and lagging social psychological consciousness accounts for all social crisis points.

A vertical adverse mindset created reform opposition. In 1989, when the public in the West saw on their TV screens dense crowds of Beijing residents pouring into the streets to block military vehicles, they decided that the Chinese government had lost public support, with the exiled Chinese writer Liu Binyan even asserting categorically that the current Chinese regime could last at most only two more years. But these judgements were wrong, because what they saw on TV was not a confrontation between the government and the public, but rather the psychologically imbalanced public venting their anger against authority and society, after which catharsis, calm was restored.

As the Chinese public had lived for many years under conditions of a product-economy, being accustomed to that secure and superstable society, when the society began to make a transition to a risky, competitive, different, and humiliating, but more vigorous social structure, emotions such as fear, indecision, and doubt welled up spontaneously to adjust to the lag. During the whole period of change, social standings, economic conditions, perceptions and sentiments, and social and cultural trends had all rapidly flowed and changed, steadily creating a sense of loss and producing a longing for the past. Such psychological undercurrents were essentially characterized by searching for chances to vent feelings and find diversions, with a clear tendency of hostility toward authority.

The Chinese government's psychological advisors seem to have always called this adverse mindset a rebellious mentality, which is an obvious mistake. A rebellious mentality is produced by the abuse of power, which can be corrected completely through technical psychological steps. But an adverse mindset is the mental result of social change, which only can and must be vented with the aid of certain causes, and can basically be eliminated only when social change slows.

While this adverse public mindset does not reflect class struggle or political struggle, its anti-government and -authority inclination is absolute. During the whole period of change, it has crouched like a tiger, spying out its prey, and looking for chance occurrences or insignificant causes to vent its feelings.

This adverse public mindset plays the positive role of oversight and deterrence against the government's power and policy-guidance operations, forcing it to act cautiously, to achieve as much moderation and balance as

possible. But its negative impact is that it takes advantage of chaos to do harm, making it even more impossible to settle already very difficult situations because unanimous public support cannot be acquired.

Vigilance is needed because, due to fear of this tiger and to accomplish their aristocratic-directed change without its interference, the governments of some countries have tried to design or fabricate an outside target to divert the public anger produced by this adverse mindset, to shift the direction of public attention. The current upsurge of antisemitism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is in this category. While mindless insanity and pointless anger are basic features of a contaminated public mood, when a government purposefully and with evil intentions ignites such a mood and guides it to an outside target, that government has become a criminal, as it is guiding its nation to disaster. Adolph Hitler's government set off a wave of antisemitism in Germany, which resulted in the establishment of a fascist, despotic, and dictatorial regime, resulting in the German nation's foolish choice of war, destruction, and hatred that subjected it to a humiliation that was hard to wash away.

In the winter of 1987, students from several Beijing universities tried to launch a student strike aimed at the government. But as the various conditions for stirring up a mammoth disturbance did not exist, this very limited student strike came to an end after only a tired and cold overnight demonstration by a few thousand college students. At dawn, the dejected students squeezed into dozens of buses that had been sent to take them back to their campuses by their magnanimous school authorities.

While this student strike certainly did not produce a public chain reaction, two of its trends are quite worthy of notice: 1) The demonstrators shouted anti-Japanese slogans and loudly sang songs of the past War of Resistance Against Japan that had strong nationalist sentiments. As the huge Chinese trade deficit with Japan had produced a sense of national humiliation among these extremely sensitive young students, they called on Beijing residents to collectively boycott Japanese commodities. 2) Once the strike was over, the authorities at Beijing Teacher's College announced that they had seized the instigators who had sowed the discord among the students, which "scoundrels" the government then arrested.

While foreigners reacted coldly to this latter event, holding that it was the PRC's habitual means of downplaying conflict by shifting the blame to just a few, a comprehensive analysis of all of the information that was revealed through public and secret channels showed that these "instigators" had certainly given the college students much "news" and "secrets" that they did not know, as well as propagating among them a mood of national anxiety. And while there has not been a final judgement, so that we have no way of knowing the ultimate fate of these instigators, the incident does

provide a clear lesson, that Chinese society will gradually produce professional "instigators," with the public mob providing a market for this profession, as the negative features of the public mindset leave the mood of humiliation of the mob impatient to be vented and released.

There is no country in the world that has never been drawn into ethnic hostility. Both Marx and Mao Zedong held that ethnic conflicts were class conflicts. But as set forth in social psychology, nationalist sentiments are only one form of venting social conflicts, generally not involving class substance, and even less inevitably being progressive. China is now involved in a great mass surge to open up its national gates, with the whole nation feeling reserved and uneasy about the zeal, fervor, and magnanimity of foreigners trying to gain access to the mainland for profit. But if Chinese economic development suffered a huge setback and fell into low growth, severely dampening public expectations and goals, might not the nation shift to a strong mood of enmity toward and exclusion of foreigners?

While this matter should not be judged lightly, it certainly would be a most dangerous movement for the Chinese nation. The West generally takes a pessimistic view of the matter, holding that sooner or later, on a large or small scale, a mood of xenophobia will eventually appear. A very possible scene would be that one very ordinary visit to a prostitute by a foreign merchant might be exaggerated by the media into a violent rape, with the resulting tearful complaints and denunciations spreading to others to touch off a riot. The government's plight at that time would be most difficult, in that admonishment or quelling the riot would touch off a rebellious mentality, leading to infamy for "having betrayed the country," while going along with the public mood would damage its international image.

But if the Chinese economy can smoothly get through the difficult period of change, to enter with sincere international aid a good cycle (with no sharp volatility), then the abovementioned possibility will be simply a bad dream. China has already gotten onto the world train, with the world also bound up in the Chinese train. At this time, national conflict appears mostly in the substitute form of economic conflict, reflecting the unjust international economic structure.

The adverse mindset in Chinese society is mostly among young and middle-aged peasants. The social standing of peasants has many negatives, such as the huge disparity between their high expectations of getting rich quick and its objective impossibility, and the grim fact that the urban-rural gap since reform has certainly not shrunk but is widening steadily. These two negatives have a tragic impact on the mindset of the younger generation of peasants. A "Voice of America" correspondent reports that China's rural areas are now generally suffering from low morale, particularly in central and western provinces and regions that depend on farming alone, where peasant pessimism and disappointment

about prospects are seen in the form of a rising bitter hatred of all officials. Their cursing of the CPC and lack of confidence in its officials is open.

Another unfortunate reality is that in farming areas there are innumerable factors that cause peasants to give vent to their anger with the world. The prices of manufactured goods, the taxes necessary for rural development, certain policy legislation, and all of the acts of power of rural administrative officials are all likely to touch off sharp outbreaks of anger. Peasants have already become the "high danger" group in China's social upheaval.

Such problems do not exist in a country with a purely agricultural society. As there are fewer peasants in certain other Asian developing countries, their form of venting their anger could be abandoning the land to flee to the cities, which might receive them with a mean attitude. But China's low level of economic development means that all initiatives or spontaneous plans become impossible. If as many as 10 percent of its peasants abandoned the land, China would be faced with severe famine. Large numbers of peasants entering the cities would create an urban disaster, with the antagonism between strata there appearing in the form of crime and sabotage. And while encouraging peasants to set up industrial projects on rural land would conform to human rights and fairness principles, it would be a shortsighted policy that would cause future troubles in its long-term economic consequences. As large amounts of low-tech, low-revenue, highly polluting, and high-consumption rural manufactured goods could only be squeezed into limited domestic markets through bribery, it would be very hard to say that this would be beneficial to the national economy. The destruction and waste of national resources due to the unscrupulous development of rural mining is very alarming. Rural coal mines generally have a recovery rate of less than 30 percent, while the utilization rate of nonferrous metals is less than 10 percent. On Deng Xiaoping's 1992 "southern tour," local officials took him to visit a highly modernized refrigerator production plant, telling him that it was a peasant-run "township enterprise." While Deng was astonished at this, might he also have been given a false impression?

The government of a country lets destructive and reckless development of primitive industry occur not due to official ignorance, but rather because it really has no alternative. Probably the only person who really understood the peasants, neither fearing nor accommodating them, but being able to effectively control them, was Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping's contribution to the establishment of Chinese political authority in this area was that he repeatedly warned officials who neglected peasants, considering them as simple, honest, and gullible, that they must conscientiously solve the peasants' problems or in the future they will challenge us!

A horizontal competitive [social-climbing] mindset creates social barriers, out of which grows social stratification. A basic feature of the competitive mindset is that a

line of fairness exists in individual or group consciousness as a criterion for judging one's own and others' social status, and the competition only goes in one direction, upward, producing strong jealousy toward those who are above the fairness line, and cruel illusions and pity for oneself.

Competition within limits is a phenomenon that has always existed in human society, occurring only within a stratum or in those parts of two strata that dovetail, with its basis being an abnormal striving for a sense of honor and respect. But competition on a society-wide scale that evolves into a universal public mindset has never appeared before in human history. It not only occurs among different strata, but also goes through a psychological evolution that renders the dividing lines between strata clearly discernible. This is what is occurring in China and the former Soviet Union. But as it has no human precedent, it is very hard to determine what its ultimate direction of change will be.

But the causes of its occurrence are clear, with experts quite unanimously holding that when a society moves from artificial equality to natural inequality, de facto gaps and consciousness, emotions, and morality that do not fit are the essential causes of a competitive social mindset, while the society's lack of protection by a fatalist religion and the absence of a clearly announced anti-equality program are its auxiliary causes. The true illusion is the pursuit of absolute equality, and absolute equality in the great majority of cases is expressed in a reactionary manner. So the functional results and judgment of the nature of such a public mindset have two dimensions. Subjectively they demand that society retreat to the equality of the past, while objectively they certify the fact of inequality from the point of view of consciousness to complete the transition from a classless to a class society. Once this transition is complete, the competitive mindset immediately changes form.

If it is said that vertical imbalance is bound to produce anger, which anger must be vented, then horizontal imbalance produces only depression, which is essentially unventable. This latter mental imbalance is a more dangerous public mood, as some experts call it the initial state of or original motive force behind class hostility, or at least the medium for cultivating class consciousness.

The continued existence of an horizontally imbalanced mindset is a particularly severe social problem for China. If it is said that the old-type democracy movement was an insignificant and obscure social conflict, then the new opposition faction growing out of this mindset has clearer class consciousness and targets of social struggle, easily finding propaganda targets, as well as backers and allies. And by the time this imbalance finally turns into a certain awareness, the social conflict is of a class nature.

When visiting China, I found that Chinese are now most reticent to discuss their society's class division problem. Officials deny that such a possibility exists, merely

talking in a low-key about China's traditional mindset of "concern not for the few, but for inequality," sneering at the uncivilized state of their own national awareness. China's heartland provinces of Henan and Hubei have experienced several occurrences of peasants collectively resisting cases by government judicial organs. As to the clues that such phenomena reveal about future social trends, the wisest officials merely express understanding and sympathy with "where there is injustice, there will be an outcry."

And China's young intellectuals are also ignorant and unaware of the social division trend. A college graduate student who is a self-proclaimed "die-hard political dissenter" explains that China now has only two classes—mainlanders and Taiwanese. While he has no confidence in the PRC, he absolutely opposes any attempt by Taiwan to break away from China, saying that if necessary, he would be willing to go to war to prevent it. He is certainly a very zealous patriot.

Of Chinese rulers, it was probably only Mao Zedong who dared to emphasize without scruples the existence of classes and class struggle, stressing their life-and-death social terror. This was the ideological cause of the great mistakes he made in his later years, as during his times mainland China actually had only one and one-half classes, or the workers and peasants who were the owners of capital in name but actually had no ties to capital, and the cadre stratum that was certainly not bourgeois but controlled capital on behalf of the state. While the cadre stratum was certainly not a completely formed class, Mao Zedong was still its first and most talented wise-man. Faced with a calm society with very few billows, his popular awareness and disillusionment were exceptionally strong, showing deep concern about China's coming unavoidable class division. As to his eventual launching of the Cultural Revolution, it cannot be excluded that he was trying to stop this trend.

While China's class division is not complete, with only a gap between rich and poor, all signs show that its process of class division has begun, as the causes of its huge gap between rich and poor can no longer be explained by differences in intellectual ability and diligence. As reform intensifies, the government has already openly acknowledged the legitimacy of non-labor income, which is the way that the real discrepancy between rich and poor formed by the degree of capital ownership will appear.

It is an almost indisputable fact that the process of social division is synchronized with reform advances, starting and ending together. It needs to be explained that once these two processes combine, society should have entered an age of a highly stratified civilization, by which time the classes formed could be understood as different strata of social life, as their relations will not necessarily be expressed in bitter life-and-death struggle and confrontation, with it being possible and essential that they coexist. But as to the ownership of social wealth and the

form of acquisition of wealth, they will be completely different classes in the strict sense of the term.

China's situation differs completely from those possible in most other countries. As China has its own special conditions, it will be impossible for it for some time to follow the path that others have opened up and succeeded at.

Official Chinese data show that the gross capital owned by the Chinese public now tops 2 trillion renminbi, which is roughly twice the value of state-owned fixed assets. But during the early reform period in 1978, the ratio of people-owned capital power to state capital was 1:200. This change and data have a deep significance, at least explaining four matters:

1. A disparity has already arisen between the actual results and the original designs of reform. State might has been relatively weakened, while capital forces of the masses have risen quickly and are growing ever stronger. While reform cannot be reversed, the direction of reform is completely divorced from the subjective will of its directors, showing a change from a natural operating state to a natural movement toward inexorable goals.
2. The social structure of the socialist lifestyle, which preserved a rough equality among all members of society through reliance on state ownership of public property, has lost the material grounds for its existence. Change in the society's basic operating style is unavoidable.
3. Due to the change in the balance of power, socialist countries are no longer able to prevent the conversion of people-owned funds into capital. The natural operations of the masses' capital are bound to duplicate the process of accumulation to concentration. Class division based on capital possession has become a social reality, not just a supposition.
4. All social struggle that occurs from now on will have completely different political implications.

While this is a natural process, we certainly cannot arbitrarily say that this process definitely means social progress, with this being particularly so for China. The existence of basic conditions, such as its huge population and a population that is low in quality, low level of economic development, shortage of all resources except for manpower, and particularly its uneven development, mean that China's social stability must be protected by equality at a low level. But once this equality is undermined, social stability, public order, and social progress will all be subject to devastating disruption. While this might be a normal process in any other country, its occurrence in China would be a national tragedy.

As China's supreme leaders are almost all without exception devotees who fight for ideals, they are also concerned about the possibility of such a tragedy occurring. While an analysis of a series of actions taken by the current PRC policymakers shows that they seem to hope that their dependence on "macroeconomic control" will

forcibly turn around certain trends, they will very quickly discover that this will be very difficult to accomplish, as the balance of power has already undergone a fundamental change. As might only obeys the direction of profit, the state no longer has the might to come up with more profits to control the masses' capital. Even if it could, it would achieve only temporary results. And from a long-range perspective, such a step would be like cutting off one's own flesh to feed one's adversary, as it would further worsen the balance of power.

Macroeconomic control essentially means using economic means as leverage to adjust the direction of the role of "might," or using profits to guide might. A pessimistic assessment is that China has already lost the material might and best chance for such regulation. Certain other macroeconomic control methods are to introduce another force to economic activity, which force is called "power." Using autocratic or unprincipled means to forcefully curb, guide, or suspend certain harmful processes, such as suspending the capitalization of people-owned funds, is completely rational in specific countries at given times. There is now an urgent need for power to intervene in China, as the society and its people are still not well-prepared for change (change in the basic social structure).

As the trend of the capitalization of funds is growing ever more evident, the governments of socialist countries are resisting it tenaciously. The focus of the struggle for both sides and the major battlefield is in state banks, or contention over funds kept in state banks.

Most of the funds in the hands of the Chinese public exist in state banks in deposit form (while China still has no private banks, it does have a secret underground market for fund lending and financing, which is another sign of approaching danger), where the savings balance has already reached 1.4 trillion renminbi, or about \$10 billion. The maneuvering and options of such enormous "might" are actually determining the country's fate. The basic reason the state can still operate the society essentially according to the traditional form of operation, preserving a controlled and planned reform process, or the reason the society remains secure and orderly, is that these funds are still held by the state in a low-interest form.

But after Deng Xiaoping's 1992 "southern tour," a crucial change occurred, with this might no longer being law-abiding. First, a new round of economic development fever touched off a new round of price rises, with the retail price index that so closely affects urban residents up more than 14 percent, while interest rates on bank savings were only about 10 percent. Contrasting the two, the Chinese public once again became aware that its bank savings seemed secure, but were actually losing value steadily. While they at first started to grow alarmed, they after all began to mature. The government quite possibly hoped to exploit the public alarm, forcing the conversion of some funds into social purchasing

power, thus stimulating production and markets. So under pressure, the government persisted in not taking such actions to raise interest rates. But as the 1988 wave of panic-buying of low-quality daily necessities just did not recur, the deadlock resulted in public awakening and rebellion. Looking at the following several months, the masses' capital began to flow out of banks, first going to panic-buying of gold and hard currency, and then shifting to investments in other profitable causes. The public's considerations were simple and practical, in that they did not wish to see the money that they had accumulated through skimping on food and clothing virtually plundered. As they had hoped that this money would retain its value and appreciate, their rebellion and search for other investment outlets could not be faulted.

On the other hand, the economic development fever not only stimulated a demand for funds, but also created innumerable opportunities for capital to quickly earn high profits. The state's macroeconomic control measures made it basically impossible to satisfy demand through loans that banks could provide, leaving many opportunities helplessly lost. So the economic development enthusiasts began to shift to the masses' channels to raise funds, while the masses' capital was just searching for outlets, with the good fit between supply and demand bringing in a short six months the national emergence of a batch of "mighty" masses' investment groups.

This contention by local governments, enterprise groups, and mass investment companies with the central government over people-owned funds has been brazen and unscrupulous, of a clear gambling nature, and so fierce that it has left no route for retreat. They have attracted unlimited amounts of scattered funds with interest rates that are two to four times those of state banks, immediately investing them in risky ventures. Real estate speculation that entails great risks but can earn huge profits quickly is now a popular gambling game in mainland China.

A great many signs show that local branches of state banks and branch cadres, lured by personal or collective profit, have played an intermediary role in this wave of fund outflow, as in principle all fund-raising activities must be approved or secured by banks. But past reform has made local bank profits independent and legitimate, providing a pretext for betrayals and making ambushes certain.

This has been a joint revolt against the central government, with the participants being local governments, local bank branches and enterprises, and some of the public. There has been a sharp outflow of state bank funds, while private capital has doubled and redoubled through speculation and price pushing. This process, driven by profits, is growing ever more intense.

It can be stated in advance that the end result of this process or revolt will be one of capital concentration. Most of the people-owned funds drawn into economic

development will vanish as the speculative causes fail (as the concept of bankruptcy still does not exist in China, with most people-owned funds being wage and salary surpluses, the public will see this only as being plundered, certainly not as bankruptcy), or depreciate in real value due to inflation. These invested funds will turn in this process into capital owned by the few speculation victors, with the steady repetition of the process being capital concentration.

Another matter meriting consideration is that in the current wave of real estate speculation on the mainland, huge amounts of Taiwanese capital have already been drawn in, with a fever for real estate investment in the mainland having formed in Taiwan, and the landing limits of Taiwanese investment no longer limited to a few coastal beachhead positions, but the flag of Taiwanese investment being planted in most places in central and western China. While the high-sounding slogans are patriotism and cooperation, the real substance is making a profit. If this capital-centralization process ends up strengthening Taiwanese investment (which probability is great, as its abundant capital and rich experience leave mainland capital with hardly any chance for victory), then the process will have been smeared with a ludicrous political flavor. A Taiwanese press figure once said fervently about Taiwan investment on the mainland that: The mainland has already been recovered!

The national government's resistance seems weak and powerless, as its study of remedies from an economic perspective alone can only land it in a double bind. If it raises interest rates sharply in contention for funds, then its capital marginal utility will be relatively lower, hitting national economic construction and private industrial production hard and making it certain that a whole series of government objectives, such as speeding up growth rates, expanding effective demand (to maintain market prosperity), achieving full employment to maintain social stability, and raising workers' cash wages, will fail. But using the means of inflation or higher fiscal deficits and printing of banknotes to cause a real devaluation of private capital would be the lowest of low means that carries not one advantage but hundreds of disadvantages. And its flagrant pillaging could only touch off more rebellion. The resulting great waves of panic-buying, skyrocketing prices, and political protest that would inevitably follow would be enough by themselves to cause an overall social collapse. As a similar process was experienced in 1988 and 1989, the government would certainly not like to see a replay of such a terrifying process.

Certain Western economists hold that one step the Chinese government could now take would be to use administrative means to force an appropriate slow down in the overly rapid economic growth rate, which would not only naturally eliminate the harmful effects of the bubble economy, such as real estate and stock speculation, but also slow price rises, to make the society more

stable. But the more important advantage of that would be that a slowdown in the economic growth rate would equal an easing of social change, which would provide a buffer period, so that the public mindset would have time to adapt and change.

While this suggestion is certainly well-intentioned, it would still be hard for the Chinese government to accept. It seems that it would be exceptionally hard for them to subjectively admit that China's economic growth is "overheated," as that would be equivalent to acknowledging that an error in guidance had been made. And objectively, it would also be hard for China to bear the social pressure brought by slow growth. A slow down in growth would produce a chain reaction, making it impossible to settle all matters, such as markets, production, revenue, enterprise losses, debts, and attraction of foreign investment. So the basic appraisal still stands, that China has already gotten onto a speeding train and determined to endure all sacrifice and difficulty to hold out until the train reaches its destination, by which time it is hoped that the basic conflicts will have been finally resolved. A good cycle will begin from that last station.

Premier Li Peng, after the 1989 Beijing incident was over, set forth a slogan for the nation calling for cooperation and reconciliation: Let us tighten our belts. Such a sacrificial spirit of national mobilization is very venerable. To keep from being shaken off of the speeding train, it was necessary to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments, enterprises, and the public in bearing the sacrifice together. Without such terms, the hoped for end would be hard to reach.

This leads us to the Communist Party's other two traditional weapons: ideological persuasion and power.

If ideological persuasion is not abused to turn into ideological terror, with the CPC cadres practicing it being well-educated and ethically accomplished, then most of the public will accept its advice and subordinate themselves to overall interests. This is because for quite some time, there will be a direct relationship binding national interests to immediate individual interests.

Regrettably, for some decades the effectiveness of the CPC's traditional ideological indoctrination has been suffering sharply, as such indoctrination is often implausible, with its bending with the wind and flavor of unvarnished pressure and awe touching off a sense of psychological disgust. In addition, the corrupt style of some cadres makes it very hard for them to teach through example. But in any case, the public working method of ideological persuasion can and must be used, as it has produced an enormous social impact in the history of the PRC. During the national famine and the large-scale adjustment of the industrial and agricultural production structures in the early 1960s, Mao Zedong persuaded the whole society to unite as one to get through the troubles largely through ideological indoctrination. It must be said that it was a miracle that China did not actually experience riots by famine victims at that time.

As it is hoped that ideological persuasion will continue to play a role in the 1990s, the PRC will have to do a good job of keeping its cadres honest, while improving its means and methods of persuasion. The most important matter is that they must deal honestly with the public, which means giving the public all the facts. False optimism is duplicitous, as the public must not again be hoodwinked even out of the best intentions of boosting morale.

By the time a society has experienced *de facto* division, most of the public can remain calm about it only because they have discovered that the governing power remains in the government's hands. The government is faced with a crucial option as regards social division, that is, its stand on the matter. China has no genuine national election system, leaving the public unable to make its own policy choices through elected legislators. But despite this, the government should realize clearly through intuitive knowledge alone that it does represent the most general public.

But whether this social or class division is acknowledged or not, the division of interests in Chinese society ought to be seen as an undeniable fact. It is only when enterprises produce products on planned-economy terms that their production goal, as set forth in socialist economics textbooks, becomes "meeting to the limit the material and cultural needs of the whole society." But as soon as enterprises get onto a commodity-production track with their own independent interests, such interests are bound to conflict with public interests in certain areas. Such a conflict certainly does not refer to a dispute between legality and illegal black-market activities in areas such as tax evasion or raising prices, rather being one between well-intentioned pressure and a desperate resistance to it. The "double tight" policy that Li Peng pursued at the end of 1989 of a large-scale fiscal and credit retrenchment, was a case of well-intentioned pressure on the the market. While making enterprises more competitive, it required them to make good adjustments, increase product quality, improve enterprise technology, and use new technology, on which grounds it reduced energy consumption and lowered product costs. It was only when enterprises completed their own technological upgrading under this well-intentioned pressure, becoming competitive on tightened markets with new product prices and features, that enterprise interests became consistent with public interests.

But Li Peng faced the sharpest resistance, with both despicable and desperate means of resistance adopted by enterprises. Since 1989, China has been confronted with at least three national social problems. Enterprises have engaged in illegal competition through bribery, inducing large-scale official corruption; enterprises have forced their way into unfunded production with no markets, touching off national debt and inventory crises; enterprises have adopted imitative and indiscriminate manufacturing means to compete illegally, causing a national flood of fake and shoddy commodities. As long as illegal

competition is profitable, it performs a guidance function, leaving the group of enterprise officials who follow the rules to be discarded by enterprise employees because they are "incompetent," lack courage, or have too much conscience. Li Peng's two-year economic-adjustment period did not lead to a stronger national awareness of enterprise technology or a fever of technological upgrading, in which sense it was a failure, as it could not prevent the arrival of another unexpected adjustment period.

But this was certainly not the end of the matter, as enterprises and their agents—local governments with pronounced local perceptions, continued to put steady pressure on the central government, demanding an end to the adjustment period as quickly as possible, to stimulate a market recovery. Such pressure was also reflected in the NPC. It is exceptionally noteworthy that the people's delegates who were chosen through local general elections alone actually did not have the will to genuinely represent "the public." Most of these "national legislators" were local government officials or enterprise officers. The few who were serving in their capacity as ordinary workers found it very hard, due to literacy or political-quality problems, to make choices on crucial political matters that represented "the public." And these people were chosen as delegates largely due to local government regard and confidence, so found it impossible to form an influential voice.

The decision-making process of China's supreme policymakers is probably one of the world's best kept secrets. While there is no way of knowing what sort of debate actually occurred within policy-making circles under local government and enterprise pressure, the "easing" certainly did occur on the quiet.

The central government should aim its use of power not at the public or bank tellers, but rather primarily at forcing local governments to be of one heart and mind with the central government. Power differs in impact from the law, being more succinct and effective in restraining local government, as it can rely on results alone without needing to seek out evidence when punishing cadres. But once a region can draw up local legislation defining "bribery" as legitimate behavior, the law is seen as being particularly feeble.

Data provided by China specialists at Harvard University in the United States show that Chinese government officials and even common manual laborers have all conscientiously studied political economy. Certain Beijing officials have also confirmed this. And while some of them can skillfully recite certain of Marx's famous economic aphorisms, what is particularly hard to understand is that none of them have actually soberly realized that the rapid concentration of capital is accelerating China's social division, which results in class opposition. Regretably, no one is concerned about this. Government officials in charge of the economics sector say contentedly that: As long as we tighten our macroeconomic

regulation and control, keeping a firm check on the overall balance between supply and demand, then all will proceed smoothly.

Exactly, the idea is to smoothly complete the "process."

Deng Xiaoping used repeatedly to emphasize the need to adhere to the socialist road, "absolutely not introducing a capitalist system," which point is of prime importance to China. In light of China's particular conditions, once its society is divided into different strata, it will be very hard for them to coexist, with the struggle among strata very likely to be conducted in quite a barbarous form. That would be a disaster for China and the world both.

The horizontal competitive mindset is also an inevitable ideological reflection of social stratification. This public mindset is developing from an ordinary public mood into a dangerous eruption point. The stage-loke features of this process is precisely a measure of that social stratification situation.

In its initial stage, it shows up as an upward move, with a clear "upper-class" circle emerging, both young and old taking pride in their ability to enter such circles, the lifestyle and consumption style of the rich stratum becoming the social fashion, and first those in the cities followed by those in the rural areas trying to be the first to imitate it. Expensive consumer goods become symbols of honor and position, while the pursuit of expensive consumer goods beyond one's purchasing power becomes the concern of ordinary families.

A clear sign of this stage of social division is the establishment of consumption arenas designed specially for those in upper social strata, such as private schools, high-fee clinics and comfortable hospital wards, aristocratic sports clubs, and markets for expensive choice articles. These arenas are designed not only to provide expensive but comfortable and fine service, because their objective role is to provide those in upper strata with social arenas in which to mix and mingle, so that this limited number of highly skilled can form into a "group."

The development stage shows up as depression of feelings of despair. Large groups of black-market criminal organizations, young hippies, and dispirited cultural figures. The pursuit of clothing is a polarizing trend, with bizarre dress, filthy outfits, and luxurious Western clothing loved by many. Excessive drinking is quite common, beginning to show up as urban-style vagrancy and homelessness. By this stage, those in the lower social strata are no longer concerned about politics, rather beginning to engage in anti-social crime with a flavor of revenge and venting of anger, with particularly the occasional occurrence of vicious cases, such as the blowing up of public structures, arson, and overdoses of drugs. Actions that severely disrupt public order and acts of collective terror often win public tolerance and sympathy, causing a split between public opinion and morality.

The clear signs proving that social division has already entered this stage are the sharp rise in the number of divorce cases due to straitened economic circumstances and suicide cases due to all causes and the obvious rise in the incidence of nonhereditary mental illness.

In the fruition stage, society shows a mood of reticence and despondency. The clear signs of this stage are a sharp rise in the numbers of those being converted to religion, and the continuous appearance of secret political organizations, radical intellectual groups, and armed urban gangs. Illegal or legal opposition parties are founded and tend to grow steadily.

In this analysis of the features of the various stages, we did not list the special showing of the military in the social stratification process because the military in various countries differs completely in basis, making it hard to make a uniform classification of its features. But in fact, the military is very distinctive in this process of change, almost able to be used as an independent yardstick to measure social change. As the various stages approach, the military changes in specific directions in all areas, such as its status in the regime, power to restrain the civilian government, discipline, professionalism, and relations between officers and men. While social stratification may also cause rifts in the military, armed rebellion by some parts of the military will appear only when civil war has already broken out.

China has now entered the initial stage of social stratification, an indisputable assessment. What is alarming is that in its entry to this forward stage of enormous historical change, almost all of the typical and atypical features of its vigor, stimulation, and impatience have completely emerged in just a few short years, and society has accepted the change quite calmly. The rational explanation for this is that society instinctively panders to and yearns for social progress, as it is really quite unnatural that such a poor and enormous society could actually have artificially maintained its unity for as long as four decades without social polarization. (While the conditions for stratification exist between urban and rural areas and between cadres and the public, genuine separations have not occurred due to the same artificial factors).

But the overly rapid pace of social stratification and the overly naive and optimistic attitude of the public certainly pose too great a risk. This is because once all the changes of this stage are completely over, the society will enter the next stage of division faster due to its momentum, leaving the public basically unable to make a timely adjustment in its mindset, and thus unable to accept the subsequent "irrational" social realities. And while the government will probably strike back at certain social phenomena to placate the public, such counterattacks would only be stopgap measures, not permanent solutions, so would not be effective.

So the matter of most concern is that when Chinese society enters the second stage of stratification, the social

climate will deteriorate. Not only will ordinary confrontations occur in sharper form, but certain features that should show up only by the third stage will do so in advance.

Intensity, politicization, and irrationality are very likely to become China's behavioral traits in the process of social stratification.

I have no policy suggestions for the Chinese Government to stop this kind of natural skid of society, because as a natural process, it cannot be reversed. The Chinese people tried. Since reform began in 1978, every head of government and party general secretary has wisely, and even prophetically, engaged in serious struggle against society's "degeneration." They have launched several society-wide movements whose objective was to purify morals and clean up the popular consciousness. These included the revival of the "emulate Lei Feng" movement; the "five emphases, four beautifications, and three loves" movement [emphasize civilization, good manners, cleanliness, order, and morality; beautify spirit, language, conduct, and the environment; love the CPC, the fatherland, and socialism]; the spiritual construction movement; anti-spiritual pollution movement; and anti-peaceful evolution movement. If we add the several rounds of anti-bourgeois liberalization movements, it would seem that the last several decades have been made up of a series of movements. Yet these social movements obviously were heavily tinted with bureaucratic overtones; the most enthusiastic party was the government itself. As for their results, official and popular assessments differed greatly. Officials on foreign visits vehemently denied that they failed to achieve their intended results, as if everything had turned out perfectly. But most young intellectuals were happy to see that the government's efforts had been in vain.

Taking pleasure in other people's failure is a manifestation of antagonism and a reflection of psychological imbalance. It is no more than a vicious way of venting those feelings.

To admit that there is division and to find out the real reasons for the increasing alienation is a task the Chinese leaders should be focusing on today.

Western experts believe that the Chinese leaders are making a very serious ideological error: they don't seem to understand that even within a political regime, there is also a question of conflict and stratification of interests and that such contention is natural.

The Chinese are making the same "mistake" their ancestors made in 1000 BC. Back then, Emperor Zhou divided up the land among the noblemen because the central regime could no longer effectively govern a territory as vast as China. Therefore, he gave the dukes, counts, and barons substantial autonomy to mobilize their enthusiasm in developing their fiefs, hoping the lush branches would lend strength to the trunk—hoping that the strong vassals would bolster the king's power, so

that the central regime and the country could collect more tax revenues and grow strong and powerful. But things did not turn out as hoped; instead, the nobles wrangled among themselves, and everybody wanted more power. The central regime suffered repeated defeats and was eventually turned into a puppet government.

The Chinese people believe that period to be China's most glorious period, a time the whole nation should be proud of. The Son of Heaven, the princes, the noblemen, and the chamberlains grabbed power and installed figureheads at every level. Eventually, all forms of authority and central control were lost, but production developed and science and philosophy flourished like never before (marked by the hundred schools of thought and their exponents); society made rapid progress and replaced its cruel system of slavery with a relatively civilized, agrarian feudal system.

When China began restructuring the economic system, it stressed the streamlining of government and devolution of power, giving localities and enterprises greater autonomy and mobilizing their enthusiasm. This point of departure was similar to the one 3,000 years ago. They were hoping that the lush branches would strengthen the trunk, or quoting the old adage cited by RENMIN RIBAO, only if the streams are full will the river flow.

Even at the beginning of reform, the central government had stipulated the interest distribution principle of taking care of the state, collectives, and individuals concurrently while putting more emphasis on the state's interests. In 1983, this principle was turned into a concrete, guidance-oriented distribution program where "individuals take a small share, enterprises get the medium share, and the state gets the large share." Local governments even relied on official documents to set the legal proportions of "large versus small shares." But after more than a decade of actual practice, large share and small share have been reversed. The relative poverty of the state and the absolute wealth of localities and individuals are in stark contrast.

The problem is one of ideology. Traditional communist moral teachings have led those in government astray. They naively believe that under the big banner of a common ideal, the interests of the state, localities (enterprises,) and individuals are naturally likeminded rather than naturally antagonistic.

There is absolutely no reason for the head of a local government to sacrifice local interests for the sake of national allegiance. In particular, after the power to appoint and dismiss officials is handed down to the local governments and the local people's congresses, there is no more basis for "unanimity" of interests between the local officials and the state. The moral and ethical ties with the state or with the country's overall interests are severed.

The depth of political reform was fully manifested at the time the state handed down the power to nominate and

appoint and dismiss local government officials to the local "people" who had been eagerly looking forward to getting rich quickly and when it gave the local governments the power to appoint enterprises managers. The right to appoint and dismiss cadres was an absolute property right, because cadres had always been directly responsible to the "people" who had the power to appoint or dismiss them. From the very beginning, this transfer of power to appoint and dismiss cadres signified the central government's determination to sacrifice the integrity of the system of state ownership of property in exchange for better economic efficiency. Perhaps the central government was thinking only about efficiency and was oblivious to the profound consequences and did not understand that to give up the power to appoint and dismiss cadres was to give up its property rights; instead it was hoping that the state could reap the "large share" as a result of added efficiency. This was indeed naive. The party holds the gun because it has the power to decide the fate of cadres. When the party Central Committee relinquishes this right, the gun will obey the "lords of the fortified mountain villages"—the local governments.

In 1958, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and other Chinese leaders were deeply angered by the despicable behavior of local cadres at all levels who exaggerated their own accomplishments. If we had believed the "accomplishments" reported by these subordinates, China would have required only another three to five years before it would "surpass Britain and catch up with the United States," realizing its economic modernization dream. The repeated errors in economic guidance committed by Mao and others later surely were attributable to the phony results reported by their subordinates; they had no way of finding out the truth. Thirty years later, China's local grass-roots cadres are still shutting out their superiors. This time, they are hiding income, output, and growth data. Their sole purpose, of course, is to lock up their wealth to protect local interests. The central government is still unable to learn the truth; the low figures conceal the objective truth of accelerated growth.

According to the Marxist viewpoint, there are two ancient principles of fair distribution in human society: Distribution according to work versus ownership of goods based on share of capital. In a society where the former principle is subordinated to the latter principle, that is, if the possession and allocation of the results of production is based on capital shares rather than on work, then that society is manifesting all the traits of the bourgeois standard of fairness.

Whether China is undergoing bourgeois transformation is not important. What is important is that the Chinese government has the responsibility and the obligation to explain what is happening to the people. On the one hand, actual inequalities are occurring continuously and are gradually dividing society into two camps, the rich versus the poor. On the other hand, China is using its "communist world outlook" to educate the people. Illusory and baseless ideologies are very different from the

cruel and irreversible reality, and to a very large extent, such discrepancy is man-made. Once this illusion is destroyed, society will find itself deceived and fooled and in a state of hopelessness, and the masses and cadres will succumb to this psychological blow. This is the greatest danger Chinese society is facing.

Since 1989, Deng Xiaoping has repeatedly warned his successors always to be vigilant on the issue of "public opinion" and never give in, not even half a step, on the question of freedom of the press. But in subsequent years, China's government-run news media have done their best to distort Deng's idea in two ways: On the one hand, in their ideological propaganda, they have eliminated all traces of "liberalization" and have inculcated society with illusory and wonderful fantasies. On the other hand, in their debates over the economic system, they have become extremely liberalized and have found themselves duty-bound to join the localities' struggle to seize power from the central government. In his 10-day stay in China, a German tourist saw on local television how enterprise managers openly complained about the central government on at least three occasions. These managers of large state-run enterprises said that their companies could not compete effectively because the central government failed to give them more power; they demanded that they be put on the "same starting line" as private enterprises.

To Westerners, this was as shocking as a coup d'etat proclamation, but the Chinese official television station provided these people with an unrestricted forum, and the officials and masses were completely unmoved by this kind of propaganda. China must go the socialist way—this is Deng Xiaoping's conclusion. However, the basic structure of China's socialism is supported by these large state-owned enterprises, and if they rid themselves of the burdens of state obligations and "stand on the same starting line as private enterprises," can China's socialism survive?

We will not discuss whether abolishing socialism will be feasible in the future, but at the present time it is absolutely impossible. Neither society nor the people are ready for it.

In China, it is a violation of the constitution to express anti-socialist opinions even in private, but one can openly denounce the very foundation of socialist economy and even flaunt it and be self-righteous about it. This is unfathomable. But the central question still concerns the people's psychological tolerance. One day, everything could be uprooted and the masses might still naively believe that they were living safely in socialism. It is tragic to be deceived.

Mao Zedong was misunderstood in many ways. When Mao brought back the issue of bourgeois rights in his old age, he was not just dreaming up some communist ideals. When he decided to compromise on "bourgeois rights," he had to have considered the acute contradiction between fairness and efficiency. Mao was not afraid of

anybody, but he was afraid that his country would forever be poor; he had to make concessions for the sake of efficiency.

Nobody understood him. When Zhang Chunqiao vehemently condemned such bourgeois rights in speeches and in writing, he was misinterpreting Mao's original meaning. When people criticized Mao after the Cultural Revolution, they again misunderstood his intentions.

In China, to maintain social stability, ease class contradictions, and solve the people's food and clothing problems, it is necessary to rely on the kind of social equality that is tinted with egalitarianism. But to stimulate productive enthusiasm and accelerate the country's economic construction, it is necessary to borrow from "bourgeois rights" to increase efficiency. Fairness undermines efficiency, but efficiency can also ruin fairness.

When Mao faced this dilemma, surely he did not forget the efficiency issue, because he praised Lenin and criticized Stalin. He said, "Stalin made a serious mistake on this matter. Not Lenin. Lenin said building a bourgeois state without capitalists is for the sake of preserving bourgeois legal rights."

Mao said, "We ourselves are building such a country, very much like the old society." Here, Mao was grumbling and making fun of himself, expressing his dissatisfaction with the state the country was in. But more important was that it showed his dilemma as he was forced to make an impossible choice between fairness and efficiency. What he went through in his old age showed that he tried to use revolution as a way to end the strange cycle, to preserve fairness, but he also used revolutionary zeal and ideological awakening to improve efficiency. But he failed. Mao was a great man who commanded respect, because he wisely admitted his defeat.

Mao failed. But what about the Chinese leaders who came after Mao? Did Mao's defeat prove that China should never separate fairness and efficiency? Or did it prove that Mao's way could be reversed and that China should abandon fairness for the sake of efficiency?

Whether China can draw a correct conclusion about Mao Zedong will determine the fate of subsequent Chinese leaders and society as a whole.

Some radical economists have offered the central government a new idea: Sacrifice fairness for the time being and use high efficiency to achieve a rapid increase in wealth and then attain a new and higher level of fairness. This is a tempting but harmful suggestion. Set aside the fact that profit generated by efficiency simply cannot be turned into wealth for the state government and then into the material basis for a new kind of fairness and the fact that efficiency is uneven because of the uneven playing field and that such unevenness will only magnify the unfairness. Even if this idea were reasonable, it would be a long, drawn-out process, and before this new

kind of fairness was eventually attained, society's existing fairness would disintegrate. Can society afford this kind of sacrifice?

The 1989 Beijing incident proved that the public could not tolerate the abandonment of fairness, even only temporarily and partially.

After 1989, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly warned his successors that social stability came first. This is another sticky problem. The basis of stability is the maintenance of most of society's inherent system of fairness, but to do so, the state must limit efficiency, including the freedom of state-owned enterprises to compete. Could he do that without incurring the resentment of localities and enterprises?

When studying China's problems, we can deeply empathize with the Chinese government's predicament in having to make those policy decisions, and we truly understand that this is a humane government. Society is stratified and divided. The government cannot simply step ahead of society and lead the people to where they are heading or blaze a trail for them. Often it can only stand alongside "the people" who are trailing behind to slow society's progress.

British journalist Darwin Shirt [da er wen shi te 6671 1422 2429 0670 3676] wrote, "This government will not produce eternal heroes. It can only continuously manufacture tragic figures." This is indeed food for thought. Perhaps this will make people understand the Chinese leaders better and respect them more.

Since China began its reform, its society has undergone some abrupt, complicated, and profound changes. These not only are changes in essence but are also changes in direction and are difficult to ascertain. Many relationships have to be readjusted as a result—new relationships must be forged between individuals and society, between individuals and organizations, and among individuals.

Amid these changes, people have suddenly lost the set of standards which used to govern their conduct; they are worried, bewildered, and lost. The psychological state of society has become extremely sensitive and fragile. **Unpredictable, localized abnormal psychological imbalance has become another important psychological trait.** This kind of anomaly not only has made society's living environment even worse and caused the self-degradation of human character, but as a by-product of reform, it is also directly or indirectly adjusting the degree of fragmentation caused by the social changes.

This kind of local psychological anomaly is manifested especially in a crisis of faith, primitive egoism, destructive protests, and unprofessional tendencies.

Amid the 1989 Beijing incident, a male university student, hospitalized when he became ill after participating in the hunger strike, told Premier Li Peng who came to visit him why he had participated in the protests. He said

that there had been a serious crisis of faith on university campuses and students had been wallowing in their dreams of studying abroad, womanizing, and gambling, and that he and his friends had been deeply distressed.

This student's statement moved the people of the world.

China has no religious life. Its people's faith has always been based on certain schools of thought or the teachings of great sages. There is nothing wrong with that. Replacing religion with other forms of belief is common in other places around the world. The problem is the kind of ideology the people are putting their faith in is too moralistic and politicized. They can neither transcend worldly matters nor are they adapt to the ever-changing world, and so ultimately they cannot be a religion that provides the people with spiritual sustenance.

Society needs some kind of common faith to provide a sense of constancy of basic stability and development. What China provided was faith in communism in the concrete form of "Quotations From Chairman Mao." But because of their class, political, and practical nature, Mao's words did not qualify as a religion. Therefore, after Mao died, and especially after China's social life underwent a dramatic change, China's crisis of faith should surprise no one.

A society without faith is a dangerous one. At one time, Deng Xiaoping tried his best to shield China from such danger. In 1977, after he recaptured political power, he immediately worked on the important task of remolding the image of Mao Zedong Thought. In April, Deng wrote to Hua Guofeng urging him to "use accurate and complete Mao Zedong thought to guide our party, our army, and the people of the whole country." At the subsequent Third Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee, he again asked the party to have faith in Mao Zedong thought and "use the complete set of Mao Zedong Thought to educate the party and guide us forward."

We have no way of knowing whether Deng had predicted the subsequent crisis of faith, but he clearly encountered a very difficult problem after his third come-back, that is, everything he had to do inevitably had one side-effect—it would ruin Mao Zedong's image and shake the people's blind faith and worship of Mao and, in turn, destroy society's faith which had taken more than 30 years to shape. It was a dilemma; it was necessary to "avoid breaking the dishes when killing the rat"—do what he had to do without producing the ill consequences. Deng tried hard to find a way to get his work done in a convincing and logical way without hurting Mao.

But all his tasks were directly related to Mao: To refute the "two whatevers" and to use political means to bring down the Cultural Revolution's vested interests and its last defenders—the Hua Guofeng faction. To do that would be to deny that Mao Zedong was God and to say

that not everything Mao had said was the truth. This concept would be planted in popular and party consciousness, and it was at such time that the politicizing of faith would expose its fatal flaws. An inevitable political act would necessarily harm faith itself. If people should again turn to their idol and insist that Mao Zedong personified faith itself, then Hua Guofeng would be the protector of the law and Deng would be an infidel. This would be the logical result of this kind of irrational faith. Deng's first political move was absolutely essential, and it was borne out by subsequent developments in China. But Deng himself did not want to undermine Mao's prestige.

What followed was the radical repudiation of the Cultural Revolution. To undertake this task, the prerequisite and the unavoidable consequence were to acknowledge that Mao Zedong personally had committed mistakes against the country, the party, and the people; it was not just a matter of misspoken words. Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese public tried their best to exonerate Mao Zedong when denouncing the Cultural Revolution. They tried to depict him as a "great man who had made mistakes" and tried to pin more of the responsibility for the bloody crimes on the "counterrevolutionary conspiracy gangs of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing." But that neither tallied with the historical facts nor was it convincing even to themselves. Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution and assigned the task of leading the Cultural Revolution to two clans. He had to take his share of the blame. But the older generation of revolutionaries like Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Peng Zhen, decided to respect history and facts and "take responsibility for posterity," and at the public trials, they did not pin the main responsibility for starting the Cultural Revolution on the 10 key culprits of the two clans.

Immediately thereafter, Deng tackled the vindication, rehabilitation, and exoneration of people falsely accused and punished during several previous political movements launched by Mao after 1957. This included 300,000 "rightist elements." Of course, it was a righteous act, but it convinced people that the Cultural Revolution had not been Mao's only mistake, and since the founding of the nation, Mao had made a series of seemingly very foolish mistakes in political guiding principles, in his analyses and judgments of social contradictions and in economic guidance. The materials in support of vindication were overwhelming, giving people the impression that every righteous man had been persecuted and attacked in this "new society" and that Mao not only had erred in understanding but had also been seriously flawed morally and spiritually. Mao's image was ruined. People came to be suspicious of the socialist system and the national decisions and principles which Mao and the Communist Party members had formulated.

Much behind-the-scenes information came to light. What was most damning often was the one-sided information provided by the "victims." They painted themselves as innocent and pure, loyal and kind people

persecuted by Mao personally and by other CPC members. The effects of this kind of propaganda were obvious. Regrettably, nobody stepped out to tell the truth or offer a logical explanation. Public opinion quietly changed. In the early 1980's, any attempt to publicly defend history was attacked. Young intellectuals denounced everybody as "conservative." They pulled themselves out of one kind of unfairness, but mired themselves in another kind. China's intellectuals once again proved their immaturity.

The unfair degradation of Mao Zedong's personal image should not have become a serious social problem, especially since this image was less-than-true and was heavily tinted in the first place. But "without Mao Zedong, there would have been no New China"—society has put its ideals and faith in this image, and the lifestyle people have come to accept was vested in this image. Any damage to this image would cause society's faith to waver and disintegrate.

Mao Zedong was different from other historical CPC members like Chen Duxiu and Wang Ming. The latter two also had made mistakes that led many CPC members to abandon their faith, but a small group of the most staunch CPC members stubbornly held on. Because Chen Duxiu and Wang Ming did not represent the kind of Marxist-Leninist ideology which hard-line CPC members firmly believed in (Mao and Deng were backbone elements of this faction), their mistakes did not in any way signify the inevitable demise of this ideology. In other words, Chen Duxiu and Wang Ming and other heads of an anti-party faction—10 members in all—had nothing to do with Marxism. They might have betrayed or deserted the party or might have made leftist or rightist mistakes, but that had nothing to do with the mainline revolution. The CPC's undertakings continued to move toward success along this mainline.

To a very large extent, Mao Zedong himself represented this mainline. Marxism and Leninism were distant ideas; they were irrelevant, too European. In China, those ideas became Mao Zedong Thought. When Mao Zedong's image was damaged, this mainline was severely shaken. Looking back from today's perspective, this was perhaps the greatest sacrifice China made when it escaped the Cultural Revolution and embarked on the reform process. Because another name for this mainline (it is a continuous, growing line) is "a unique developmental path with Chinese characteristics," when a section of this mainline becomes so blurred as to be indistinguishable, the Chinese people are no longer able to tell which direction they are heading; they cannot find their way, and that is when they make even more mistakes. Deng Xiaoping knew this very well. China cannot go the way of Asia's Four Small Dragons or go where Japan and Europe and the United States have gone before, because China is a vast and poor country with a high illiteracy rate. The only correct way is to follow the extended line stretching along Mao Zedong's footsteps and pave its own way.

Even if it would have been impossible for China to take the next step without criticizing and rejecting Mao first, China should still have limited this kind of sacrifice or painful by-product, so that they would not produce far-reaching and disastrous consequences. The only feasible way to achieve this kind of limit was to promptly mold a new idol to replace Mao Zedong.

In principle, this might appear foolish, and it might be against modern culture, but in practice, this approach was absolutely necessary in China. China's tomorrow is modern civilization, but its today does not meet all the necessary conditions for a modern civilized society. It must first live through today; otherwise it will never see tomorrow. Tomorrow may find the children living independent lives, but today they must still obey their parents; otherwise they will not grow up safely.

Many Western nations are making animated gestures and telling China what to do. This is ridiculous, because before they became relatively civilized themselves, they had embarked on a stupid and barbaric path too. Stupidity and barbarism are the foundation and means of attaining civilization and progress. This is a simple and obvious truth in world history.

China needed a new idol, but China might have missed its opportunity.

Deng Xiaoping resolutely refused to play this role bestowed on him by history. He publicly cited his reason to be his opposition to modern cultism. He believed that personal cults of leaders had caused the Party and society great harm and suffering. Deng himself was a victim. He previously was driven out of Zhongnanhai twice for no good reason; each was decided by a single word from Mao Zedong. He did not even have a chance to defend himself.

Another testimony to Deng's disdain for the movement to create another god was his animosity toward Hua Guofeng. Hua loved the fawning and adulation shown by the masses and the cadres, and eventually Deng could not take it anymore; otherwise he would have put up with Hua's incompetence and would have allowed him to continue to take an honorary, figurehead post.

Deng loudly appealed to the public to improve the party leadership system to truly realize an ideal democratic centralization system and set up a more reliable collective decision-making system. He had nominated Hu Yaobang to be party chairman, but then he quickly abolished that important post and renamed Hu to the newly instituted post of general secretary. The connotation of this title was that he was but the convener of assemblies.

Deng Xiaoping has never openly sung the personal praises of Hu Yaobang or his successor, Zhao Ziyang, nor has he ever done anything to artificially bolster their prestige. But this should not be interpreted as distrust of the two younger men; rather it was because he did not

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want to choose a man with too much personal overtones to be the party leader. Such a leader tends to be put on a pedestal so high that he is above the party. But in 1989, just before Deng retired from office completely, he deliberately gave another general secretary, Jiang Zemin, a prominent additional title, naming him the "core" of the collective leaders. This is very intriguing.

On the question of leadership, authoritativeness, and augmentation of necessary personal prestige, had Deng made mistakes at first and corrected himself later? There is no way for us to know. But the change came after the 1989 Beijing incident. The incident definitely provided Deng with some very important revelations.

A British reporter wrote the following passage after the Beijing incident: A contingent of nearly a thousand men walk slowly behind a dark purple banner embroidered with the words "State Council Supervisory Department." These protectors and supervisors of discipline are openly defying discipline and protesting against their own leaders. This is shocking. When the state loses its authoritativeness, everything seems to turn into chaos.

If Deng Xiaoping had accepted some of his comrades' suggestions to amass greater personal authority, would his warning and advice have kept the public from going berserk? Could he have prevented this tragedy? Of course we will never know. But without ideological authority, one can only use material authority to restore order, and that means using the army. This is another fact of life. Only if there is authority will a stable and ordered society be maintained, because order is partly the product of conscious behavior and partly the result of timid submission.

Another of the CPC's judgments has also turned out to be very controversial. The party insisted that the country and society had not collapsed and production had not stopped completely despite the madness and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution because of the party's presence. This conclusion is not very convincing. In fact, for two whole years, 1966-1968, the CPC's organization was completely paralyzed; there was no underground organization or activities. It was exactly in those two years that the public's faith in communism and their faith in Mao Zedong Thought peaked and even reached a state of absolute madness. The force that maintained order in society was definitely faith and not organization.

Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized that China was basically a poor and backward country. He also emphasized that the quintessence of Mao Zedong Thought was the principle of seeking truth from facts. Therefore, we can imagine that in such a country the people's faith will not be expressed in the form of civilized, rational behavior; instead it will have a "primitive" or superstitious overtone. When this kind of "superstition" becomes a social need, compromise is wiser than struggle.

From Mao Zedong on, every enlightened leader and every intellectual has longed for an ardent and lively

political situation where a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend. It was like that in the most glorious period in China's history—during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Periods. These people know very well that truly wise and astute philosophies are born of disputes, but they are also too naive in believing that such a state can be attained unconditionally. In fact, a society truly in that state must make huge sacrifices. The first sacrifice is the faith the people share. Next, they must give up authority and order. War continued for 800 years during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Periods. The Confucian (Ru) Taoist, Mohist, militarist, agrarian, and legalist schools all had different political beliefs. Can China withstand and tolerate this kind of situation today?

Twice Mao used his romanticism and courage to personally conduct experiments—once in 1957 and once in 1966. The first time, the fire got too close to him and the CPC as soon as it had been lit; he had no choice but to quickly put it out. The second time, he was too weak to put the fire out.

On the question of faith, society has never left a void. The so-called crisis of faith in essence is a challenge of the dominant form of faith. China's reality is that once the people are allowed to have doubts about their faith and the authorities, outside ideas and theories will quickly rush in to fill the vacuum.

In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee decided to redress the Qingming Festival incident of two years earlier. It was fair. But that incident nevertheless was a spontaneous public act of contempt for and an attack on Mao Zedong's authoritative position. Redress implied that that form of "rebellion" should be encouraged. The series of student strikes and protests that followed must be directly attributed to this redress decision. But for the CPC to step out to absolve the populace of rebellious political activities no doubt provided future generations of intellectuals a format of political freedom which they would not hesitate to choose.

Since 1978, many Western academic ideas and political theories have found their way into China. Rather than attributing this phenomenon to the policy of opening up, it would be better to say that it was the result of the weakening of faith. When China yields the space, it opens up a market for outside ideas and theories.

As far as China's progress is concerned, the continuous influx of fresh academic ideas and theories is definitely a good thing. At least people learn something and widen their field of vision. But the Chinese people must first realize that these are blossoms from a foreign land. Remember, they are foreign. Different soil and water produce fruits of a different kind.

A clear premise is that China will maintain its own political characteristics for a long time to come. For

example, it will continue to have a one-party political system where the Communist Party rules. If we acknowledge that this premise is essential to China's social progress and stability, then outside ideas and theories generally are not suitable for China, because where these theories originate, there is no provision for dictatorship by the Communist Party or other similar situations.

All Western theories, including pure and scientific economic theories and socio-political thought, that make their way into China will have two effects: One, they will clash with the political conditions of the native land—human rights concepts and democratic political designs are examples. Two, they will guide and enlighten—microeconomic and macroeconomic theories and modern management concepts and methods are examples. The inspiration of human rights concepts is very important. But no idea can directly guide the Chinese people onto the path of development. Those ideas must first be transformed by the Chinese themselves before they become useful. Marxist thinking is magnificent, but without a native born and bred peasant-intellectual like Mao Zedong who transformed them and put them to use, they would be just that, magnificent ideas. At most they would summon a handful of courageous rebels, but their rebellion would never have succeeded. From this perspective, there is a need for China to create another "Mao Zedong."

Another question we are still unable to answer today is, who will make up China's decision-making tier after Deng Xiaoping? Mao Zedong always had great disdain for the intellectual elites. He believed that China was a nation of workers and peasants, and only those with the talent to understand the workers and peasants should have the right to make proposals and to speak up in China's decision-making process. No doubt Mao's position was extreme, but it was by no means unreasonable, because this was the conclusion drawn from the bloody experiences of the CPC's rise and fall and eventual seizing of political power. Mao's successors must take to heart his warning and never let those people who are educated, but who do not understand society's lower classes, have the opportunity to make independent decisions. When Zhao Ziyang was general secretary, several young scholars who had returned from their studies abroad advocated that management meant productive efficiency, and from there they started a noisy upsurge of "optimal combination." Optimal combination is a systematic optimization program in modern management science. It is not only scientific but is a completely apolitical, universal management concept. But after introducing this purely technical management measure to China's government organs and enterprises and making it the basis for reorganizing the workers and staff and the cadres, it was immediately controlled and manipulated by the much more vigorous political forces inherent in the lower classes in China. "Optimization" was generally turned into "purification." Powerful leaders at the grass-roots level seized the opportunity to eliminate their opponents, attack those who disagreed

with them, purify their own power environment, and purge and seek revenge on those who had informed on them before and anyone else who posed a threat to their power and position. After they "optimized" power, they no longer had any supervision. Some optimized leading groups became collectively corrupt; they openly gave and accepted bribes. Some purified leading groups started a new round of power struggles among "comrades."

The application of new management techniques was not translated into productive forces, and, in turn, did not boost the central regime's power as first hoped. On the contrary, in many localities, especially in grass-roots units, it reinforced separatist forces that alienated the people from the leadership, so that the central government's ability to control the localities and enterprises further diminished.

It may sound ridiculous, but it was also the truth in China. Once people learn of China's real situation, they will immediately come to detest those Europeans, Americans, and Asians who, with their sense of superiority, try to enlighten and guide the Chinese people.

In 1934, at the critical time when the CPC was in the midst of its decisive struggle against its enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, it handed the power to command its 150,000-strong main force to a German, Otto Braun (also known as Li En.) and to a Chinese intellectual, Zhou Enlai. It banished the obstinate, unruly, and unconventional Mao Zedong, the peasant-intellectual in the leading group, to the mountains, far away from the power center. The result of this "optimization" or "purification" of power was that in 8 month's time, the CPC lost 90 percent of the land under its control. The Red Army's main troops were forced to make the 10,000-km great escape.

What was interesting was that Chiang Kai-shek also employed two German military consultants. But working with the Germans were the Huangpu-affiliated regular troops led by local warlords who had started out as tyrants or by the even more elite children of rich farmers. This combination was hardly optimal, but this time they were the victors.

As more and more Germans pay attention to what is happening in China, many have come to know the name and the story of their fellow countryman, Otto Braun, and they have mixed feelings about this self-made military expert with his typical German personality.

After the defeat, Zhou Enlai changed his mind and lent his support to Mao Zedong. Strictly speaking, it was a change in "faith." From a devout follower of faraway Germans like Marx and Engels, Zhou became a believer in Mao Zedong, a fellow Chinese. He spent the latter part of his life working industriously and frugally according to Mao's instructions.

The difference between Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai was that Deng seemed to have been able to turn from foreign to native independently and naturally, without

turning to Mao Zedong; instead he turned to himself. But he "himself" was exactly like Mao Zedong, and that was why Deng was once regarded as a member of Mao's camp and was exiled. Since Deng and Mao "reached the same goal by different routes" it only proved that people had faith in "Mao Zedong thought" not because Mao was a genius but because that faith was the common, correct choice of value of that generation of advanced intellectuals. It was a social necessity.

As an individual, Deng is independent of Mao Zedong, therefore he can be a devout believer in Mao Zedong thought while disapproving of Mao's personal flaws. This is because this system of thought is to a large extent Deng's own thought. When he followed his own ideas and came up with a set of theories on reform, opening up, and civilization and progress, he in fact was carrying out continuous development of Mao Zedong's thought system.

The occurrence of a crisis of faith shows that the Chinese people are on the verge of another change. If they seize the opportunity and make a system of thought that is richer, more suited to the realities of Chinese life—that is, an extension of Mao Zedong's system of thought—the basis of society's common faith, then this nation can remain unified and develop. If they miss this opportunity and let German or American, traditional or super-modern schools of thought and theories take part in the decision-making process and recruit followers and wield influence, this nation will soon suffer a serious setback.

Nobody really wants to see China suffer a setback. If tens of millions of little Chinamen make their way into continental Europe via Russia to look for food and work, it will be the end of the world for the Europeans. On the China issue, the world's best choice is neither to interfere nor to "help." That is, nobody should attempt to use those pretty ideas, ideas that are useless to China, to guide and enlighten the Chinese. Let the Chinese do what they want in their own country.

As a consequence of the crisis of faith, unprofessional conduct becomes a common social phenomenon, and such a phenomenon continuously poisons and pollutes the living environment and shakes society's common faith even more.

Unprofessional conduct generally can be separated into two main categories: deterioration of professional ethics and exploitation of professional power. But in terms of actual behavior, there is no difference between the two. For example, policemen who abuse their power to enrich themselves are also violating professional ethics, and careless medical personnel do not care often because they have nothing to gain by caring. The reason a distinction is made between the two is that the motivations behind their conduct and the way this conduct is reflected in society's development are radically different, as are their trends and how to deal with them.

From a more simplistic point of view, the dishonest conduct of abusing power for private gain is a manifestation of the inevitable flaws of social administration as

reflected in the conduct of administrators. It is an issue that belongs in the material or technical realm. Thus, this problem does not reflect social attributes nor society's moral atmosphere. It can happen in any country. Chinese newspapers report extensively on problems of Western countries such as drug abuse, AIDS, bribery of officials, fanatical religious activities, government scandals, and money politics. They try to use those incidents to prove the "corruption of the capitalist system" and even make arrogant predictions of the demise of Western societies. This is baseless and superficial. The above-described social evils are quietly happening in mainland China; they are spreading like wild fire. In a year or two, they are bound to become widespread social problems and will provoke great public anger. But we cannot draw the conclusion that Chinese society is already corrupt on that basis, because problems such as dishonest officials and social corruption can be resolved within the technical realm.

To be fair, China's social tendencies and government honesty today simply cannot be compared to the situation during or before the Cultural Revolution. Back then, the mainland was pure and clean; the CPC was proud of that. But today, Chinese society has embarked on the road of reform and opening up; its economy is being gradually marketized, and it can look forward to entering a benign cycle eventually. Can we call this social retrogression?

A socialist society is a clean society and a capitalist society is necessarily dirty. This is the CPC's misunderstanding. When they use this kind of misinformation to guide the public, to a large extent it will only lower public tolerance for social changes. The public inevitably will become inexplicably angry at the only ruling party when they see the filthy phenomena in their own society.

If there is no close supervision and proper management of power, then power will inevitably become a means to gain profit. This is true in any country and in society of any kind. In comparison, because the laws of Western democratic countries do not believe that morals can restrain power, they tend to emphasize drawing up measures to supervise and control power, so that it cannot run amok. However, China traditionally believes in the morals and conscience of the government officials and stresses their ideological and moral education and does not put much weight on drawing up a supervisory system to restrain power. Therefore, there are more opportunities for power to be tempted and bought by profit. This perhaps is due to cultural tradition and conceptual differences. To Westerners, the Chinese philosophy that says "never distrust those one employs and never employ those one distrusts" is absurd, but to the Chinese, this is the only moral standard. The Chinese are wrong, because all of their philosophical reasoning and famous adages were products of the conditions of a non-commodity society, but today they are making an effort to build a commodity economy.

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Several hundred pairs of eyes are focused day and night on the powerful. The Chinese people have come to realize that it is necessary to do so. They are openly hoisting the banner of distrust and are tightening the internal checking and control system. This is not only necessary but is completely moral. Distrust is one kind of supervision and safeguard.

There is a serious problem with corruption of government officials in mainland China today. This is nothing horrible, because this is different from the other phenomena of class division. Other than saying that administrative concepts are backward and the administrative system needs to be improved, it does not really mean anything, even less does it foretell that something bad is going to happen to this society. Of course, corruption arouses public fury and in turn causes large-scale, ruinous social unrest. But generally speaking, once such protests and punishments meted out against the ruling party's failure to govern blow over, society will simply go on as before.

But if the problem of government corruption is not resolved fairly soon, and if it spreads, then the CPC will find itself in real trouble. In the future, if an opposition party should emerge in China, its very first political stand will surely be to fight corruption. This platform not only will win public support but will hang the plaque of corruption squarely on the shoulders of the ruling party. This is a political tragicomedy played out in all countries worldwide.

Improving the government functionaries is a part of political reform. A proper and benign political system will discourage or prohibit officials from resorting to reckless behavior. China's problem today is that it cannot speak hastily about political reform, because such reform action can be one of the causes of social instability.

When Deng Xiaoping regained power at the end of the 1970's, he appealed for improvement of the party's leadership system and the vigorous strengthening of democratic construction. But the reaction of society, especially intellectuals, was very peculiar. They came up with a set of democratic systems prevalent in Western nations and asked the Communist Party to accept them; they even suggested a multi-party, parliamentary democratic system. Of course Deng Xiaoping struck back.

Subsequently, the CPC launched several nationwide anti-bourgeois liberalization movements. Besides aiming to stabilize society and stop endless student strikes, a more important purpose was to make some headway in preparing for political reform. In 1987, Deng and then-General Secretary Zhao Ziyang reached the following consensus: Without the necessary political reform, the restructuring of the economic system could not proceed properly, smoothly, and thoroughly; but political reform required the country to draw a firm and clear line of demarcation with bourgeois liberalization.

No matter at what time and from what angle we look at Deng's and Zhao's understanding, it was absolutely correct.

The period 1987-1988 was one in which both the CPC and the media were clamoring for political reform. This was before Gorbachev's political reform in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the CPC did not forget to strengthen the anti-liberalization propaganda at the same time, and this made the Chinese approach completely different from Gorbachev's. This kind of meticulous preparation should have facilitated smooth progress of the planned reform.

But once again, the Chinese public reacted in a very peculiar way. Perhaps because of a misconception or because there was something wrong with the planning procedure, the public at first reacted with great fear to political reform. They faintly felt that their own sense of safety and job security was threatened. Indeed, the intent of the reform of the employment system which included "optimized combination" was to smash the "iron rice bowl" to which the people had grown accustomed. The public's second reaction was anger toward "reform." Such anger was fully manifested in the 1989 Beijing incident.

After 1989, the CPC became very cautious about any propaganda on political reform. In some open propaganda materials and "editorials" in journals which clearly had the backing of important people, they actually rejoiced over the fact that economic reform "had not been accompanied by political reform," saying that otherwise China would have been mired in the same utter chaos as the former Soviet Union. Some foreign commentators shared this viewpoint.

The Chinese people more or less take pleasure in the Soviet people's predicament. This is a sentiment shared by almost everybody interviewed on the streets of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. But the Soviet people are also watching the goings-on in China. When Russian newspapers talk about China, almost all use the same tone of voice: Their political reform is not thorough; their problems are yet to come.

Currently, China is faring much better than nations of the former Soviet Union. This fact basically answers the question of who made the right choice and who made the wrong choice. Gorbachev did not think of Deng Xiaoping's "four cardinal principles." This was the most fundamental difference between the political reforms of the two giant communist countries. Because of this difference, the two countries have undergone changes that are completely different.

But should China go ahead with the restructuring and renewal of its political system? Life in China and the increasingly corrupt social tendencies have already answered this question. If no strong and effective action is taken in this area, the Chinese will indeed encounter serious trouble—trouble this society cannot deal with—further down the road.

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The attempt at political reform in 1987 was seriously flawed. It was also a puzzle. The Deng-led revolution ran into real problems when the people struck back because they felt that their interests were infringed upon. Public interest is a very resilient concept, and on such things as prices, political freedom, and housing problems, there can be compromises, but on two basic points, the people will hold their ground: The above-average-standard lifetime guarantees already granted to the people by the socialist state, and the sense that people are masters of society. If reform attacked these two basic points, the reform leaders would meet their Waterloo. Compromises are necessary.

These two basic points mandate that in restructuring the economic and employment systems, only upward adjustments be made on top of the workers' vested interests. The average line already attained must be kept, and greater distinction between rich and poor can be made on top of that line; one must not make upward or downward adjustments by removing the average line. In China, the reason for the inherent, complicated, and strong tendency for power to radiate outwards, making some members of society richer than others, has often not been economic. But as long as the masses' own basic interests are left intact, they have a large capacity to accept this kind of injustice. What Mao Zedong has given to the people, Deng and others may not take away. The strong "Mao Zedong craze" that suddenly swept the country after 1987, precisely reflected this kind of sentiment in society.

The 1987 reform dealt with the cadres' "iron chair" and the ordinary workers' "iron rice bowl" at the same time. As a qualified Chinese leader, Deng should have anticipated the following situation when he designed the reform program: Because cadres had all sorts of protection, the "iron chair" could not be smashed anytime soon; ordinary workers had no protection, and the reform targeting them would immediately become a reality. Such "temporal differences" actually gave this reform an unintentional overtone of a one-sided challenge of the masses' basic interests.

The reform targeted the ordinary people right from the beginning. Was this aristocratic elitist consciousness, or was it simply poor planning?

Another puzzle is even more intriguing. At that time, the CPC propaganda machine was spreading inaccurate propaganda about "socialist spiritual civilization" and socialist superiority. Little children with leukemia receiving outpourings of sympathy and support and similar incidents were given vigorous publicity in the newspapers. This was obviously misguided. There are natural conflicts between the shock of reform and the people's psychological endurance. The correct propaganda would be to banish the people's illusions about socialist superiority rather than to feed them with phony stories to avoid conflict or to numb their senses. They should clearly and correctly tell the public that this

country was poor and could not take care of the medical expenses of the large number of children, nor could it solve the country's many problems. They should ask the people to accept this reality and tell them that they should no longer rely on the state and society to solve problems related to the individual's livelihood and security; the people had to rely on their own struggle.

To acknowledge this point would be painful for the CPC. For their entire lives, the older generation of party members, like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, had hoped that the masses would be able to lead a rich, worry-free, and protected life. But even if that was not just their dream of Utopia, it was an ideal that could only come true in the future. Even now, neither the state nor society has the ability to attain that goal.

Telling the people the truth so they are psychologically prepared, and actively facilitating the "track-changing and remolding" of society's psychological mechanisms is the correct propaganda to accompany the restructuring of the political and the economic systems.

But to do so will be difficult for the CPC too, because they must continuously publicize the "light" of society in order to set the people's minds at ease. This is another dilemma.

Before summing up the discussions in this book, we must answer or make some predictions about the following questions: Can China maintain long-term stability in the modernization process? Can China achieve its modernization program as scheduled? What measures will the Chinese government take when faced with a social crisis? How should we assess the social value of these policy measures?

The probability of China being able to sustain long-term social stability in the modernization process is very slim. It is in practice a process full of risks, continuous conflicts, setbacks, errors, and even intense confrontation. There will be a series of dilemmas creating insurmountable conflicts and problems between development and stability. But this process is by no means beyond human control, and if the government adopts the correct, comprehensive countermeasures and has a certain amount of foresight, society is fully capable of using compromises to resolve the conflicts and keep the contention and clashes under control.

The greatest and perhaps most realistic threat will come from the decision-making group's misunderstanding of China's social development. In dealing with the crises, ideological errors will lead to policy errors. This is a process of continuous errors and continuous rectification of mistakes. But history and China's complex social development are imposing severe conditions on the CPC. They do not allow this ruling party to make a mistake on important issues and at critical times. Any mistake of this kind will disrupt the entire process.

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We have already repeatedly explained that China does not meet the conditions for setting up scientific democratic decision-making and feed-back mechanisms at the present stage. Although a new generation of leaders is striving to go through repeated consultations, debates, and previews in their decision-making process, the decisions still have a strong personal and traditional overtone. This again increases the opportunities and probabilities of mistakes.

If prejudices in traditional ideologies are the traps that cause errors in decisionmaking, then the CPC is likely to run into the following well-disguised traps as it leads this ancient nation toward modernization:

1. A relatively high rate of economic growth is the key to solving all social conflicts; speed and stability can keep pace with each other.

This is a very dangerous trap. Although slow economic growth can trigger a crisis of confidence in the political process, rapid economic growth can heighten society's inherent conflicts, and the resulting new problems are those the CPC is not familiar with.

After more than a decade of reform and economic growth, Chinese society has changed dramatically. Currently, it is at a critical point when the old structure and systems are disintegrating but the new structure and systems designed to replace them have not been established. What we should realize is that these new structures and systems are not something the National People's Congress can produce from its conference room. They can be effective only as the natural products of economic development. Therefore, an exceedingly high rate of economic growth can lead to the sudden collapse of the old system, and since the new structure that inevitably lags behind has not yet developed, society will suddenly find itself in a void.

If we think that the double-track system has already brought great troubles and vexation to the Chinese people, then that period of void when even the double-track system is not working will bring even greater social crises. If we think that under the double-track system interest groups are reaping reform dividends, then during that blank period, social cliques that have interest ties to their respective tracks will lose their backing and will attack the central government from left and right, at which point, the government will be caught in the middle, and no matter what it does, it will be blamed. It will lose control at the higher level as it will have long since lost control at lower levels.

Yet this is not the worst situation yet, because the government can still act as a buffer. When both the left and the right supersede the government and attack each other, society will be in a state of total anarchy.

Since the beginning of the 1990's, the Chinese government has promised the public to "diligently resolve the issue of unfair social distribution." But this was but a

signal for political action; there has been no actual movement. Since the problem is a natural result of reform itself, except for total retreat, there is no real solution. Since then, stock and real estate speculation crazes have swept the country, but the government has not seriously tried to curb or guide the people. Speculating in the stock market can mean tens of thousands in profits or losses. Isn't this "unfair distribution" of a worse kind?

When Deng Xiaoping decided to retire in 1989, he personally advised his successors to be cautious and to keep economic growth at 6-7 percent a year. At the end of 1990, the Seventh Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee ratified the "10-Year Program" and set a 6 percent annual rate of increase for the GNP. It clearly wanted a steady rate of increase. Considering that the GNP was increasing at an average rate of 7.8 percent a year under the "Seventh Five-Year Plan," it was in fact asking that the economic development be slowed down. Deng clearly made his decision after some serious considerations.

There are two knobs regulating the speed of economic growth. One is total fund input and the other is the stimulus provided by the newly introduced reform measures toward economic growth. For principles already analyzed, the central government is unable to tighten either knob. China's economy is like an inferior-breed horse with a bad temper; it bolts off willfully. Based on the most conservative estimates, the GNP grew more than 11 percent in 1992.

The Chinese people often can work miracles. Anything can happen in China. Perhaps they are not constrained by some outdated laws and can sustain a super-high rate of growth while maintaining social stability.

2. The theory of omnipotent market mechanisms and the restructuring of the management system of the large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises.

The restructuring of the management mechanisms of the large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises is the focal point and the hot point of China's economic reform today. A document issued by the Seventh Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee called it the "central link of thorough economic reform." A 1992 estimate of the financial deficit was in excess of 25 billion yuan renminbi, and a substantial portion of that was spent on subsidizing losses incurred by state-owned enterprises. It is vital to make these enterprises more competitive and to increase revenues while reducing expenditures.

Nations of the former Soviet Union are practising a so-called "hard-landing" transformation of their state-owned enterprises. They are using various means to turn or transform most state-owned enterprises into enterprise-owned, collective-owned, or privately owned enterprises and are limiting the role of state-owned enterprises

in economic operations, thus creating conditions for developing a market economy and a single-track system.

The Chinese may be opting for a "soft-landing"-kind of reform, but the Soviet design is also one of their design goals too. Transforming state-owned enterprises is a very tempting idea, but it can also be the turning point where reform may henceforth embark on the crooked path.

Today the CPC does not have a deep understanding of a market economy. They may have noticed how the market mechanism can stimulate production and skillfully allocate resources, but they do not truly realize the fatal flaws of the market economy. They are attempting to utilize macroeconomic regulation and control simplistically to remedy the inadequacies of the market. They are completely bookish and naive.

China yearns to develop its economy quickly and become modernized. One of its greatest advantages is that it possesses a full array of state-owned enterprises which have definite developmental potential. Enterprises that make up this contingent must sacrifice some autonomy.

There is a huge gap between realistic economic life and economic models. According to the model, the spontaneous regulation of market mechanisms can completely optimize the allocation of resources, and only through this kind of spontaneous regulation can the allocation be optimal. This is correct. But we must remember that the model assumes the absence of all interference, as if matters are traveling in a vacuum. This kind of ideal result can be achieved only if all the conditions of free competition are satisfied; otherwise spontaneous regulation will inevitably create very absurd and extremely ridiculous results. China's internal and international environments make it impossible to "fully satisfy all conditions."

While traveling in China, whenever the officials talked to me, a scholar from a country with a commodity economy, about the wonderful roles and miraculous effects of free competition and the market mechanism, I always became depressed over their shallowness and biases. On many occasions Mao Zedong spoke about how the cadres had an inadequate command of dialectics, and today he is proven correct. If China cannot maintain this huge state-owned economic force and allow it to play a role in allocating resources and stabilizing the economy, then the commodity economy system simply cannot function harmoniously. This is especially true for a country like China which is just making a transition to market mechanisms. The production of all goods closely related to the national economy and the people's livelihood must include a certain percentage of participation by the state economy. State enterprises only follow state plans and do not seek profit; they only comply with the overall situation and do not follow their own management goals.

Socioeconomic development goals are diverse. They seek comprehensive political, cultural, educational, and

environmental developments as well as improvements in the quality of life. This is the most important principle in the CPC's socialist theories, but it has taken several hundred years before capitalist societies finally learned this fact. Market mechanisms always use indirect means to fulfill all social development norms other than economic norms. It may even sacrifice other goals—such as tolerating deteriorated environmental conditions and educational standards—for the sake of profit. When China proceeds with its modernization construction, it should avoid mistakes other countries made.

After nearly 40 years of hard work, the Chinese people have set up a state-owned industrial system. This is their characteristic and their unique advantage. Because of this advantage, China can avoid the many problems other developing nations could not avoid during their economic development. These problems include lack of focus in fund input and too much emphasis on light industry; inability to regulate the labor market; unbalanced industrial structure due to insufficient investments in basic industry and infrastructure; and price-conscious, shortsighted market and production behavior. National and social stability in particular require a state-owned economic force capable of taking care of the unemployed labor force, adjusting differences in income distribution, regulating the volume of goods and materials in circulation, curbing price increases, and so on.

From the socio-political point of view, in China, whoever controls large and medium-sized enterprises controls the country's lifeline and the seal of authority. Similarly, in the era of the warlords, one had to be in control of the heavily armed main force. To give these enterprises "autonomy" when restructuring the management system is to "let the tiger return to the mountain"—asking for trouble down the road; they are bound to turn themselves into kings. When the central government tries to command this scattered army again, it must buy them out, and that will be much more costly to the government than subsidizing the unprofitable enterprises today.

Mao Zedong had a famous saying which has become the maxim for almost every politician or politically ambitious person. Mao said, "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party." Mao's language might have been blunt and simple, but the intention was most interesting. It revealed the thinking and experience of a mature politician. This statement exactly tells you all about the art of government and the secrets of administration of a solid regime: You must command your own forces and not let those forces obstruct you. In other words, you don't want to hit yourself in the head.

The Chinese people and the Chinese government may pay a steep price before again reverting [to the ideas] of Mao Zedong.

3. Smashing the "iron chair" and the democratic cadre appointment system.

When Mao Zedong summed up his own administrative experience, he emphasized repeatedly that he was able to sit tight in the fishing boat despite the rising wind and waves—hold his ground despite pressure and opposition—because of his two contingents of cadres (referring to the two generations of cadres nurtured during the revolutionary wars and the economic construction). The fundamental stability of the contingent of cadres is synonymous with political and social stability.

In the modernization process, it is certain that more and more members of society will demand that they be allowed to participate in politics. Because of China's unique political system, grass-roots demands for political participation cannot aim at wielding influence in the central government's decision-making process but will most likely target the appointment and dismissal of mid-to-low level posts held by the cadres. Different members of society who take part in politics have different motives and social interests. Those who believe they have suffered a setback in the new economic structure hope that the cadres will notice their interests and demands and formulate the pertinent sympathetic and protective policies. Those who are better adjusted to the new economic life and have accumulated some wealth, on the other hand, want to appoint cadres who are even more resolute about reform measures which not only will protect their wealth but will provide more opportunities for increasing it.

No doubt both of the above demands are rational and therefore two different types of cadres are needed to ensure social stability and development. China's current guiding principle for selecting cadres, besides sticking to traditional standards, tends to emphasize the "explorer-type" cadres. This is consistent with society's accelerated "transformation." If all high-ranking officials of a province belong to the type keen on exploring reform possibilities, then after a term is up, all the cadres in that province will be replaced by those of the same mold according to the law of "like attracts like." Then who will represent the political needs of the other members of society?

According to the general rule, when members of a faction in society basically have no way to express their political needs and economic interests, they will not change their demands or curtail their interests; instead they will express themselves via abnormal channels. These abnormal channels are a serious threat to social stability. They include demonstrations and protests, secret meetings, underground organizations, and formation of clans and groups, and in some developing nations, they are accompanied by assassinations and bombings and other terrorist acts.

Since there are differences in interests, there will inevitably be political confrontations and struggles. Rather than resorting to oppressive measures which tend to make the political struggle society-wide or turn them into a secretive process, it would be better to choose negotiation and compromise. Society is not the swimming pool

for some; it is home to all people. All factions in society should have their own representatives in government or in the people's congress. The interaction, discussions, negotiations, and compromises among the representatives help society develop in a steady way.

There are no mass groups and organizations, such as community organizations and independent unions, that are completely independent of the government in China, which means there is one less interest buffer zone, which makes it even more essential to have diverse organs of power.

There are other even more important reasons for maintaining a stable contingent of cadres. As the commodity economy develops, people will become more aware of the concepts of democracy and modernization. A prominent tendency of this kind of development is anti-establishment consciousness and liberalization stands. In turn there are natural confrontations with government officials who symbolize unity, stability, and authority.

On the surface, the most difficult part is government officials will never win in these confrontations. This is because when the public demands and evaluates the quality of the government officials based on its new value concept, it can target any problem in ideology and conduct, such as bureaucracy, lifestyle, inefficiency, lack of legal concept, cronyism, and even isolated incidents of abuse of power for private gain. Sometimes there are grounds for these complaints; sometimes they stem from simple hatred. But whether there are grounds or not, public opinion is already shaped.

This is a prime opportunity for making mistakes. Catering to public opinion and pandering to the will of the people are the beginning of errors. Public employees and cadres must gradually foster new concepts and rectify their own behavior through an internal mechanism in order to adapt to social changes. But they should not start making surgical cuts here and there. The reason everything seems so "illogical" is that public employees have become "defendants" or "objects of nitpicking"; it does not mean that all of them are so degenerate as to be useless. Furthermore, if the cadres are slow in shedding old ideologies, it is actually a normal social safeguard. People should understand this.

The government employees as a group give expression to the stable and normal development of society, and therefore they also represent its overall interests. If this contingent itself is not stable, then some members may challenge the security of society. Therefore, governments of developing and developed nations generally try their best to maintain the stability of the basic cadre contingent during social changes. They try to keep the dialogue open, and upon weighing the pros and cons, they usually adopt a policy of tolerance and letting bygones be bygones even when the cadres are "caught red-handed." But after changes are made and the regime is stabilized, the policies often tighten. South Korea and Taiwan and

other quasi-developed Asian countries and regions have experienced such social transitions.

4. Maintaining a sense of continuity in policies.

Not all state governments are willing to declare that what they are implementing is an extension of old policies, because policy changes are the manifestation of a pragmatic spirit. China is an exception. Its government emphasizes the constancy of its policies. Perhaps this is the manifestation of a certain spirit of principle or sense of dignity.

There are endless problems and contradictions in the modernization process. As a means to resolve these conflicts, policies must be continuously renewed and modified. Decisions may flip-flop, and what is said today may be refuted tomorrow. This is a natural phenomenon.

When implementing some policies, the government must make promises of its long-term stability, so that society can feel at ease about accepting and implementing them. For example, when China implemented the family-based output-related responsibility system in the rural areas in the early days of reform, if the government had not made the promise that it would hold fast to that policy for the next several decades, the peasants would not have put their money in the land they had contracted. By the time there is no more conflict between a policy and the people's everyday life, then the policy has in fact become a normal part of life, and it naturally will be extended.

Other kinds of policies must be readjusted constantly. When the CPC promulgated the "regulations against speculation and profiteering" in the early days of reform, many of the clauses actually violated the rules of commodity circulation. They are no longer applicable today and have long been abandoned. When making this kind of readjustment, it is not necessary to admit "mistakes," because the government's responsibility is continuously to modify various policies. Just like driving a car. Every time one steers left or right, it has to be the correct move because the car is moving forward.

If a policy change is too drastic and obviously groundless, people may doubt the government's ability to govern and may become disappointed. Some people may become alienated from the government. For example, during Deng's tour of South China, local governments and the central government formulated their respective policies to encourage employed workers to look for second jobs. The purpose of this policy was to encourage the workers to find ways to earn more cash income to combat inflation and higher prices and ease the social conflicts caused by unfair distribution. But at the same time, it also became a legitimate excuse for the deterioration in professional ethics. There were too many flaws, which made it a poor policy.

Many similar hot-headed policies will be abandoned by the government after responsibilities are pinned on a few scapegoats.

5. Propaganda and good intentions.

For any government, the only guiding principle for propaganda is fairness and respect for the truth. Any other motive will put its propaganda in the "misinformation" category. The CPC has truly experienced the great danger of phony propaganda during the Beijing incident, but it seems that they have not yet realized that much of their own propaganda has always been misinformation.

It is always thought necessary to publicize the results of reform or the achievements of a regime, because otherwise it would be difficult to bolster public morale and confidence. This is a misconception. The public generally only take to heart what they themselves experience as a result of social progress; they are seldom impressed by what the official mouthpiece tells them. Therefore, overzealous official propaganda is left with only two side effects: It either misleads the public into having unrealistic expectations, or it has a negative psychological effect. Moreover, the CPC propaganda machine's prestige has been seriously damaged in the past; its effectiveness has declined, and grinding out greater volume or more intense propaganda will only produce the opposite result. The 1958 propaganda on the "Great Leap Forward," the 1960 propaganda about the "great situation," and the "magnificent results" of the Cultural Revolution have all been thoroughly repudiated, but psychologically, the people naturally associate today's propaganda with the propaganda machine that produced those old masterpieces and in turn assume that there is no truth in today's propaganda.

In the more than 40 years of the CPC regime, its biggest mistake has been in its efforts to persuade the people to believe in "miracles." Before launching every social movement, the CPC would tell the people that it was the beginning of a miracle. The cooperatives, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution eventually produced no miracle. What is strange is why the Chinese government still has not learned the lessons of propaganda. Once again, it is disseminating the idea that "reform can work miracles." Reform cannot work miracles. It can only lead society to embark on a difficult road, but a road that will produce positive results, and, on the contrary, the idea of miracles will only hurt reform. After the Cultural Revolution, the CPC's several major policy mistakes were all attributable to the unrealistic pursuit of miracles. Hua Guofeng's "foreign leap," Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang's pursuit of accelerated growth, and the recent land development craze were all manifestations of an immature government.

A gentleman in Beijing wrote: "The biggest mistake in the decade of reform is that most of our decisionmakers have not rid themselves of or completely rid themselves of the simplistic idea of 'grasping revolution to promote production.' The only difference is, they have substituted 'reform' for 'revolution.'"

Only if propaganda respects the truth will it succeed in educating the masses and at the same time gain respect

for the propagandists. After the 1989 Beijing incident, to make peace with society, Chinese government propaganda generally portrayed the "hooligans" who placed road blocks on the streets of Beijing and sets fire to keep the army out of the city as criminal elements with records. The effort to vindicate ordinary citizens no doubt was based on good intentions, but it was not the truth; it did not help the citizens make self-criticism, and it generated a worldwide sense of distrust of the Beijing government's propaganda. Based on information disclosed later, a month after the incident, five districts in Beijing Municipality indicted a total of 2,578 "hooligans," of whom only 190 had criminal records (referring to people set free after serving their prison terms and people released from rehabilitation through labor and reeducation through labor). They accounted for 7.37 percent of the total number indicted. Although these numbers and percentages were higher than the natural percentages of this category of people in the city in the same age group, but "hooligans" nevertheless made up an "extreme minority." When propaganda exaggerated the role of this kind of social misfits in the Beijing incident, they were intentionally or unintentionally clouding the truth, which did not help the government and the people draw correct conclusions.

The reason this information finally came out was that this kind of government propaganda angered another government department. That department was in charge of prisons and prisoner rehabilitation. The government's distorted propaganda directly refuted the department's claim of success in rehabilitating prisoners. The official in charge of the department, Wei Xiangru [7614 4161 1176] protested, saying: "Ex-criminals who took part in the incident made up 1.08 percent of all similar types of people returned to society in the past five years, which proved that the social task of saving ex-criminals has withstood the test of blood and fire."

Of course, the fact that Wei Xiangru's information and anger could be aired through semi-official mouthpieces was proof of China's loosening propaganda policy. When people are allowed to dispute the official version of an incident, fairness in propaganda is guaranteed.

When I was traveling in China, I went on a cruise of the Yalu River along the Chinese-Korean border with many well-dressed Chinese people. When we approached the shores of Sinuiju City in North Korea, the Chinese people called out to the Koreans who were even skinnier and more malnourished than they were: "Come over here. We have dog meat over here." That kind of national superiority and chauvinism left a deep impression.

But in some cities in southern China, Chinese girls working illegally as prostitutes loiter in hotel lobbies; they are more than happy to solicit South Korean clients, because they are generous and are even more gullible than the Japanese.

Soliciting rich neighbors and deriding poor neighbors are despicable social habits. Having a proper attitude toward

one's own nationality is the most important part of the government's propaganda education, and to improperly flaunt one's progress and mislead the people into a sense of arrogance and national superiority should be viewed as a propaganda failure.

At this point, China is far from being a rich and powerful nation, and compared to its neighboring countries, its per capita national income and regular overseas combat capability (referring to military strength) are low, but it is achieving greater economic success through reform. If its people have already developed a narrow and intense national sentiment, then this large country with its super-dense population has become a potential or future threat to its neighboring countries, and as it continues to move forward, it will encounter strong resistance and preemptive restrictions. This is a situation neither the Chinese government nor the Chinese public wants to see.

Social and national modernization should keep pace with economic progress. A prominent characteristic of national modernization is the public's and the government's political maturity. This has been the most important experience and lesson for post-Hitler Germany.

If Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were two of the most outstanding leaders in Chinese history, then Mao Zedong was far luckier than Deng Xiaoping. Mao was free to write whatever he wanted on the vast and blank pages of history; he could wantonly and shrewdly revise and design his early drafts and leave a strong feel of his own personality in history. Deng Xiaoping did not have that opportunity. When he was in power, history had already forced China onto a narrow and dangerous path. He could only lead his party and the people along this arduous, but only, path predestined by history. One misstep and the whole nation could topple.

As the nation's spiritual leader, Mao Zedong's basic style was his heroic overtone and romantic optimism. His opponent was no match for him in this chess game, and therefore he could discuss strategies at ease and took an easy win. The impression Deng Xiaoping gave to the world was one of grave responsibilities. Perhaps the whole nation is still optimistic, but that is because few truly understand the crises and dangers the nation is facing.

On several occasions, Deng wanted to hand responsibility over to leaders of a younger generation. But Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang suffered defeats one after another, which not only made the handing over of power extra difficult but also showed the gravity of the responsibility. The successor must carefully and meticulously and almost painfully lead the whole nation forward. Historical conditions are very harsh. It is almost impossible not to make a mistake, but the leader must go down in history taking responsibility for any mistakes or errors. This is definitely not a task anyone would envy.

Some China experts in the West once thought that if Mao had completely handed over state power to Deng

before the Cultural Revolution, China's situation would have been completely different today. In fact, not long before the Cultural Revolution, Mao and Deng exchanged heated words on one occasion. Before a meeting to study and draw up rural work policies, Deng used his power as CPC general secretary to try to block Mao from participating. Mao was very angry and protested vigorously. He said: "According to two books, the 'Constitution of the PRC' and the 'Party Constitution,' I have the right to speak up as a citizen and a party member."

According to experts on CPC party history, Deng did what he did with good intentions, and Mao was overly sensitive about power. But no matter what, Deng had no desire to seize power then, nor had history made similar arrangements. History was only interested in keeping itself intact, producing a complete Mao Zedong and a complete Deng Xiaoping. Without the subsequent Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong would not have been complete; without the tortures of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping would not be what he is today.

History has been magnanimous to the Chinese people only in leaving them with a complete Mao Zedong and a complete Deng Xiaoping. This perhaps is the nation's greatest good fortune.

To seize this good fortune means never to part with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.

Chapter 6: China and International Society

Summary: Since the end of the Cold War, where will the next danger originate? The four criteria of countries that pose a threat to the human race. Simply because China meets these four criteria is it an enemy to the world security? Ways to judge a country's status quo and grasp its trends. A rational analysis of China's future.

I

With the breakup of the Soviet Empire and the subsequent collapse of the communist regimes in the Eastern European countries, the Cold War global order that lasted nearly a half century is finally over. Symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crushing of the aborted "19 August" coup in the Soviet Union, another page has been turned in world history.

The Cold War was like a nightmare, in that its dreadfulness was suddenly realized only after it was over. It needs to be noted that the human race travelled that long route nearly on the verge of self-destruction with its eyes closed, which path moreover was one of militance, striding proudly ahead, and mutual wrangling with an absolute lack of awareness of the abyss yawning beneath our feet. Is it only now, when we are turning to look back at our own tracks, that we are breaking out into a cold sweat realizing how lucky we were to avoid catastrophe

through countless fortuitous coincidences and one miracle after another? While we are sighing over the indomitable magic of the vitality of the human race, we are also alarmed at the Creator's malicious humor. How often will He actually have to recreate the human race, so that we can celebrate our rebirth in astonishment? What if He had by chance played a trick on us?

Having luckily survived, we are even more alarmed that having experienced that near disaster, the human race is absolutely without a sense of brotherhood, with no confidence in each other anymore. Still badly shaken by looking back at our past, we are still forced to take a cautious look at our future prospects. Is the future development path of the human race going to be smooth, or has yet another lethal quagmire been long since arranged for us? Are we likely to be able only to get a little breathing space in this island of security, with even greater seductions, treacheries, and hazards waiting for us ahead? Is the human race already on the brink of another crash?

The lack of either confidence or self-confidence in the human race, with no solid ground for each step forward, leaves us full of apprehension, firmly believing that we have already committed a deadly error, and are walking step by step into a set trap. The question is: By the time the next devastation arrives, can we still hope for divine protection and another round of luck?

We are forced to take stock of our surroundings, laden with anxiety and afraid of even our own shadows. Among our many fellow travelers, who will be the Judas that pretends to be a holy disciple, ruthlessly stepping forward when we are approaching the abyss to push us over the edge, leaving us no way to survive? Who will be the black sheep, obsessed with ambition, wildly kicking biting out of personal gain and sham idealism, seizing and beating us, and leaving the human race to perish together in a collective suicide?

Since the world has entered the 1990s, the very concept of collective security has long since uncovered its potentially mortal enemy, which needs to be strangled before it ultimately acquires the might to take dangerous action.

The list of suspects is long. If we acknowledge that the UN Security Council is correct, that it has not knuckled under to the will of the powerful (In fact, instances of the Americans forcing their will on the UN are legion. Moreover, this state of affairs has persisted for quite some time. In other words, it nearly constitutes the very history of the UN.), then the list already contains the names of the following countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, Serbia, the Khmer Rouge... And the potential list includes almost all of the most poverty-stricken countries.

This list is far from impartial, or is at least unjust in form, as it reflects the wishes and likes of the powerful, with the UN "majority" often knuckling under to the

rich and mighty. If the "Security Council" was made up of these countries, then the first country on the list would be the United States.

The question is: Do the powerful and the majority genuinely represent the world's mainstream? If we renounced false pride, to understand the matter reasonably, could we not hold that the powerful and wealthy nations are that way precisely because of their rational economic structures and political advancement, and it is precisely such models that represent promise and the future? Do not all nations throughout the world wish to be rich and powerful?

The reality is certainly not so, with powerful nations often being the source of global crisis. Particularly when a powerful nation is in transition from prosperity to decline, its degeneration, selfishness, ignorance, insanity, gloomy mindset, and unreasonable behavior in attempting to hold back world progress are precisely the world's darkest and most reactionary forces and roots, from which warfare often arises. At this point we will mention the Soviet Empire's last monarch, Mr. Gorbachev. May the human race ever extol and bless him. Just at the moment when the most powerful and prosperous military empire in human history was about to collapse, he chose humiliation for himself, but peace for the world.

Similarly, weak or poor countries are also not necessarily rational. Poverty is often accompanied by isolationist, extremist, fabricationist, and desperate modes of thinking. Are not countries weak and poor exactly due to their political backwardness and economic irrationality?

So what criteria should we actually use to judge whether a country poses a threat to world security? And on what socio-economic and political terms should these criteria be set?

II

All countries throughout the world are in a process of constant change. The outcomes and directions of this change not only affect the fate of the nation per se, but also may sharply change the face of the whole world. This is because change in one nation might be either the cause or the result of change in other countries.

So national change on a worldwide scale is often observed to be in a tidal state. In the 1930s, the world saw the simultaneous emergence of three fascist regimes in Germany, Japan, and Italy. And in the postwar period and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nearly 40 Marxist regimes emerged almost simultaneously throughout the world, forming a powerful socialist camp. But by the late 1980s, these regimes had changed flags one after another, undergoing a wave of capitalist regimes and property rights transformation in the name of reform. A tiny change in any country can influence a global tide, showing the weakness or plasticity of a state or a regime, and showing that independent development is an absolutely groundless illusion.

This feature is also the grounds for our optimism about the prospects for the world's future and security.

But this feature of national change similarly shows the spurious nature of so-called change, in that it is unstable and profit-oriented. Particularly when such change is driven directly by state powerholders, the direction of change is not necessarily progressive. When Africa's arid countries announced that they were already socialist societies, it was hard to tell whether they were moving forward or backwards. And when the Khmer Rouge occupied all of Kampuchea, the nation actually ended up with two whole years of primitive religious barbarism.

Rulers have always been reformers, at least in word, with even restorations often occurring under the banner of reform. But the reforms promoted by these authoritative reformers have always been blind, with certain major disasters even having been touched off precisely by them. Mao Zedong was the greatest reformer of this century, with China under his leadership certainly undergoing revolutionary change. However, in 1966 when he indulged in wishful thinking to try to thoroughly remold China's cultural traditions and national character and push Chinese society into a more ideal age of reform and renewal, he subjected his deeply loved nation to a great decade-long disaster, thus sharply damaging his great image.

Reforms can lead to disasters. In addition to two of the reasons for this—that reforms are influenced by international tides and thus are blind, and that they have a subjective flavor when authority-driven—a more frightful cause is their mass nature. As the general public (particularly the lower levels, which are major social players) has strong aspirations to change its state of existence, it is the natural supporter of social change. So this social player composed of the majority of the members of society has two basic demands or tendencies toward social change: 1) It demands that social change be rational; 2) it is eager for quick success and instant results. And when these two demands are not met, there is a danger that the reform alliance of the rulers and the lower members of society will be shaken and break up. So rulers often set forth certain unrealistic reform slogans to gain public support, which false goals further stimulate public idealism and zeal, in turn transforming reform and renewal of the state and society into hateful change.

At this point, we can set forth three limiting factors for the promotion of social change in a state and society: It is not merely influenced by the international tide, but rather proceeds from economic and political demands within its own nation and society; it comes not from the bold vision and best intentions of the rulers, but rather proceeds from the major social players; it does not pander to the strong appeals and wishes of the public, but rather is a conscientious remolding of society by exemplary members of society according to their understanding of the ideal society.

Of these three factors, we are excluding the intense influence on change of external factors, as well as the dominant role in change of internal factors of the aristocratic and poverty-stricken strata, retaining only the particular social stratum of the "exemplary members of society," and we place the great mission and our hopes for national and social change and renewal on the members of this stratum. This is certainly not to say that external and other internal factors have absolutely no impact on social reform and change. In fact, as the two excluded factors often display powerful might in the course of social change, they are enough to influence any change. But as the restraints, limitations, and uses of these two factors can be resolved by tactical and technical means, we have grounds for not considering them.

So we are left with a second question: Who are the exemplary members of society?

III

Our world is so small. The population crowded onto this tiny celestial body has now reached 5.5 billion, with the most conservative estimate being that within another three decades (by the year 2025), the human population will reach or top 10 billion.

All nations, and all of the residents of our coming 10-billion-person world, will have the desire and right to subsistence. They will have to be fed and clothed, which will require abundance and development, and will even have a more extravagant sense of vanity and self-respect, demanding that they live better than others, which will mean needing to control others. These basic motives will force all races and even the whole human race to wildly abuse and recklessly develop the limited resources this planet can provide, as well as arbitrarily polluting without scruples mankind's own living space. And the most optimistic projection is that for the human race to finally break out of our global restraints and develop a new base of subsistence on another planet, it will take at least three centuries of unremitting efforts by generation after generation of scientists! And 300 years from now, how large will the earth's population be?

Such dark prospects are terrifying! And our only consolation is that we ourselves will not live to see that day!

On one hand, the population figures and human desires will grow without limit, while on the other, the natural resources that the human race depends on for subsistence will be increasingly exhausted. And the only civilized means that the human race has to surmount the crisis—advances in natural and social science—are still coming relatively slowly. So the opposite pull of these two applied forces will create enormous tension, tearing at the integrity of human society, until it finally snaps like a rubber band that is stretched to its limit.

When the integrity of human society snaps, what will that mean? Will it mean killing each other off with thermonuclear weapons in a mutual Armageddon?

But as God has created the human race, He cannot just let it destroy itself. Or perhaps, as the majority believe in their deepest being, no creator essentially exists, and the human race has created itself. But whether mankind created itself or was created by a creator, from the time of the creator's emergence and throughout the whole course of steady renewal and progress of the human race, they have always held high a sharp weapon to protect the existence of the human race. That weapon is the law of natural selection, in which the fittest survive through their excellence, while the unfit are selected out through competition.

This law emphasizes not merely competition in the ordinary sense, but even more so adaptability. It is only those individuals, groups, races, or nations that can adapt to the world that have the power to survive and develop. The backward and unsuited have only the power to change themselves in an attempt to adapt, but no power to demand anything else!

While the world has developed to its current state, in which national independence and the integrity of borders are still honored and recognized, the internal divisions and boundaries of the whole world, as a large system of steadily flowing information, have long since been smashed to the point of collapse. So backward nationalities and nations in an open world system have absolutely no means of self-preservation, but are being ruthlessly remolded, assimilated, exterminated, or abolished, thus becoming a regrettable but necessary sacrifice for the survival and optimization of the whole human race.

These views are the unanimous conclusions reached by thinkers in the biological school of thought in the early 20th century. Regretably, while these conclusions were biased, but close to the truth, they have become unbearable due to Hitler's absurd advocacy and bloody practice. But in these 50 postwar years, the advanced industrialized nations have never abandoned their policy of assimilating other races, while the backward and poverty-stricken countries have also awakened from their own tragic plight to the same truth, or have seen their even more tragic future, which has brought forth calls to remold themselves and save their nations. This is probably the most fundamental factor in the global torrent of reform since the beginning of the 1990s.

As a sort of retaliation, for a time after the end of World War II, two ideological trends were most widely disseminated and acknowledged throughout the world.

The first was the theory of communism founded by Marx. The communists and their leaders who held state power in various countries after the Second World War made this theory a well-meaning form of remolding the world according to their own interpretation, turning it into a shining Garden-of-Eden-type ideal. They used the theory to produce a whole set of measures to run their countries well and provide their people with peace and security that stretched deeply into all areas of their social

structures. Both these leaders and their people firmly believed that by taking this healthy path of development, they could reach the bright and glorious ideal paradise—communism. The problem was that communist theory and methodology in all countries was subject to much conflict and differing interpretation. But the basic practice was similar, to encourage wholehearted devotion to the mode of thinking, while curbing the wealthy and supporting the poverty-stricken in economic system.

This ideological trend of communism was once most widely disseminated throughout the world, not only becoming the consensus in most backward countries, but also influencing a whole generation in Western industrial society. The current U.S. president, Clinton, was attacked during his election campaign by the older generation of statesmen for being a communist sympathizer, because he had once in his youth taken an active part in certain political movements. In any event, communist theory certainly once won a crucial victory, which is an undeniable fact.

But since the 1980s, the zeal for communism throughout the world has unexpectedly cooled off suddenly. Since the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was declared illegal and stopped its activity, communism has almost become a synonym for the devil. Most communist-ruled countries almost simultaneously declared that they were abandoning the communist policy that they had practiced for decades to begin a capitalist-type transformation.

But this certainly did not mean that communism had failed as a theory. Marx's theory was more accurately a capitalist theory, as it very correctly exposed the laws of capitalist economic operations. In fact, just as communism was declining in the East, Marxist theory in the West was forming a new high tide, with almost all financial and economic theory being renewed and transformed on the basis of Marx's expositions. Curbing the wealthy and supporting the poverty-stricken has become a successful capitalist model, with the basic pillar of Clinton's economic policy being to tax the rich!

And what does this phenomenon illustrate?

The other ideological trend was the spread of the right to national survival and equality. In the postwar era, particularly since the 1960s, as the old world order ended and centuries of colonial rule were liquidated, national independence nearly swept the whole world. In recent years, all geopolitical change has involved the ethnic problem, with national independence and self-determination struggles going on in the form of domestic political struggles only because international boundaries have long since been completely delimited. But this has certainly not reduced its intensity. Not only have countries such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, broken up one after another, but the broken up countries have also faced further dangers of separatism. The ethnicity matter is also making a strong showing in Western industrialized nations.

Analyzed from the perspective of international politics or global economic operations, once this world is finally divided up into hundreds or even a thousand independent countries purely by ethnic criteria, will that actually be a disaster or a blessing? As a primitive emotion inherent to mankind, should ethnic sentiments be seen as a religious creed to be fully respected, and thus become a yardstick for international activity, or should they be subjected to a certain degree of downplaying, weakening, and criticism?

The ethnicity matter has now caused at least the following troubles. It has made it essentially impossible for the international family of nations to express relevant views in line with a just standard or uniform yardstick, turning it into a tool of political struggle, and giving second place to the harm caused to nationalities. The continuance of such a state of affairs will eventually cause more chaos in the world, to finally weaken justice or internationally acknowledged truth.

1. Once the ethnicity matter gets tangled up with historical problems, all methods of dealing with it or plans to resolve it become unjust. Historically, while South Africa was undoubtedly a land of black Africans, the white race has been developing and governing there for at least two centuries. So who has more right to that land? And if the matter of the ownership of Arab lands occupied by Israel is judged by a purely historical yardstick, it gets even messier. As history is so long, with land ownership changing repeatedly, which part of history should actually be used to arbitrate the matter? In fact, as authentic history is always a process of ethnic mixing, the establishment of a country with a single nationality is precisely out of line with this historical reality, thus touching off much controversy, making the matter extremely complicated.

2. Once national interests or room for ethnic survival clashes with geopolitical borders, the same factor also causes confusion over right and wrong.

3. Once ancient ethnic sentiments are covered by a contemporary civil rights consciousness, historical justice can even become a case of the most severe damage to the whole human race per se. In the course of development of human emotions, in addition to primitive sentiments being deeply rooted in human genes, emotional development also shows a cyclical pattern of advance, of sometimes departing from and at others regressing to, such primitive sentiments. But each cycle ought to take the human race even farther from its primitive self. So while an advocacy for a civil rights consciousness gives no cause for much criticism, such advocacy ought to be historically progressive, not regressive.

4. Finally, the repeated use of the tool of ethnic consciousness in international political confrontation not only strengthens it, but also produces many types of fissions. Particularly once these changed branches are grafted onto a number of dying trees, the joint effect of the various distant and near hybridized genetic factors

make them put forth much different flowers that are fresh in color and magnificent, but a kaleidoscope of evil. For instance, when the ideals and zeal of ethnic liberation are combined with Islamic scriptures, customs, and traditions, they very quickly burst with irresistible force the dikes built with power and violence by the governments of certain countries, rolling over them to eventually engulf whatever is of the most concern. In addition, ethnic hostility, arrogance, and tyrannization all quite easily find suitable branches on which to lodge or live as parasites.

Ethnic consciousness has created conflicts and troubles for this world that are hard to reconcile, being invariably linked to warfare. But while this is a reality that we can no longer ignore, ethnic consciousness is rooted in the histories, cultural traditions, and national psychological trends of all nations. As a key governing force in the postwar period (or in the whole history of human civilization), it has to be acknowledged and respected, and it will certainly govern all of mankind for an even longer period of history.

The postwar evolution of global political movements and forces has in fact always been composed of the mutual confrontation and ties between these three major ideological trends [Darwinism, communism, and nationalism]. They are the source of the world's complexity, diversity, and progress, while making it possible for all of the world's component parts to eventually understand each other.

We have no way to judge which of these three ideological trends is more rational and progressive, because moving through time and space, they have all played double roles as heroes and villains, progressive and regressive, protectors and troublemakers. But once they have infiltrated a specific country's or society's political and economic life, expressed in the form of legal statutes or social inclinations, the forms they are composed of gives the clear features as objects of investigation, and objectively reveals the position they occupy in the stages of the overall course of mankind's advance and the journey of progress of nationalities. This makes it possible for us not only to make a rational assessment of a country's status quo, but also to accurately predict its future trends.

This is the only valid macro-means of viewing the world through a third eye (grounded in micro-technical analysis and quantitative data reports), as its prerequisites exclude bias and do not set any theoretical criteria.

IV

In the postwar period of bitter struggle and confrontation, the East and the West almost simultaneously embraced Marx's doctrine, as well as engaging in a great social experiment. This not only shows indirectly that the Cold War confrontation was certainly not linked inevitably to ideology, but also clearly expresses the

consensus tendency and subordination instinct of mankind toward an understanding of truth.

While this was a miracle, the miracle was concealed by the differences that resulted when all countries transformed Marx's theory into local products. But the differences were not small, and could not be blotted out simply through displaying the brilliance of the ideology. In fact, an ideology can only display its vitality and authenticity when turned into a local product.

The mistake made by most countries was precisely that their political leaders and theoretical authorities tried to restore ideological purity, using so-called orthodox ideology to guide their practice, by which time the ideology had turned pale and preposterous.

The Eastern camp used the form of autocratic communist regimes to practice Marx's ideals. In these countries, Marxist doctrine was combined with each nation's historical traditions, ethnic cultural customs, international status, state of economic development, and values, and even with their political leaders' personal characters and interests, to produce countries with communist dictatorships of every hue and color, forming a huge "socialist camp."

But it was also precisely because all countries, when grafting Marx's ideology, used such widely differing maternal lines that the flowers that they produced were also so distorted beyond recognition and different in color. So these cousins seemed to be wearing mostly the same uniforms, while certainly not being able to genuinely form up into a complete system tied together by a sense of close kinship. Each independent entity made no secret that it was retaining its historical inheritance. The former Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy was almost a replay of Tsarist Russian traditions. China's closed state, isolation, arrogance, and patriarchal concepts and system, and even its model and method of palace intrigue power struggles, were all clearly stamped with the influence of the Manchu Qing Dynasty. Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, Romania, and Poland, after declaring their change of color, were still unable to become equal members of the family, possibly not having essentially changed their traditional role on the European mainland, in that they remained subject to Asian great nation pressure, being forced to acknowledge allegiance and remain docile, while always expressing resistance, rebellion, and an indelible enmity toward Russia. And Korea similarly showed two faces. On one hand, its lofty sense of national pride left it retaining a walnut-like hardness. While on the other, it adjusted its stand as necessary to gain the protection of its neighboring great nations, leaving it with an absolutely unembarrassed conscience. Historically, the pattern of relations in East Asia between this peninsular country and its neighbors can be traced back to China's glorious Tang Dynasty in the 6th century.

It is undeniable that having carried out their communist revolutions and established autocratic communist

regimes, all Eastern countries and nations certainly achieved amazing successes and advances in the four-plus-decade postwar period. Particularly in the field of economic construction, the centralized administrative management model and planned economy system was quite authoritative, able to conveniently pool limited human and financial resources for the concentrated development of certain crucial industrial fields, thus achieving miraculous successes in general terms. For instance, the former Soviet Union achieved in all war-related industrial production sectors roughly the same success as the advanced Western industrialized nations, which was awe-inspiring and respected. And China had already achieved rapid growth out of proportion to its poverty-stricken national might in aviation technology, nuclear arms manufacturing technology, and a few other industrial projects.

The problems were in the following two areas.

1. The economic growth rate problem. It was very hard for us to judge what impact a country's regime having carried out a Marxist transformation actually had on the growth rate of its national economy. This was because: A) The externally announced statistical data of all countries (particularly annual growth figures) were exaggerated to the point of losing credibility (for instance, adding up Romania's growth figures for the four decades prior to 1986 would make its current national product scale higher than that of Britain, France, and Germany together). B) The data were not comparable. If a country could turn back in time and take a different development path, one can only guess at what ultimate result would be. Even using modern computerized means of computation, it would be hard to convince anyone due to the complexity of the variables.

But if one does not estimate development rates, it is impossible to compare the pros and cons of the choices, while the only believable method of estimating is the method of rough general comparisons. Of course, this method of comparison still has a risky and irrational dimension, as both of the objects of comparison have specific factors playing a role that are hard to exclude. But if the key component of these factors is political, then we could boldly exclude it. Because the hypothesis in carrying out research concerned the rate of economic development occurring in a political vacuum, the objective was to estimate the unnatural impact of quantitative political change on the object to be estimated [economic development rates].

If we make the two large East Asian metropolises of Shanghai and Hong Kong our objects of comparison, with 1949 and 1989 as our two observation points, we can not only make a macroeconomic judgement on the developmental variation under different political settings, but also specifically calculate the real quantitative impact of quantitative political change.

2. The quality problem. To test the quality of economic construction, there are two key indexes: A) an evaluation of the overall effect; and B) an evaluation of the index of humaneness.

Any economic (or industrial technology) achievement can touch off a chain reaction in all aspects of life in a national state or society. And it is only when this impact drives economic growth, to bring marked improvement to the quality of social and political life, that it can be called a significant economic achievement.

As certain highly specialized concepts, formulas, and figures used to assess economic efficiency are unfamiliar to the ordinary reader, we will do all possible here to avoid such technical illustrations and demonstrations, basing our evaluations rather on the ordinary data of motive and results alone.

As to motive, or the point of procedure when launching industrial projects, when formulating industrial and economic development plans, the fewer man-made or subjective decision-making factors there are, the higher the standard of quality of the project. For instance, due to its political foundation, when the former Soviet Union launched certain domestic industrial or economic projects, its basic focus was certainly not the objective needs of domestic production or economic development, but rather the international political struggle, even to the point of being an all-out effort to manufacture a white-wash merely to improve the country's international standing and illustrate the correctness of its political choice. And when an economic achievement or industrial project is treated as a tool to be exploited, it is often divorced from reality, which has an impact on its quality.

Subsequently, as to the overall impact of the achievements of industrial construction, their criteria of evaluation are not in their dazzle, but rather in their real benefits. When industrial achievements are divorced from the overall national economy, this often creates enormous social waste. Another disastrous consequence is that a blind sense of success blocks progress along the path of national renewal. When the Soviet Union beat the United States in launching the world's first man-made satellite in 1958, the Soviet people lost the capacity to criticize domestic policy for quite a long time.

In contrast to economic achievements, the successes achieved by all Eastern countries that chose to take the socialist road seemed very uneven in fields such as social and cultural life. On the one hand, supported by powerful regimes, the fields of education, public health, art, philosophy, and scientific culture all developed rapidly. But on the other, the lack of economic success made these developments hard to follow up. When government finances grew ragged at the elbows, to the point where, except for continued moral support, these fields could be granted no more financial support, the developments already achieved withered or declined,

regressing to the proper position in line with their respective social, political, and economic support.

Let us take China's recent events for example. Before China began its reform policy, it had already essentially established a system of universal primary education for all of its people and a cooperative urban-rural health care network, which was an exceptional achievement for a developing country. But since it started to practice its reform policy, with its national financial might beginning to be dispersed, its cooperative health care network very quickly collapsed, with its system of health care at public expense for urban employees also breaking down. Rural children are being deprived of education on a large scale. The attempt to maintain educational spending by raising funds from peasants has caused grumbling by these peasants who are certainly not rich. And if the schools are not maintained, it will not be long before a crisis arises of declining workforce quality. In fact, the government is already in a double bind.

As these countries' political establishments also went astray, they similarly did not achieve their proper development. Political leaders, and even the ordinary electorate, were all subject to a misconception, holding that once their countries had taken the socialist path, the growth rates and achieved levels of their political establishments had sharply exceeded their material production advances, and that this transcendence would be bound to bring a stronger economic growth momentum.

This was a most absurd interpretation and abuse of Marx's doctrine. Marx repeatedly conveyed in his works his view that social transformation and national advancement politically were dependent on economic development and material success. To keep his later followers from misinterpreting him, this doctor of philosophy even braved the danger of attack by his political enemies to assert that a society's cultural, spiritual, and political development goals are subject to economic development goals, or that spiritual development has to be suited to the stage of material development.

Thinkers in various countries throughout the world have always been puzzled by this. With such clear and unequivocal guidance by their teacher that was open to no doubt, why did all countries with communist regimes without exception go astray? Despite the longstanding Sino-Soviet confrontation, with these two countries acting in ways that were diametrically opposed to each other, why was it that they acted so consistently in putting politics first, so that when using the development of a spiritual civilization as their means and pretext, they mercilessly strangled their societies' material production capability that had essentially not been fully developed?

By the late 1980s, when reflecting on reform, these countries' communist bodyguards all boldly admitted their mistakes, while enumerating certain objective rationales for having gone astray at the time, which rationales show the difficulties involved and the inevitability of the mistakes they made. Their key rationale

was the threat, aggression, and subversive conspiracy of the international "imperialist forces," or that external pressure caused internal errors.

This rationale was tenable, as the United States and all Western nations had also been through a temporary period of "darkness" in the early 1950s (during the Korean War), for which their rationale was also the stereotype of the communist threat.

But the question is: How was it that the West was able to correct its mistake so quickly, so that it did not subsequently pay an even greater price for it, while the East has put off correcting its mistake for so long?

The age-old question as to which came first, the chicken or the egg, is no longer of any significance in this case. East-West confrontation, the Cold War, or the danger of thermonuclear war that could nearly wipe out the human race, for which the West is certainly not without responsibility, while the East is also not merely the victim, are all past. If the whole human race learns a valuable lesson from these crises, then the price that we paid will be fully recouped, as it will guide us to smoothly and without loss get through other succeeding crises.

If we ourselves were Gods, then we would have the highest regard for Marx's doctrine, as it is a key part of mankind's great spiritual wealth. But meanwhile, we would also have to respect the independent choice of Marxist doctrine by certain countries, such as the former Soviet Union and China, as well as showing a respectful and reverent mood in dealing with the spirit of boldness, determination, and sacrifice that they displayed in practicing this doctrine. We need to recognize that while these moving efforts certainly did not bring the corresponding results, even dragging them into dreadful mistakes, the problem was not in the doctrine itself or even mainly in the incorrect or absurd interpretations of the doctrine by the powerholders. Rather, the whole problem could be summed up as fate, which is the logical development of all nations, the terms on which their respective histories and objective environments were formed. This is because no choice is determined wholly by logic. While mainland China and Taiwan have been isolated from each other for four decades, with these two parts of China ruled by two antagonistic political parties, the day may come in another four decades when we surprisingly discover that these two parts of China have actually been on very similar development paths, with even the major contradictions and features of each development stage panning out the same in both places. Such is the magic of history and tradition.

Similarly, the introduction of Marxist doctrine played a key role in the renewal and transformation of China's national spirit and the reorganization of its state political structure. China's ruling party has forced ideological indoctrination in Marxist doctrine on its people for these 40 long years. But this "indoctrination" has absolutely not been in vain as to the course of development of national thinking. After this country began to practice

the new policy of reform and opening, its national consciousness did not revert immediately to that of initial communist rule in 1949. As a bridge, Marx's doctrine has played a historic and immediate role in the advancement of the Chinese nation in these past four decades; it has infiltrated the bloodlines of two whole generations to become part of China's national character.

V

God has certainly not completely stripped the destitute of their chance for survival, rather providing them with an emancipation weapon: The factor of the advantages being with the newcomer.

We are now faced with a preposterous and tragic but perplexing situation. When our destitute brothers raise their arms in an attempt to change their tragic plight through collective confrontation and joint resistance, they often seem weak, helpless, and unable to accomplish anything, even achieving the opposite effect of deteriorating or stopping their own country's development progress. And once such countries open up their national doors on set terms to warmly welcome international investment (which action and policy was generally considered economic aggression and loss of sovereignty in the 1960s and 1970s), as well as being duty-bound when importing such capital to engage in tit-for-tat competition with their former partners in poverty, while this loss of their own precious blood may be bitter, it constitutes a partial sacrifice of interests in return for development of national resources, establishment of an industrial system, maturity of management talent, and renewal of national awareness, and thus the achievement of a national economic takeoff. Taking South Korea for instance, after nearly three decades of efforts, this small peninsular country has grown from an undeveloped to a rising industrialized nation, not only starting to use the same method to engage in capital expansion and unequal cooperation with even poorer countries (including large nations such as China), but also being capable of competing with powers such as Japan and the United States in certain key product fields. (Some experts predict that by the late 1990s, South Korea will have become a formidable adversary to the Japanese automobile industry, while Japan will have long since seized quite a large part of the automobile consumption market from the United States.)

And once such capital predation changes form from colonialism to capital expansionism, this form of pillage clearly acquires a dual-interest character. As an irrational disposition of resources and injustice in the acquisition of wealth are the inevitable result of thousands of years of imbalanced and unsynchronized development by all nationalities and civilizations throughout the world, they have become a widespread reality in all corners of today's world. And the only way to change this reality is to accept pain and sacrifice, while fully

exploiting the inherent backward-country factor of the advantages being with the newcomer.

The advantages of the newcomer are low labor costs formed by low consumption, export advantages due to low labor costs, and superior investment terms composed jointly of these first two advantages. And once such advantages are confirmed politically and acknowledged in national emotions and become genuine legal tender assuring victory in international commercial warfare, it is certain that the country's modernization process has begun.

We often marvel at the wisdom of the Chinese, in that they have a philosophical and thought-provoking maxim to accurately expose such changing world trends: Water seeks its own level. The imbalance in world economic development has formed economically configured depressed zones where, just as water seeks its own level governed by physical force, capital and technology (including management techniques) flow to these depressed zones attracted by profit, finally making it possible to fill them in.

Saying that capital input has a dual-interest nature refers to the objective results of such exchange. In fact, the course of capital aggression is reflected mainly in brutality, destruction, and interference, which is even likely to touch off political turbulence and the collapse of public morality. But transnational groups are growing ever more aware that their profits are grounded in the interests of their counterparts, with an awareness of alliances or partners no longer being merely a strategic principle, but also having become the grounds for negotiation and a technique for making profits, meaning that the cooperative atmosphere has begun to lighten.

But as the grounds for such cooperation are the respective demands and aspirations of each partner for profit, there is an unequal exchange and a development tactic of compromise born of a situation that offers no alternative. And the party with the capital, in order to acquire even more favorable investment terms, is bound to make demands on its cooperative partners that transcend economic demands, pursuing ideological transformation of this profitable land. So the basic factors of a poisoned climate of cooperation never go away, with cooperative partners clashing and struggling in many areas, such as economics, culture, morality, and politics.

This puts a developing country in an awkward double bind over the matter of opening up to the outside world and introducing overseas capital, technology, and management. While pursuing a policy favorable to foreign investment naturally makes the country more competitive in attracting investment to speed up its pace of development, this implies a sharp clash with the country's original political and cultural traditions, leaving almost no room for the proper maneuvering. In addition to stirring up nationalist sentiments, causing huge profit losses, and destroying to a certain extent the country's

weak industrial base, the more serious problem is that pursuing a policy favorable to foreign investment causes great damage in the course of economic reconstruction to the political structure and interest groups that are suited to a country with a backward economic structure. It needs to be noted that once the process of economic reconstruction and transformation is over, the management awareness and political concepts accompanying the inflow of capital and technology are accepted by the country, thus forming a rebellious political force intertwined with the new economy. And the next objectives of the rebellious are transforming or directly seizing legislative and judicial power.

The processes of modernization and national renewal and transformation are both painful as, once they begin, they are bound to produce social unrest and political pain. While the cultural and political traditions of each country determine the form of the conflicts, making them either sudden and bloody or gradual and peaceful, the enormous profits involved make the conflicts just as intense.

It is interesting that under the impact of the international tide of reform, while it is the powerholders who first personally open the doors of each country, their introduction of hope also opens the door to polite bandits who then declare war on them. China's revolutionary leaders were want to ask rashly: Having opened our doors and windows, what is there to fear if a few flies get in? But it seems that the matter was absolutely not so simple, as even more problems were subsequently to arise in China.

So how about tightening national control to restrict the transmission and spread of a modern management awareness and stop its contamination of political authority, or keeping political power as the ultimate arbiter of economic transformation and the fate of foreign capital. Would any of this be feasible?

The answer is no for two reasons: 1) If political authority clashed with economic renewal, that would increase investment risks and undermine the capital proliferation climate, thus making the country less competitive in attracting foreign investment. 2) But if political authority coincided with economic renewal, even becoming a protective force, then such pleasant cooperative relations would still be merely a stage. Both South Korea's General Chun Doo-hwan and Taiwan's General Chiang Ching-kuo completed their power turnovers either before or after their deaths. While we will not discuss here whether those two autocratic generals should be judged as heroes, on the one hand, their achievements in using political power to complete national industrial transformations are undeniable; while on the other, once power had been turned over, their peoples criticized and judged their autocratic and despotic actions, which gives much food for thought.

The father of Chinese reform, Deng Xiaoping, is undoubtedly the wisest statesman of the century, his

country's most intelligent leader. A well-known phrase of his accurately describes the inevitably tragic plight of a country once its capital competitiveness is weakened and its pace of technology importation is slowed. He said that "the backward will be beaten." And another of his colleagues said even more provocatively that the backward will lose their very global membership! The meaning of which was that they would be in danger of being wiped off of the earth. Anyone who can speak so incisively is undoubtedly clearheaded. As for China, if it loses out in the current round of competition to attract foreign capital and technology, while its two genuine long-standing enemies, Russia and India, those two giants, grow stout and strong, its plight and fate can be easily imagined. Standing as a great central nation like a piece of fat meat, surrounded by tigers and wolves (including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the rising Southeast Asian countries), it will not have even a single day of peace.

It is precisely due to this double bind, or even loss no matter which way one goes, that economic change, opening up to the outside world, and the subsequent political transformation will always be accompanied by pain and conflict. Any political mistake, an imbalance in the relations among various group interests, or even the occurrence of an insignificant incident that could provoke nationalistic sentiments, could all touch off sharp internal conflict. And once two interest groups are fully developed, the conflict could evolve into internal disorder or civil war.

That is the source of the danger.

VI

While this century has brought two world wars, the world has seen nearly 50 years of peace since the end of the Second World War. And statesmen from all countries predict unanimously that this peace will last for quite some time to come. But this peace is not a result of the nuclear threat, but rather shows merely that the old terms of war, whose major substance was contention over colonies, have gradually disappeared, while the new ones, whose essential substance is protecting the environment (environments in areas such as subsistence, development, and investment), have not yet fully matured.

In this half century, local wars have occurred one after another, without a single day of tranquility. And except for purely domestic factional or racial warfare, they have all been wars in which second countries have participated, remnants of the old terms of war, or ones with an obvious flavor of the new terms of war. Taking the United States for instance, the Vietnam War was aimed at curbing Soviet expansionism in South Asia and to prevent the domino effect of "revolution" being exported to Southeast Asian countries. That war had no economic flavor at all. But the military intervention in Panama and the Gulf War led by President Bush were

both of primarily economic significance. As for the Gulf War in particular, if General Saddam had been allowed to annex Kuwait and then threaten Saudi Arabia and other Mideast countries, thus controlling the major share of the world's exportable oil, that would have been a catastrophe for the global economic order and investment climate, which is why most nations favored firm intervention to bring it to a halt. This war showed that the new combat concept and point of procedure was to preserve a normal climate for economic activity. Of course, the ones that first felt the impact of and sustained the greatest economic loss from the climate of deterioration were the economic great powers of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. If the old-style warfare was charged with being "dirty war," then the new-type involves a certain degree of justice or fairness. We say "a certain degree of" because when making the judgement, no one essentially was willing or took the time to consider Iraq's explanation, or whether the separation of Kuwait from Iraq was just. What was of concern was merely the impact of the incident on the global economic climate.

As to this point, the immediacy, limitations, and bias of justice (or generally acknowledged truth) are of key importance. While justice has nothing to do with might, so is of the nature of generally acknowledged truth, it clashes in many cases with the concept of a standard of justice. When people act according to their own definitions of justice, they often violate generally acknowledged international truth or principles of justice. And when such violations do severe damage to the vested economic order and economic growth climate, then what follows can be only sanctions and warfare.

In recent years, the UN has successfully played the role of arbitrator in international affairs. And while such arbitration has often been tarred with an intense flavor of the will of the powerful nations, it at least has won the formal support of the majority of the members of the great family of nations. As to this, the Chinese have often used the form of abstaining from voting to convey their reservations and admirable restraint in the face of being forced to submit. Such flexibility of diplomatic stance shows China's objective understanding of its own might, as well as reflecting the substantial distance between the international interpretation of justice and that of other UN members, especially the United States. While China is a great nation, with all of its actions having an international impact, it is also an underdeveloped communist-ruled country with strong traditions, meaning that it will inevitably clash in many areas with international society in the area of ideology. And such ideological clashes also have a crucial international impact, which is why many international statesmen and strategic theorists see China as a potential or immediate source of danger.

But the only feasible way to eliminate this source of danger is to support the successful achievement of Chinese economic reform (which will include political

reform in its later stages), so that it can smoothly achieve its change of track and make a soft landing, thus getting onto a smooth and natural path of development. This will be a blessing not only for China, but also for the whole world.

But China's social stability is conditional, in that it is only when the majority of the Chinese public acquire obvious advantages that the society remains in a docile and stable state. But when the extremist sentiments of the lower levels of society are connived with and exploited by the political leadership in the superstructure, and when this joining of forces breaks or reverses the natural course of development of the society, that is what produces a genuine crisis. As to the 1989 Beijing incident, while it appeared in the form of young intellectuals trying to force the Communist Party to hand over executive power, its true cause was the indisposition and fear among residents about the state of social progress. Those young intellectuals were flying high, not representing anyone, merely reflecting public sentiment, and hoping to achieve through the chaos certain of their own unclear goals, such as freedom of speech and the press. In that incident, the forces that adhered to social progress were precisely the ruling Communist Party (or, more accurately, part of it), while regrettably, most Western statesmen did not see the truth clearly through the fog.

In China today, the middle class, or the "exemplars" who genuinely represent commercial wealth, has not yet matured, while the upper and lower social forces have not formed a firm buffer separating the two lands. So once social progress suffers a crucial setback or a certain incident touches off sentiments of fear and hatred at the lower level, the real trouble will start.

China's situation is much more ominous than Russia's, as Russia is far superior in all areas of development, such as economics, culture, national literacy, and political rules, as well as not being burdened with such a huge population, so that its frequency of crisis is much lower. And while China has achieved a certain amount of economic development in the last decade of economic reform, imbalances are universal. Conflicts between foreign and local capital, developed and poverty-stricken regions, central control and local power sharing, social principles and economic incentives, and those who profit and the ordinary populace are intricate and overlapping, all of which occurs in a high-density population group of huge numbers, low literacy, less than full employment, and straitened economic circumstances. It could be said that all central government actions are partially wrong, with crises likely to occur at any time, always accompanied by risk.

China's course of social reform has already begun, and cannot be reversed. But once this process snaps, the whole world will be swept up into a disaster. So the world needs to help China, which in turn needs to help the world. This book's analysis of China in all areas, such as

the order, features, and strong points of its cultural traditions, political structure, public cultural mindset, and socioeconomic operations, is aimed not only at helping us to understand today's China but also at clearly discerning the rough contours of the China to come.

Which brings us back to that same old question: Where will the world's next crisis originate? What are the conditions in which countries and regions pose a threat to the world environment?

In November 1984, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, set forth at the U.S. Press Club his famous six principles for the use of U.S. military force abroad.

1. Unless a particular war or situation is considered to be of extreme importance to our country's interests, the United States should not put troops into battle overseas.

2. We should go into battle only when there are clear hopes of winning.

3. Implemented operations should have clearly enunciated political and military objectives.

4. It is necessary to constantly engage in reassessment and to carry out adjustment as they are needed.

5. Such operations must be supported by the U.S. public and their elected congressional representatives.

6. Use of military force should be the last option.

The formal appearance of these "six principles" on restrictive terms shows the trend of cutbacks in U.S. military force application, caution, efficiency, and restraint. And since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, while local conflicts have occurred repeatedly,

the Americans have certainly not played the hypothetical role of military police for world security.

But the Americans have certainly not turned suddenly into benevolent Buddhas. While their use of military force overseas is "the last option," it still remains a natural means of extension of politics and diplomacy.

The first of the six principles, or "of extreme importance to U.S. interests," is the button that starts the operational order, and once it is pushed, the other principles can all be disposed of either procedurally or technically.

In June 1950, when war broke out between two hostile regimes on the Korean Peninsula, President Truman quickly decided to launch a military intervention by sea and air. When French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann received the official notice of this from the United States, he broke out in tears, saying "thank God we did not make the same mistake this time." Mr Schumann was remembering the pre-World War II period when neither Britain or France took prompt action to stop Hitler.

While the Korean War is history, the public perception of its disaster or potential disaster has certainly not changed. And this perception has the following significance today:

When extremist ideology, financial bankruptcy brought on by illogical economic policy, undemocratic political structures and decision-making forms, and a less-than-ideal human rights situation, as well as domestic and international upheaval or war touched off by the above factors, are linked with large scale means of war, such as thermonuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, international intervention will be unavoidable.

So we just have to understand China!

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